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Why does privatization, a practice that is generally employed to increase 
efficiency and effectiveness, actually appear to decrease effectiveness when applied to 
the military sphere?  How does security privatization affect democracies’ propensities 
to be victorious in war?  This dissertation examines these two questions 
simultaneously, arguing that private security companies (PSCs) increase military 
effectiveness in certain situations and decrease military effectiveness in others.  Of 
primary importance to these two issues, I argue, are the following: (1) the structural 
integration of private security contractors into the military forces with which they are 
deployed; (2) the cohesiveness of the collective identities of private and national 
military forces deployed together; and (3) the extent to which private security 
companies and their personnel operate in an ethical manner, complying with 
international humanitarian law.  The dissertation explores three different types of 
cases, concluding that private forces: (a) tend to decrease military effectiveness and 
prospects for the democratic advantage in modern cases of PSC-military co-
deployment due to a combination of these structural, identity, and ethical issues; (b) 
often increase military effectiveness in situations in which PSCs are deployed in place 
of national military forces, yet decrease the chances that the methods of operational 
behavior are performed with due respect for established legal norms, and decrease the 
prospects for the democratic advantage due to their impact on states’ conflict 
 selectivity; and (c) both increase and decrease military effectiveness in historical 
situations of hired forces’ deployed with national militaries, and consistently put 
ethical force employment at risk, due to a combination of structural and identity-based 
factors.  In developing robust theoretical and policy-relevant conclusions, the case 
studies blend original and existing interview data with content analysis of academic, 
government, industry, media, and historical documents.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 As of December 31, 2007, at least 1,123 private contractors working for the 
U.S. Government or U.S. companies in Iraq had been killed, according to the U.S. 
Labor Department.  Private contractors constituted the largest occupying force in Iraq 
during this time period, outnumbering even U.S. forces, with roughly 155,000 
contractors employed there as of February 2008. 1  These contractors came from 
around the globe, ranging from citizens of English-speaking countries such as the 
United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, to contractors from 
countries such as Chile or Fiji that were not directly involved in the conflict (third-
country nationals, or TCNs), to local Iraqis (local nationals, or LNs).  Of these, 
approximately 20,000 were security contractors.2  
 Such a story would have been unimaginable thirty years earlier, when 
superpower competition fueled national militaries.  Not until the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the corresponding “Peace Dividend” were national militaries – particularly 
the U.S. military – downsized to the extent that outsourcing of non-core military tasks 
would be deemed acceptable and necessary.  It was during the Reagan and Thatcher 
eras that the economic logic and culture of outsourcing government functions gained 
prominence.  Neoliberal economic thinking and government reports throughout the 
1980s and 1990s on the cost-saving benefits of privatization and outsourcing led to the 
development and expansion of private companies that could provide all non-core 
                                                
1 David Ivanovich, “Contractor Deaths Up 17 Percent Across Iraq in 2007,” Houston Chronicle 
February 9, 2008.  Accessed April 14, 2008 at 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/5528613.html.  See also U.S. Congresswoman Jan 
Schakowsky, “Schakowsky Uncovers 1,001 Contractor Deaths in Iraq,” Press Release (August 6, 
2007).  Accessed September 4, 2007 at 
http://www/house.gov/list/press/il09_schakowsky/pr_contractordeaths_080607.s.  
2 Steve Fainaru, “Iraq Contractors Face Growing Parallel War,” The Washington Post (June 16, 2007), 
A01.  Accessed January 11, 2008 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061502602.html.  
 2 
military services for the troops, leaving the skilled war-fighters free to perform the 
actual combat tasks.  These companies provided services such as weapons-system 
maintenance and upkeep, supply transport, cooking, cleaning, and base construction, 
among many others.   
The industry expanded when former U.S. and U.K. military officers, 
particularly from the Special Forces, built upon the legacy of 1960s British and 1980s 
South African officers in developing the notion of the “private security company” 
(PSC) – a company that would provide armed bodyguards and convoy security 
services for various actors in high-risk areas of operation.3  In order to distinguish 
themselves from less reputable private military companies that operated mainly in 
African states in the 1980s and early 1990s, these new private security companies are 
adamant that they provide only defensive services, and will not fight offensively or for 
non-democratic causes.  The United States and its allies utilized private military firms 
in both the 1990-91 Iraq War and the Balkans conflicts in the mid-1990s, but the 
majority of the companies involved in these conflicts were employed to perform 
logistical functions, not security services.  Notably, the United States employed many 
fewer contractors in these conflicts than it does in the current wars in Iraq and 
                                                
3 Former British Special Air Services (SAS) Colonel David Stirling formed the first of the modern 
private military companies, WatchGuard International, in Britain in 1967.  The firm employed former 
SAS personnel to train the militaries of the sultanates of the Persian Gulf, to provide support for their 
operations against rebel movements and internal dissidents, and eventually to provide Military Advisory 
Training Teams to clients in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and East Asia.  WatchGuard 
became the model for all future private military companies, and several other British private military 
companies grew out of this model in the next few decades, including Kulinda Security Ltd., KAS 
Enterprises, KMS (“Keenie Meenie Services”), Saladin Security, and Defence Systems Ltd. (DSL).  
Then, in 1989, a member of the South African Defence Force – Luther Eeben Barlow – formed 
Executive Outcomes (EO).  Executive Outcomes operated in conflicts throughout the African continent 
during the 1990s, most notably in Angola, Sierra Leone, the Congo, and Burundi.  Executive Outcomes 
was disbanded in 1999, but many former EO officers went on to form their own private military firms, 
including Alpha 5, Stabilco, Omega Support Ltd., Panasec Corporate Dynamics, and Southern Cross 
Security.  See Kevin O’Brien, “PMCs, Myths, and Mercenaries: The Debate on Private Military 
Companies,” Royal United Services Institute Journal (February 2002).  Accessed June 10, 2008 at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/military/02debate.htm; “Executive Outcomes,” 
SourceWatch.  Accessed June 10, 2008 at 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Executive_Outcomes.  
 3 
Afghanistan.  The rapid expansion of the private security industry over the past several 
years is unprecedented in modern times, as is the current practice in Iraq and 
Afghanistan of deploying private security personnel in large numbers on the ground 
alongside coalition forces.  This is particularly true because today’s private security 
personnel are not formally integrated into the military structure, as is the case with, for 
instance, French Foreign Legion troops and the French military.  Thus, security 
contractors’ position in the military chain of command is constantly in question, 
which, among other things, leads to a host of potential PSC-military coordination 
problems. 
The privatizing reforms of the 1980s and 1990s that preceded this rapid 
expansion of the private security industry were designed to make government 
operations more efficient.  Yet, some media and governmental reports portray such 
privatization, when applied to the military sphere, as having actually decreased 
military effectiveness.  This project is therefore designed to address the puzzle of why 
reforms that were intended to increase performance may be serving instead to decrease 
it.  The project expands its theoretical inquiry beyond the issue of military 
effectiveness, however, to examine the ramifications of security privatization for the 
likelihood that democracies will be victorious in their conflicts.4  I examine the impact 
of private security forces on military effectiveness in three different types of 
situations: instances of PSC-military co-deployment, such as the current Iraq War; 
instances of PSC deployment in place of military deployment; and cases in which 
mercenary forces other than PSCs are structurally integrated into and deployed 
alongside the military.  In using these cases to probe this puzzle, the study has two 
interrelated goals: (1) To compare different situations of privatized force employment 
                                                
4 As Chapter Two elaborates, the focus on democratic advantage theory is appropriate here because 
democracies dominate in the hiring and supplying of PSCs today.    
 4 
in order to illustrate PSCs’ potential effects on military effectiveness and on the theory 
of the democratic advantage; and (2) To understand the different effects of structure 
and identity on the effectiveness of military forces composed of national armies 
combined with PSCs, with an eye to providing policy prescriptions for current U.S. 
policy. 
The overarching argument put forth in the dissertation is that private security 
companies (PSCs) increase military effectiveness in certain situations and decrease 
military effectiveness in other scenarios.  Of primary importance to PSCs’ impact on 
military effectiveness, I argue, are the following: (1) the structural integration of 
private security contractors into the military forces with which they are deployed; (2) 
the cohesiveness of the collective identities of private and national military forces 
deployed together; and (3) the extent to which private security companies and their 
personnel operate in an ethical manner, complying with international humanitarian 
law.  In exploring the three different types of cases mentioned above, the dissertation 
concludes that private forces: (a) tend to decrease military effectiveness and prospects 
for the democratic advantage in modern cases of PSC-military co-deployment due to a 
combination of these structural, identity, and ethical issues; (b) often increase military 
effectiveness in situations in which PSCs are deployed in place of national military 
forces, yet decrease the chances that the methods of operational behavior are 
performed with due respect for established legal norms, and decrease the prospects for 
the democratic advantage due to their impact on states’ conflict selectivity; and (c) 
both increase and decrease military effectiveness in historical situations of mercenary 
forces deployed with national militaries, and consistently put ethical force 
employment at risk, due to a combination of structural and identity-based factors.   
While it is hoped that both professional/policy and academic audiences will 
find these conclusions and this research to be compelling, these different audiences 
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will likely find different aspects of this work to be useful.  Policymakers and military 
professionals who may take for granted that PSCs are here to stay will likely be most 
interested in the study’s recommendations for how to use PSCs most effectively.  
Those who are more skeptical of the value of PSCs, however, will likely be most 
interested in two notable implications of the findings elaborated in the following 
chapters.  First, this latter audience will find in the evidence outlined throughout the 
study a strong critique of the democratic peace hypothesis, as the forthcoming chapters 
indicate that PSCs can be and are indeed used by democratic policymakers to avoid 
accountability to the citizenry for decisions to go to war.  Such an implication bodes 
poorly for PSCs’ impact on global efforts to create and sustain a peaceful international 
system.  Second, an audience skeptical of the value of PSCs will note that Chapter 
Six’s prescription for greater regulatory oversight is a potentially costly 
recommendation that could ultimately render PSCs relatively uneconomical. 
 
Context of Outsourcing 
The turn to private military and security forces would be impossible if much of 
the world had not already embraced a larger ideological shift toward privatization and 
the outsourcing of a range of government functions, including the exercise of coercive 
power and violence.  Governments and leaders across the globe have relied on 
mercenaries and other private forces to supplement or replace their own militaries 
throughout history.  Yet, the outsourcing of violence in modern times expands beyond 
traditional mercenarism, and occurs according to both a logic of capacity (i.e., the 
need to fill the demand for forces) and a normative logic.   
In many cases, governments have insufficient numbers of soldiers and/or are 
reluctant to institute a policy of conscription, causing leaders to look elsewhere for the 
forces necessary to defend the state and carry out the military elements of state policy.  
 6 
As Gil Merom notes with regard to the limitations imposed on democratic leaders by 
having to institute a policy of conscription, “. . . those most likely and best able to 
check the president’s war powers would not do so unless they had a personal stake . . . 
there is ‘no representation without taxation’.” 5  Hence, democratic leaders will avoid 
instituting a draft if at all possible, and the potential to outsource violence and military 
functions offers a way for such leaders to handle problems of military capacity without 
imposing policies of conscription.  In other words, outsourcing occurs in such 
instances in order to bolster the capacity of existing forces.  This happens, for instance, 
with United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping missions, which are outsourced to small, 
decrepit state militaries such as the Fijian Army.  As the Fiji Times notes: 
 
Since the 1970s, this impoverished and remote remnant of 
the British empire has positioned itself as a discount-soldier 
surplus store.  Its best customer has been the UN 
peacekeeping operations.  Today, on the post-September 11 
battlefield, Fiji is marketing for hire its 3,500 active 
soldiers, 15,000 reservists and more than 20,000 
unemployed former troops.6  
Such outsourcing practices have a long historical trajectory.  Egypt began 
outsourcing its war-making activities to mercenaries in 1479 B.C., substituting 
mercenaries for citizen armies for the next 700 years.  The Egyptians actively 
recruited mercenaries from North Africa (the Nubians) and from tribes in the Aegean 
Islands and along the Anatolian Coast.  Both supply and demand dictated this increase 
in the use of hired soldiers, as Egyptian citizens preferred to avoid the battlefield and 
enjoy their riches, and large numbers of poor and/or displaced tribes were 
simultaneously available to fight for money.7  The Israelites, meanwhile, hired soldiers 
                                                
5 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 247. 
6 “Making a Living With a Gun,” Fiji Times (February 26, 2008).  Accessed June 3, 2008 at 
http://www.fijitimes.com/print.aspx?id=82373.  
7 Michael Lee Lanning, Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, From Ancient Greece to Today’s Private 
Military Companies (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), 3-4. 
 7 
from foreign lands so that local citizens would be free to maintain the economic output 
necessary to support both the kingdom and the army.  The Hebrews began this practice 
around 1250 B.C.   Although David steadily decreased Israel’s reliance on foreign 
soldiers after he assumed power around 925 B.C., Israel never completely stopped 
hiring mercenaries.8   
The Roman Empire also relied upon mercenaries to bolster the capacity of its 
existing forces.  When the effects of the Second Punic War on the Italian countryside 
forced small farmers to sell their land to wealthy landowners and migrate to the cities 
for menial jobs, poor citizens began to feel distanced from the empire, and thus 
reluctant to risk their lives in the military.  Meanwhile, their wealthy counterparts were 
similarly reluctant to join the military, preferring instead to stay at home and enjoy 
their wealth.9  Rome’s expansion therefore outgrew its capacity to man its military 
with professional soldiers in the fourth century, and the empire was forced to hire 
mercenaries to keep up with this demand for soldiers.10 
More recently, both mercenaries and privateers played a critical role in 
supplementing existing forces in the American Revolution.  As explored in Chapter 
Three, the British government signed treaties with six German princes in 1776 for the 
provision of a total of almost 30,000 German soldiers to help fight the colonial 
uprising in America.  Landgrave Frederick II of Hesse-Cassel provided the vast 
majority of these soldiers, and thus the entire deployed German force was commonly 
referred to as a Hessian force.11  The Hessian mercenaries served as British auxiliary 
forces, fully integrated into the British military system.   
                                                
8 Lanning, 2005: 9-10. 
9 Lanning, 2005: 31-32. 
10 Lanning, 2005: 32. 
11 Charles W. Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
 8 
On the American side of the conflict, American colonists commissioned 
approximately 700 ships to fight against the British.  These privateers – ships licensed 
by the Americans to harass British vessels and confiscate their cargoes – bolstered the 
American sea presence considerably, fighting alongside the American Navy’s 100 
ships.  Both Thomas Paine and General George Washington owned stock in 
privateers.12  These private ships also played a large role on both the American and 
British sides in the War of 1812.  Congress even granted legal sanction to privateers 
during this period.  With a few extra cannon and men, therefore, any merchant vessel 
was easily converted into a privateer.13  
Outsourcing under the logic of capacity has similarly occurred in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, primarily due to the 
expanding definition of what constitutes “warfare” in U.S. military and policy circles.  
The growing tendency to consider Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 
(SSTR) missions as an integral component of warfare stretches the U.S. military and 
coalition forces thin, causing U.S. policymakers to rely on private security companies 
as an ad hoc supplement to regular military forces.  The practice of outsourcing 
violence has become so commonplace in U.S. policy that the Department of Defense 
(DoD) now publicly recognizes the private security industry’s primacy in developing 
current notions of warfare.  Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
missions are now defined as a core U.S. military activity, one in which the DoD 
explicitly acknowledges that the private sector must play a defining role.  Department 
of Defense Directive 3000.05 now formally includes the private sector in the emerging 
Pentagon policies pertaining to SSTR missions:  
 
                                                
12 Alexander Tabarrok, “The Rise, Fall, and Rise Again of Privateers,” The Independent Review XI, 4 
(Spring 2007): 567. 
13 Tabarrok, 2007: 566. 
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It is DoD policy that stability operations are a core U.S. 
military mission that the Department of Defense shall be 
prepared to conduct and support.  They shall be given 
priority comparable to combat operations and be 
explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD 
activities including doctrine, organizations, training, 
education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, 
facilities, and planning.14  
This document further indictates that:  
 
Many stability operations tasks are best performed by 
indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals . . . 
Military-civilian teams are a critical U.S. Government 
stability operations tool.  The Department of Defense 
shall continue to lead and support the development of 
military-civilian teams . . . Participation in such teams 
shall be open to . . . members of the Private Sector 
[including private sector individuals and for-profit 
companies] with relevant skills and expertise.15  
The explicit connection drawn between the private sector and this new core mission 
for the U.S. military is a significant one, illustrating the key role that private 
contractors now play in conflicts, particularly the stability and reconstruction (S&R) 
operations that are beginning to be deemed a core military activity – at least in the 
military doctrine of strong states, and particularly in the relatively pacifist democracies 
of Europe – in the post-Cold War era.  In this scenario, policymakers are predisposed 
to privatize operations that have traditionally been considered as falling under the 
rubric of Operations Other Than War (OOTW), in order to maintain adequate military 
capacity for actual war-fighting missions. 
The outsourcing of violence occurs for normative reasons as well, however.  
As Gil Merom defines it, “normative difference” is “the distance between the position 
                                                
14 U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, 
and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations” (November 28, 2005), Section 4.1, p. 2.  Accessed October 31, 
2007 at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf. Notably, DoD Direction 3000.05 
represents a profound shift from the U.S. Army’s Capstone Doctrine of 1905, which defined the Army’s 
two core missions as offense and defense. 
15 U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Sections 4.3 – 4.5.2, pp. 2-3. 
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of the state and that of the liberal forces (that give meaning to the term ‘society’) 
concerning the legitimacy of the demand for sacrifice and for brutal conduct [in 
conquering insurgencies].”16  In terms relevant to this study’s focus, the leaders of 
democratic societies have, on occasion, outsourced violence to distance the state from 
actions in warfare that may be considered illegitimate by their electorate.  This 
occurred, for instance, in the 1990s in Croatia, Sierra Leone, and Colombia, when the 
United States and Britain hired PSCs to play military assistance roles outside of the 
public view.  Chapter Four explores each of these cases in greater depth.  
Violence is similarly outsourced according to a normative logic in the 
diamond-rich states of Africa, where diamond companies such as Endiama in Angola 
hire private military companies to push artisanal diamond-miners (“garimpeiros”) off 
of their land.  In many cases, the private military forces resort to human rights abuses 
in order to carry out the company’s wishes.  Yet, Endiama and other such firms are 
still able to claim that their diamonds are “conflict-free” and mined in accordance with 
the U.N.-mandated Kimberley Process.17 
 
Outsourcing a Broad Range of Government Functions 
 While the outsourcing of violence has been pervasive throughout history, a 
broad range of government functions beyond those related to violence has been 
subject to privatization in recent years.  In the case of the United Kingdom, the United 
                                                
16 Merom, 2003: 18.  Merom builds upon the aforementioned notion regarding the limitations associated 
with policies of conscription in the context of the normative conduct of war as well: “The potential size 
and power of the anti-war coalition depends in large measure on the sort and number of people who are 
personally affected by the war – that is, the fate of the war depends on the nature and scope of military 
mobilization . . . In the long run, a greater reliance on conscription and reservists reduces the capacity of 
the state to act in the battlefield with unrestrained force, to pursue far-reaching objectives, and to win 
the war.”  Merom, 2003: 21.  Logically, reliance on private forces would allow the state to act with 
unrestrained force, since it would not have a direct impact on the electorate. 
17 Keith Harmon Snow, “Chloe’s Blood Diamond: Angola Rock Sold for $16 Million to GUESS Jeans 
Founder,” Global Research (November 24, 2007).  Accessed June 3, 2008 at 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleid=7423.  
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States, and much of the Western world, the ideological shift leading to the 
privatization of government functions took place beginning in the 1980s with the 
Thatcher and Reagan “Revolutions.”  As British Prime Minister throughout the 1980s, 
Margaret Thatcher was devoted to the principles of free enterprise, competition, and 
the market economy.  She was a firm believer that state-owned enterprises were 
inefficient and politicized, and as such, she began selling off Britain’s nationalized 
industries in the early 1980s.  Industries privatized under Thatcher included the 
National Freight Corporation, part of British Aerospace, Cable and Wireless, British 
Oil, British Rail Hotels, Associated British Ports, the British water supply, and the 
country’s bus systems.18  What began as a slow privatization push gained popularity 
by Thatcher’s later terms in office, as each privatization helped to fund tax cuts, won 
political support from business, and further weakened the opposition Labour Party.  
British Airways was privatized in 1987, as were Rolls Royce, the British Airports 
Authority, and the government’s remaining shares of British Petroleum.  British Steel 
was privatized in 1988.19  After Thatcher left office, privatizations that had been 
planned under her leadership – including the continued privatization of the electricity 
industry – were carried out by her successor, John Major.20   
Meanwhile, in the early 1980s in the United States, Ronald Reagan began 
espousing what has since become a key tenet of conservative political philosophy: that 
the nation’s basic needs can best be met by private enterprise.21  Such a philosophy 
was in line with Reagan’s overall economic plan, “Reaganomics” or “trickle-down 
                                                
18 Earl A. Reitan, The Thatcher Revolution: Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Tony Blair, and the 
Transformation of Modern Britain, 1979-2001 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 37-38. 
19 Reitan, 2003: 78-79. 
20 Reitan, 2003: 135. 
21 James Carroll, “Outsourcing Intelligence,” The Boston Globe (August 27, 2007).  Accessed February 
4, 2008 at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/08/27/outsourcing_intelligenc
e/ 
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economics,” based on a theory proposed by economist David Stockman.  The theory 
called for a hands-off approach to fiscal management and major tax cuts for the 
wealthy captains of industry in order to encourage them to invest and thereby 
stimulate the economy.  The program led to excessive budget deficits, and was even 
denounced by Stockman himself at one point, nearly costing him his job.22 
In keeping with the privatization pushes of the Thatcher and Reagan 
administrations, widespread outsourcing and privatization spread to Latin America in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.  In 1990, economist John Williamson – an expert on 
international monetary and development issues – coined the phrase “Washington 
Consensus” to refer to Washington-based economic institutions’ political advice to 
Latin American countries around 1989.  These policies included fiscal discipline, tax 
reform, interest rate liberalization, trade liberalization, liberalization of inflows of 
foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and secure property rights.  
Williamson’s phrase soon became a synonym for “neoliberal policies” more generally, 
and the idea of the “Washington Consensus” continues to be pervasive throughout 
Western economies.23  
At the same time, privatization began to take hold in Eastern Europe as well, as 
economies there started transitioning from communism to capitalism.  Eastern 
European privatization by necessity occurred on a much larger scale than did 
privatization in the West, as each Eastern European country had thousands of state 
enterprises to privatize (compared with tens of enterprises to privatize in Western 
countries).  Furthermore, Eastern European privatization posed a unique challenge in 
                                                
22 “The Reagan Years: Reaganomics,” CNN.com In-Depth Specials.  Accessed February 4, 2008 at 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/reagan.years/whitehouse/reaganomics.html. See also William 
Greider, “The Education of David Stockman,” The Atlantic Monthly (December 1981).  Accessed 
March 21, 2008 at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/budget/stockman.htm.  
23 Center for International Development at Harvard University, “Washington Consensus.”  Accessed 
April 23, 2008 at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html.  
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that it occurred in states that were only beginning to develop market economies, had 
few markets and very little private property at first, and did not have market-oriented 
legal systems.24  Because no comparable privatization has ever taken place, Eastern 
European countries had no precedent on which to base their privatization policies.  
Most of the former socialist countries began with small-scale privatization, selling off 
small shops, bars, restaurants, and workshops at auctions.  To privatize the large state 
enterprises, a number of countries – Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, and Latvia – adopted voucher privatization programs.  The principle 
underlying such programs is that all resident citizens above a certain age receive an 
equal number of vouchers that can be exchanged, within a particular time period, for 
shares in thousands of enterprises that are to be privatized.25  The key lesson derived 
from the post-communist privatizations was that the transfer of ownership must 
happen as quickly and on as large a scale as possible, because the state is even less 
able to manage enterprises during the transition than it was before.26  There are 
interesting parallels between this and the current situation of co-deploying private and 
national military forces in theaters such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where the transition 
to the large-scale use of PSCs has been rocky at best and has challenged the United 
States’ ability to manage its forces.  Chapter Five elaborates upon these cases. 
 
Military Outsourcing in the United States 
Privatization of the defense sector in the United States took on new meaning in 
the post-Cold War era, as military downsizing and smaller defense budgets required 
the Pentagon to rethink how it did business.  During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, one-
                                                
24 Anders Aslund, Post-Communist Economic Revolutions: How Big a Bang? (Washington, D.C.: The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), 69. 
25 Aslund, 1992: 83-84. 
26 Aslund, 1992: 87. 
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tenth of the people deployed were private contractors.  Then-Secretary of Defense 
Dick Cheney was determined to increase this ratio, and in 1993 he commissioned a 
study on how to quickly privatize the military bureaucracy.  Interestingly, Cheney 
commissioned this study from the private sector itself, from a division of his own 
future firm, Halliburton.27  The Pentagon carefully considered Halliburton’s 
recommendations, later commissioning another study by the Defense Science Board 
(DSB) Task Force to examine outsourcing options for the Department of Defense 
(DoD).  The Task Force published its findings in August 1996, citing earlier U.S. 
Government policies that had relied on outsourcing to bolster its claims.  For instance, 
it cited a 1955 statement by the Bureau of the Budget (the predecessor of the Office of 
Management and Budget): “the Federal Government will not start or carry on any 
commercial activity . . . for its own use if such product or service can be procured 
from private enterprise.”28  The Task Force’s recommendations were completely in 
line with this 1955 policy, reporting that “all DoD support services should be 
contracted out to private vendors except those functions which are inherently 
governmental or directly impact war-fighting capability, or for which no adequate 
private sector capability exists or can be expected to be established.”29  The report 
projected that the Pentagon could realize savings of thirty to forty percent of function 
costs through such outsourcing practices, generating a potential total annual savings of 
$7 to $12 billion by fiscal year 2002.30  
A follow-up report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 
December 1997 concluded that the Defense Science Board Task Force’s estimates in 
                                                
27 Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: 
Nation Books, 2007), xvi. 
28 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Outsourcing and 
Privatization (August 1996), 3A.  Accessed May 15, 2007 at 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/outsourcing.pdf.  
29 Defense Science Board Task Force Report, 1996: 6A. 
30 Defense Science Board Task Force Report, 1996: 6A. 
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this 1996 report were overstated.  Agreeing that the Pentagon would be able to achieve 
cost savings by outsourcing certain activities, the GAO found that there were many 
legislative barriers to outsourcing – thus, not all logistics activities could be 
outsourced, as the DSB Task Force had originally argued.  The GAO further reported 
that the DSB’s cost-savings estimates were overstated by approximately $1 billion for 
contract administration and inventory reductions, and by approximately $1 billion 
more for reliability improvements.  The GAO argued that correcting such 
overstatements would reduce the DSB’s projected savings by thirty percent.31  
This GAO report notwithstanding, Donald Rumsfeld spurred on defense 
privatization when he entered his post as President George W. Bush’s Secretary of 
Defense in 2001.  On September 10, 2001, Rumsfeld spoke to the Pentagon officials 
in charge of overseeing defense contracting, stating: 
 
The topic today is an adversary that poses a threat, a 
serious threat, to the security of the United States of 
America.  This adversary is one of the world’s last 
bastions of central planning.  It governs by dictating 
five-year plans.  From the capital, it attempts to impose 
its demands across time zones, continents, oceans, and 
beyond.  It disrupts the defense of the United States and 
places the lives of men and women in uniform at risk.  
Perhaps this adversary sounds like the former Soviet 
Union, but that enemy is gone: our foes are more subtle 
and implacable today . . . The adversary’s closer to 
home.  It’s the Pentagon bureaucracy.32  
Rumsfeld then announced a major initiative that would shift how the Pentagon was 
run, replacing the old bureaucracy with a system that would make ample use of private 
industry.  This new policy – which became known as the Rumsfeld Doctrine – would 
draw heavily on the private sector, with an emphasis on covert missions, greater use of 
                                                
31 United States General Accounting Office, “Outsourcing DOD Logistics: Savings Achievable But 
Defense Science Board’s Projections Are Overstated,” Publication No. GAO/NSIAD-98-48 
(Washington, D.C.: December 1997), p. 13. 
32 Quoted in Scahill, 2007: xiv. 
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Special Operations Forces and contractors, and highly technical weapons systems.33  
In defense of his new approach to remaking the Pentagon bureaucracy, Rumsfeld 
wrote, “We must promote a more entrepreneurial approach: one that encourages 
people to be more proactive, not reactive, and to behave less like bureaucrats and more 
like venture capitalists.”34 
 The Rumsfeld Doctrine forms the basis of the current context of outsourcing 
and privatization of defense functions in the United States, a basis codified in 
Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 and other policies pertaining to contractors’ 
role in warfare.  The private security industry represents a relatively small fraction of 
this privatization, with weapons producers and logistics-support companies (such as 
Halliburton) comprising a much larger portion of the defense privatization activities in 
this country.  Nonetheless, increasing reliance on the private security industry has 
important consequences for the U.S. military and for the militaries of other 
democracies that rely on private security companies, as well as for the international 
system of states as we know it.  This study focuses on the private security industry – at 
least to the extent that it can be clearly distinguished from other private military firms 
– leaving examination of these other elements of defense privatization for future 
research.  Several scholars working on issues related to the private security industry 
have developed classification schemes to categorize the various firms and services 
comprising the industry.  Their typologies are useful in delineating the types of firms 
and activities that this study focuses on. 
 
 
 
                                                
33 Scahill, 2007: xv. 
34 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2002). 
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PSC Classification Schemes 
 Peter W. Singer developed the first typology to classify the various firms 
providing private military and security services, the so-called “Tip of the Spear 
Typology.”  This classification scheme distinguishes firms based upon their range of 
services and the level of force each utilizes in performing these services, looking 
particularly at firms’ proximity to the front lines of battle.  It divides private military 
firms into the categories of “Military Provider Firms,” “Military Consultant Firms,” 
and “Military Support Firms.”35  Military provider firms focus on the tactical aspects 
of warfare, engaging in activities at “the forefront of the battlespace.”36  Military 
consultant firms, on the other hand, offer “strategic, operational, and/or organizational 
analysis” through their provision of advisory and training services “integral to the 
operation and restructuring of a client’s forces.”37  Finally, military support firms 
provide non-lethal supplementary military services such as transportation, logistics, 
intelligence, supply, and technical support.38  
Singer’s typology is valuable in its distinction of the types of services 
performed by firms in the private security industry.  Yet, the “Tip of the Spear” 
typology suffers from two shortcomings.  First, in modern warfare the conception of a 
front line of battle is essentially irrelevant; the prevalence of terrorism and insurgent 
warfare in modern times means that battles are waged from civilian areas not 
traditionally thought to be included in the notion of the “battlefield.”  Thus, the “tip of 
the spear” terminology is somewhat misleading in the context of modern private 
security companies.  Secondly, and more importantly, the majority of private security 
companies are increasingly diversifying and expanding their range of services to 
                                                
35 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), 93. 
36 Singer, 2003: 92. 
37 Singer, 2003: 95. 
38 Singer, 2003: 97. 
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include services spanning across Singer’s three categories.  The companies do this in 
order to remain innovative and competitive within the industry, but it means that they 
are less easily classified.   
For instance, Control Risks Group (CRG) expanded its services from crisis-
management consulting to include armed security in order to accommodate its 
involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom.39  Olive Group has expanded over time to 
include close-protection security operations, a crisis consultancy, securities design and 
integration (using state of the art technology), a satellite tracking system, intelligence 
analysis and assessment, and training for private firms, military groups, and/or 
international organizations.40  Blackwater Worldwide is constantly innovating, and its 
services span the gamut from research and development of new and improved military 
technologies – Blackwater is currently building an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), 
the Polar 400 Airship - to training domestic and international actors in advanced law 
enforcement and military techniques, special purpose canine training, intelligence, and 
aviation, ground, and maritime mobility and logistics work.  Blackwater even appears 
to be branching out into humanitarian work with the newly developed Blackwater 
Foundation, which rescued three stranded missionary workers in Kenya in January 
2008 and set up a tent city (and donated 10,000 pounds of supplies) for victims of 
wildfires in southern California for three months.  Both of these services were 
performed free of charge.41  The study at hand therefore examines private security 
firms that span the range of Singer’s three categories.  It does, however, focus mainly 
on Singer’s “Military Provider” and “Military Consultant” firms. 
                                                
39 Eric Westropp (Director, Control Risks Group) in interview with the author, January 23, 2007. 
40 Interview with high-level PSC official, January 24, 2007. 
41 Blackwater Foundation, “Kenya Rescue 2008.”  Accessed March 18, 2008 at 
http://www.blackwaterusa.com/foundation/Kenya_Rescue.html.  Blackwater Foundation, “Blackwater 
Worldwide Provides Relief Within a Fire.”  Accessed March 18, 2008 at 
http://www.blackwaterusa.com/foundation/Wildfire_Victim_Relief.html.  
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 Deborah Avant’s typology better accounts for this tendency for firms to 
innovate and expand their services.  Avant distinguishes between external (foreign) 
and internal (domestic) security support, and suggests three categories of services 
within each of these two broader geographic categories.  External security support 
encompasses operational support, military advice and training, and logistical support, 
while internal security support includes armed and unarmed site security, crime 
prevention, and intelligence.42  Avant’s typology makes its most valuable contribution 
in its use of contracts rather than firms as the unit of analysis.  This allows the analyst 
to look at a certain firm based upon its activities in a certain situation, rather than 
generalizing about the firm based upon outdated notions of the services it provides.  
The study at hand focuses on both external and internal security support contracts, 
looking at cases in which PSCs provide operational support, military advice and 
training, and site security, as well as personal security details (PSDs). 
 Meanwhile, Christopher Kinsey has developed a typology of private military 
and security companies based upon the distinction between the “object to be secured” 
and the “means of securing the object.”43  The object to be secured falls along a range 
between private and public, while the means of securing the object falls along a range 
between lethality and non-lethality.44  Thus, an actor securing a public object in a very 
lethal manner would most closely represent a national military, while an actor securing 
a private object in a fairly lethal manner would most closely represent a “military 
provider firm” in Singer’s terminology.  An actor securing a public object in a 
relatively non-lethal manner would be representative of a conventional police force.  
Finally, Singer’s “military consultant” or “military support” firms would exemplify an 
                                                
42 Deborah Avant, The Market for Force (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 16. 
43 Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Solders and International Security: The Rise of Private Military 
Companies (London: Routledge, 2006), 10. 
44 Kinsey, 2006: 10. 
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actor securing a private object in a non-lethal manner.  Kinsey’s typology is 
interesting in its inclusion of the public realm, for it allows us to not only distinguish 
between PSCs but also to distinguish PSCs from state-sanctioned methods of violence, 
as well as to see PSCs in the context of state-sanctioned violence.45  In Kinsey’s 
terminology, the study at hand focuses on both public and private objects secured in a 
lethal manner – as seen in the French Foreign Legion and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
cases, for instance – as well as private objects secured in a non-lethal manner (e.g., 
training and consultancy operations). 
 
 
“Mercenaries” vs. “Private Security Contractors”:  
A Comparison 
How do these various members of the private security industry compare with 
the mercenaries of days past?  Many industry critics equate the two types of actors.  
Most PSC personnel, however, find their association with the lawless, stateless image 
of a “mercenary” to be ridiculous.  They cite the fact that most of them are former 
military, primarily former Special Operations Forces (SOFs).  Hence, they do not 
perceive themselves as qualitatively different from professional soldiers, and certainly 
associate themselves more closely with the uniformed military than with the 
traditional image of a mercenary who will fight for any cause, given adequate 
compensation.  Furthermore, they scorn the “mercenary” label because it is bad for 
business.  Given that the modern PSC industry is predominantly based in democratic 
states, PSC personnel do not want to be perceived by the voting public as immoral, un-
patriotic mercenaries – especially when the price could be the loss of a contract worth 
                                                
45 Each of the typologies mentioned here has strengths and weaknesses, and any one may be better 
suited to use in certain analytical situations than would the others. The typology I develop in Chapter 
Five is not intended to be a competing means of classifying the private security industry, but rather to 
complement those outlined above. 
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multiple billions of U.S. defense funds, or anywhere from $500 - $1,000 per day, per 
individual contractor, for the duration of a particular job. 
Yet, how unrealistic is the characterization of modern PSC personnel as 
mercenaries?  According to the legal definition of mercenaries set out in Article 47.2 
of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, some private security company 
personnel fall closer to the realm of “mercenaries” than they might prefer, as 
elaborated in Chapter Six of this study.46  Despite the fact that some PSC personnel do 
fit the Article 47.2 definition of a mercenary in certain situations, private security 
company personnel do have several important traits that distinguish them from the 
traditional mercenary image.  Most importantly, PSC personnel are by definition 
backed by a corporate infrastructure designed to select them, train them, and deploy 
them.  This corporate infrastructure similarly bids on contracts and in most cases has a 
professional portfolio detailing its performance on previous contracts.  Furthermore, 
the modern industry is unique in its scale and transnational nature.  Indeed, most PSCs 
have the capability to hire hundreds of men representing at least five or six different 
nationalities at a moment’s notice. 
 Another significant trait distinguishing the modern private security industry 
from the traditional mercenary is that virtually all of the reputable firms openly 
                                                
46 Article 47.2 of Additional Protocol I defines a mercenary as any person who: 
(a) is specially recruited locally and abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict  
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competing for government contracts espouse a company ideology in line with the 
liberal ideals of the United States and its Western allies.  Whether they make political 
campaign contributions, distribute literature aimed at shaping U.S. or other countries’ 
foreign policies, or solemnly declare that they have no intentions to affect foreign 
policy, presumably none of them would accept a contract directly challenging the 
liberal democratic ideals of the United States – at least not at this point.  One can 
surmise that this is primarily because a large number of the industry’s contracts come 
from the U.S. Government.  It is worth considering the counterfactual scenario in 
which a non-democratic power achieves superpower status and the capacity to buy the 
industry’s services.  Where, then, would the company loyalties lie?  This is not to say 
that economic motives would necessarily overpower democratic ideological motives 
in such a scenario, but that the possibility exists. 
 Related to this second distinguishing characteristic of the modern private 
security industry is the fact that - while most do not - some companies do indeed make 
both explicit and implicit attempts to shape foreign policy.  Blackwater Worldwide is 
a prime example of this phenomenon.  Acting almost like a non-governmental 
organization or think tank, Blackwater maintains and widely distributes a weekly 
electronic newsletter titled “The Blackwater Tactical Weekly,” a collection of (usually 
conservative-minded) newspaper articles and other media reports pertaining to the Iraq 
War, the War on Terrorism, and other key U.S. national security issues.  Even more 
notable is Blackwater’s Global Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (BW 
GPSOI), which sponsored its first annual two-day symposium in Washington DC in 
December 2007.  The symposium’s theme, the “Public/Private Partnership in 
Peacekeeping,” had as its goal to: 
 
. . . look at those areas where the military and  
government can use private sector expertise to 
successfully accomplish security and reconstruction 
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operations. To most effectively and efficiently 
accomplish stability and reconstruction missions 
requires using the most appropriate skill sets. Frequently 
those skill sets reside in the private sector. To best use 
the taxpayer’s resources may require leveraging the 
private sector.”47   
Whether elaborate lobbying tactics or public relations schemes to improve 
Blackwater’s public image, these two examples illustrate Blackwater’s interest in and 
pro-active approach to influencing U.S. foreign and military policy.  Meanwhile, 
company founder Erik Prince acknowledged in October 2007 that Blackwater held 
over fifty U.S. federal contracts at that point in time.  By the end of 2006, the total 
value of all Blackwater contracts was $1 billion.48  The company has 450 permanent 
employees, and a contractor database of thousands more ready to be called into 
service.49  While Blackwater is only one company and many other private security 
companies do not engage in the types of policy-related activities outlined above, 
Blackwater’s size is such that its attempts to affect foreign and military policy are 
positioned to have an impact.  Traditional notions of mercenaries do not include such 
direct involvement in the shaping of state policy. 
 The third and final trait distinguishing modern private security personnel from 
traditional mercenaries is the voluntary regulatory system in place in the United States, 
and increasingly in the United Kingdom.  The International Peace Operations 
Association (IPOA), a trade association for the private security industry in the United 
States since 2001, has devised a “Code of Conduct” to which all of its members must 
adhere.  Thirty-eight PSCs are presently IPOA members, and must monitor their 
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internal operations and employees to assure that the Code of Conduct is followed.  The 
IPOA has an open system whereby any person is free to register a complaint with the 
IPOA about Code violations, and the IPOA has a Standards Committee consisting of 
officials from several member companies who are tasked with investigating such 
complaints.  In the event that a company is found to be in violation of the Code and 
refuses to take actions to remedy the situation, the company’s IPOA membership is 
revoked.50  The British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) is similar 
to the IPOA, and is developing its own code.51  Chapter Six discusses both the IPOA 
and BAPSC in further detail. 
 
Overview of Hypotheses & Methods 
 This study employs qualitative comparative case study methods, tracing 
historical processes and analyzing the content of both existing and original interview 
data.  The null hypothesis is that PSCs have no effect on democracies’ military 
effectiveness.  Two additional hypotheses and four sub-hypotheses are tested in the 
following chapters.  The first hypothesis predicts that PSCs should cause a net 
increase in democracies’ military effectiveness through their beneficial impact on 
military responsiveness and quality, by acting as force multipliers, and by utilizing 
their initiative and independent position to be innovative on the battlefield.  Four 
relevant sub-hypotheses fall under this first hypothesis: one predicting that PSCs’ 
compliance with international laws of war increases military effectiveness by 
supporting the war for the “hearts and minds” of the citizenry, a second predicting that 
PSC non-compliance with the laws of war decreases military effectiveness by 
                                                
50 Doug Brooks (President, International Peace Operations Association), in interview with the author, 
April 3, 2007. 
51 Dr. Sabrina Schulz (Director of Policy, British Association of Private Security Companies), in 
interview with the author, January 25, 2007. 
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undermining the war for the “hearts and minds” of the citizenry, a third predicting that 
PSC compliance with the laws of war decreases military effectiveness by limiting 
PSCs’ abilities to take on the dirty jobs necessary to defeat insurgencies, and a fourth 
predicting that PSCs’ non-compliance with the laws of war increases military 
effectiveness by enabling PSCs to take on the dirty jobs necessary to defeat 
insurgencies.  Due to the study’s explicit focus on a specific type of warfare 
(counterinsurgency) and a specific type of state and democracy (the United States), the 
inclusion of these sub-hypotheses into the study’s analysis is both relevant and 
illuminating.  A second hypothesis predicts that PSCs should cause a net decrease in 
democracies’ military effectiveness by decreasing military integration and skill.  
These hypotheses are tested against each other to determine their relative strengths, 
and are elaborated in further detail in Chapter Two. 
Given these hypotheses, the study includes one independent variable, the use 
of PSCs by democracies, and one dependent variable – military effectiveness, 
measured as detailed in Chapter Two. The cases analyzed here were selected on the 
independent variable, to reflect different situations of PSC use by democracies.  
Several of the cases selected include the United States as a major actor, but this 
reflects the fact that the United States is a major democracy, is very involved in the 
global promotion of democratic ideals, and has the strongest military in the world.  
Thus, these cases represent hard cases where we would expect PSCs to have very little 
incremental effect on military effectiveness and the democratic advantage.   
 
Plan of the Thesis 
 The remainder of this study proceeds as follows: the next chapter frames the 
problem in terms of existing International Relations theories of the state, military 
effectiveness, the democratic advantage, and the structure-identity dichotomy in the 
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social sciences, and describes the methods employed in the study in greater depth.  
Chapters Three through Five examine and compare different cases of privatized force 
deployment.  Expanding upon the project’s historical context, and in an effort to 
generate insights regarding what is necessary to insure that mercenary forces work 
well with regular military forces, Chapter Three examines two historical cases in 
which grouped mercenary forces other than modern-day PSCs were deployed 
alongside the regular military: the deployment of Hessian troops alongside British 
forces in the American Revolution from 1776-1783, and the deployments of the 
French Legion with the French military in Indochina (1883-1891) and Algeria (1954-
1962).  Chapter Four then examines what were, until 2003, the most common 
scenarios of modern-day PSC deployment: situations in which PSCs are deployed in 
place of professional military forces.  This chapter looks at the cases of Military 
Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) in Croatia, Sandline and Executive 
Outcomes in Sierra Leone, DynCorp in Colombia, and Sandline in Papua New 
Guinea.  Reflecting this project’s strong focus on the increasing reliance on PSCs 
deployed alongside the military in the field, Chapter Five examines key cases of PSC-
military co-deployment – namely, the 2003-2007 portion of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
and, to a lesser extent, the concurrent conflict in Afghanistan.  Chapter Six reflects on 
the lessons drawn from the case studies in the previous three chapters and examines 
the current state of the private security industry’s regulation, with a specific focus on 
regulations designed to address abuses in the field.  In doing so, this chapter notes how 
current regulatory measures to address such abuses represent an improvement over 
historical regulation, as well as areas in which this regulation could and should be 
improved in order to insure that PSCs affect military effectiveness in a positive 
manner.  Chapter Seven concludes the study with reflections on the implications of the 
modern private security industry for the future of the state as we know it, as well as 
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policy recommendations for how this industry can best be harnessed for an effective 
military. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DEMOCRATIC STATES, THEIR MILITARIES, & SECURITY PRIVATIZATION: 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In conceptualizing private security companies’ impact on democracies’ 
military effectiveness and propensity to achieve victory in warfare, I draw primarily 
upon several related bodies of International Relations theory – those examining the 
state as an actor in global society, those examining issues of military effectiveness, 
those arguing that democracies are more likely than other types of regimes to win the 
wars in which they engage, and the dichotomy between structural and identity-based 
explanations in the social sciences.  The following chapters explore the pressures that 
the private security industry places on the state and the consequences of such 
pressures, particularly with reference to democratic states’ abilities to successfully and 
effectively fight wars of counterinsurgency.  The project thus uses the proliferation of 
private military and security companies in modern democracies as a lens to provide a 
particular insight into the modern state’s relation to society and the economy.  Yet, the 
study’s theoretical contributions do not fall solely within the realms of state theory, 
democratic advantage theory, military effectiveness, and the structure-identity debate.  
In particular, Chapter Five draws upon the professions’ literature and civil-military 
relations theory, as well as various conceptions of structure and identity, to develop a 
comprehensive analytical framework that helps explain why PSC personnel and the 
military interact in the manner that they do, and to suggest how real and potential 
frictions between these two groups can best be reduced while maintaining the 
beneficial impacts of each on military effectiveness.  Furthermore, Chapter Six utilizes 
the lessons of the literature on comparative regulation to inform this study’s 
recommendations of the legal and regulatory options that can reasonably be pursued 
with regard to the private security industry.  I outline and synthesize these theories 
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below, demonstrating their relevance to the topic at hand, and explain the 
methodology employed throughout the study. 
 
State Transformation: 
The Privatization & Transnationalization of Force Provision 
Until the recent past, many analysts accepted the Weberian argument that the 
state enjoyed – and in fact, was defined by – a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
coercive force, a monopoly that is now increasingly challenged by the private security 
industry.52  Max Weber emphasized that, “. . . force is certainly not the normal or only 
means of the state – nobody says that – but force is a means specific to the state . . . 
the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of 
legitimate violence.”53  Inherent in Weber’s conception of the state is the notion that 
the state is sovereign, exercising exclusive control over a given territory.54   
In contrast to Weber, some theorists argue that the Westphalian sovereign state 
is an ideal form that has never quite been replicated in reality – transnational flows 
have always existed to some extent.  Chief among these arguments is that espoused by 
Stephen Krasner, who argues that: 
 
The term “the Westphalian system” is . . . misleading in  
suggesting that there has been agreement on the scope of  
authority that could be exercised by sovereign states.   
The positive content of sovereignty, the areas over  
which the state can legitimately command, has always  
been contested.  The claim to exclusive control over a  
given territory has been challenged both in theory and in  
practice by transborder flows and interference in the  
                                                
52 James Cockayne, “The Global Reorganization of Legitimate Violence: Military Entrepreneurs and 
the Private Face of International Humanitarian Law,” ICRC Review 88, 863 (September 2006): 460-
461; David Held, “Central Perspectives on the Modern State,” in States and Societies, ed. David Held et 
al. (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 34-38; Paul G. Lewis, “Introduction,” in States and 
Societies, ed. David Held et al. (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 413. 
53 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber, ed. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1972), 8. 
54 Stephen D. Krasner, “Westphalia and All That,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy, ed. Judith Goldstein 
and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 235. 
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internal affairs of states.”55  
Krasner’s argument – particularly the notion of pervasive transborder flows – is 
certainly supported by the extensive number of kingdoms and states hiring foreign 
soldiers throughout history, as Chapter One outlines.  State theorists taking Krasner’s 
view of the persistence of state authority argue that the growth of the private military 
and security industry does not mark a drastic shift in the history of “the state.”  Rather, 
this industry is the result of the evolving material factors – namely, military 
technology and trade – that enabled sovereign states to become prominent in the first 
place.  Janice Thomson, for instance, explains the rise of the state’s monopoly on 
violence as a trend that is “distinctively modern.”56  Thomson argues that this shift 
occurred when: 
 
. . . violence was marketized, democratized, and 
internationalized through the actions of state rulers 
seeking to escape feudalism’s constraints on the exercise 
of violence and intent on amassing wealth and military 
power autonomous from their subjects and other rulers.57  
Given her argument that the sovereign state’s monopoly on violence only occurred 
when violence was “marketized,” Thomson clearly sees the sovereign state and force 
privatization as having been symbiotically related throughout history. 
Krasner and Thomson make convincing arguments regarding the 
exceptionalism of true sovereignty and the prevalence of transnational flows 
throughout history.  Many scholars, however, while admitting it is an exaggeration, 
still cite Weber’s state monopoly on legitimate violence as a defining feature of the 
state.  As such, various analysts studying the private security industry see it as having 
the potential to vastly transform the state’s control of violence and coercive force.  
                                                
55 Krasner, 1993: 236. 
56 Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994), 3. 
57 Thomson, 1994: 6. 
 31 
Deborah Avant, for instance, concludes that force privatization should redistribute 
power over the control of violence both within states and between states and non-state 
actors.58  
The analysis herein acknowledges that the proliferation of private military and 
security companies clearly represents a decline in the state’s control over the provision 
of force.  The study at hand, however, also acknowledges that states still play a key 
role in force provision, maintaining state militaries and providing the vast majority of 
the funding and contracts keeping modern PSCs profitable.  The fact that corporations 
now act as middlemen between the state and individual soldiers-for-hire does not 
diminish the state’s relevance to the force provision equation.  This view is in line 
with that of Avant, who notes, “Even though states continue to be powerful players, 
these changes alter expectations about the way international politics works.”59  
Perhaps more significant than the private security industry’s impact on the 
state’s role in force provision are the ways in which it interacts with the internal 
characteristics of states, and how it subsequently impacts state-building activities and 
the organization of states within the international system.  Charles Tilly argues that 
four interdependent state activities – war making, extraction (i.e., taxation), state 
making, and protection – were crucially significant for the formation and organization 
of states in Europe before the twentieth century.60  In the modern era, however, state 
building activities look very different than they did in pre-twentieth century Europe, 
                                                
58 Avant, 2005b: 7.  See also Joakim Berndtsson, “Private Military Companies and the Privatisation of 
Violence and Security: Rethinking the Monopoly of Violence and the Role of the State,” Paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (San Diego: March 2006). 
 
59 Avant, 2005b: 258.  See also Berndtsson, 2006. 
60 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, 
ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985). 
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due in part to the global proliferation of PSCs and their impact on these four 
interdependent state activities.   
For one thing, PSCs allow leaders of weak states to protect while 
simultaneously eliminating the need to create bureaucratic state structures to tax the 
citizens in order to pay the military.  Avant cites Sierra Leone as an example of this 
phenomenon:  
 
Of the four other cases where security was privatized in 
weak states, in one – Sierra Leone – the government was so 
weak that it relied on PSCs for control of operations . . . 
Also, continued and enhanced influence from commercial 
miners (prominent security consumers) decreased the 
incentives for politicians to build democratic or capable 
institutions.61   
The fact that PSCs eliminate the need to create a bureaucracy to tax the citizenry, 
coupled with the fact that PSCs often fulfill a greater range of functions in weak states 
than would the regular military, means that PSCs hinder incentives for state-building 
in weak states when employed directly by the leaders of such states, or by their 
proxies.  They similarly hinder the development of the long-term institutional 
mechanisms necessary for a viable state to develop in the target regions of the world 
where strong states maintain an interventionist presence, as elaborated below. 
Strong states such as the United States, meanwhile, are increasingly beginning 
to focus on Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) functions in 
their military missions and, as Chapter One notes, PSCs play an integral role in these 
missions.  In these situations, PSCs free the state’s military forces to perform other 
functions, thus increasing state capacity and the state’s power-projection capabilities.  
Avant similarly notes the existence of this phenomenon: “In strong states, 
privatization has often brought new security tools in ways that opened the way for a 
                                                
61 Avant, 2005b: 255. 
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broader variety of functions, sometimes at increased cost and with still uncertain 
effects on professionalism within the military (and thus the long-term military 
effectiveness).”62  In some cases, then, PSCs provide states with a greater range of 
options for strengthening their own state apparatus and, by extension, their systemic 
position.  As Avant notes: “Strong states that take advantage of the market buy 
increased power in the form of raw capacity to protect their interests abroad.”63  Yet, 
the result of such heavy reliance on PSCs for these activities is that the target state in 
which the SSTR missions take place does not develop its own state-building capacity, 
and thus it remains a weak state.   
Whereas Tilly’s view of pre-twentieth century Europe was that “war became 
the normal condition of the international system of states and the normal means of 
defending or enhancing a position within the system,” states’ abilities to alter their 
systemic position appear to have changed, and to favor strong states to a 
disproportionate extent in the modern era of such heavy reliance on PSCs as opposed 
to regular militaries.64  The extent and corporate organization of the modern private 
security industry therefore foreshadow significant consequences for the systemic 
organization and relative power balances of states in today’s world.  These 
observations are explored throughout this study with a particular focus on democratic 
states, as elaborated below. 
 
The Democratic Advantage 
 Many modern PSCs are both based in democracies and predominantly hired by 
democracies at this point.65  Because we live in a democracy and security privatization 
                                                
62 Avant, 2005b: 256. 
63 Avant, 2005b: 259. 
64 Tilly, 1985: 184. 
65 The 2007 State of the Peace and Stability Operations Industry Annual Survey reports that North 
America is the base of operations for sixty-one percent of the private security industry’s companies, 
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is an issue facing democracies today, this study focuses primarily on democratic states 
and examines PSCs’ impact on theories specific to democracies.  A prevalent strand of 
literature in the International Relations field focuses on the democratic peace – the 
observation that democracies are more selective than are autocracies in choosing their 
wars, and that they rarely fight one another.  A subset of this literature focuses on the 
democratic advantage, or the argument that democracies are more often victorious in 
their wars than are other regime types.  This argument originated in David Lake’s 
empirical observation that democracies more often win the wars they fight than do 
nondemocracies.66   
Two logics exist within the democratic advantage literature: one focusing on 
selection effects, and one focusing on military effectiveness.  The selection effects 
argument, as espoused by Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, is based on the idea that 
democracies selectively involve themselves only in the wars they are likely to win.  
Electoral politics play a crucial role here, as the theory holds that democratic leaders 
will be more beholden to their domestic publics than will autocratic leaders, and will 
consequently be forced to be more selective with regard to the conflicts they enter.  
The military effectiveness argument for the democratic advantage, according to Reiter 
and Stam, holds that democratic militaries fight more effectively on the battlefield due 
to better leadership within the ranks and more independent-minded soldiers than those 
                                                                                                                                       
with fifty-two percent of the world’s companies based in the United States.  Operationally, companies 
have their largest presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, with seventy percent and sixty-five percent of 
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See J.J. Messner and Ylana Gracielli, State of the Peace and Stability Operations Industry: Second 
Annual Survey (2007), Peace Operations Institute, International Peace Operations Association.  
Accessed at http://www.ipoaonline.org.  
66 David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” The American Political Science 
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found in autocratic militaries.67  In other words, democracy’s emphasis on the 
individual is argued to promote more independent-minded soldiers capable of 
exhibiting strong initiative on the battlefield.  Furthermore, Reiter and Stam argue that 
leadership is stronger in democratic states’ militaries than in other militaries, due to 
the “need for officers in a nondemocratic state to be politically unthreatening.”68  
Reiter and Stam also look for indicators that morale is stronger in democratic 
militaries than in others, although their findings do not establish morale as a 
significant variable.  Nonetheless, portions of the interview data examined in Chapter 
Five indicate that in some – though by no means all – cases, PSC personnel may have 
lower levels of patriotic motivation than do professional soldiers.69  Because Reiter 
and Stam measure morale partly in terms of patriotic motivation, these data speak 
directly to their work on morale. 
The democratic advantage literature has been subject to a fair amount of 
criticism, particularly in terms of the military effectiveness argument.  The selection 
effects argument, meanwhile, is considered the strongest element of democratic 
advantage theory.  Even so, Michael Desch and Risa Brooks both cite inherent 
weaknesses in the dataset used to develop all components of democratic advantage 
theory, as well as mistakes made by democratic advantage theorists in analyzing the 
data.  Examining both the historical record and Reiter and Stam’s methodological 
approach, Desch argues that five explanations other than those based on regime type 
                                                
67 Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III, “Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness,” The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 42, 3 (June 1998): 271-272; Reiter and Stam, Democracies At War (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 27, 193. 
68 Reiter and Stam, 2002: 70. 
69 Author’s interview with two anonymous high-level PSC officials, London, January 24, 2007; 
Author’s interview with anonymous PSC operator and trainer, Washington, DC, April 26, 2007.  
Deborah Avant’s experimental research likewise indicates that “Americans see the motivations of 
private security personnel as more monetary than patriotic,” though Americans also feel that they and 
the U.S. Government are just as responsible for contractor deaths as for U.S. military deaths in Iraq.  
See Deborah Avant, “After Blackwater, Four Fundamental Questions About Our Democracy,” San 
Francisco Chronicle (October 8, 2007).  Accessed November 14, 2007 at 
http://www.pacificcouncil.org/pdfs/Avant_10.08.pdf. 
 36 
more plausibly explain how states perform in war: (1) an advantage in military power; 
(2) the nature of the conflict; (3) nationalism; (4) a spurious correlation between 
democracy and victory; and/or (5) the degree of regime consolidation.70  Brooks points 
out a number of other problems with Reiter and Stam’s analysis, arguing that they do 
not give adequate attention to a variety of aspects of tactical activity that affect 
battlefield success, nor to the broader strategic and operational plans and decisions that 
are essential to victory.  She writes, “In the end, tactical effectiveness may be only a 
second-order issue: Ultimately, how much does a military’s tactical proficiency 
matter, if its strategy and operational plans doom it to defeat?”71  Brooks also points 
out that Reiter and Stam conflate culture and institutions, lump together all autocratic 
states, fail to control for confounding variables, and code “level of democracy” in a 
problematic manner.72  Another critique of this literature focuses on the causal 
direction of the variables in question, posing the question of whether regime type is 
the root cause of the unit-level factors causing victory in wars, or whether those unit-
level factors actually cause regime type.73  Each of these is a reasonable claim 
challenging the conceptualization of the democratic advantage. 
 Despite this criticism, I use the democratic advantage literature as a point of 
departure for this study’s analysis, because its examination of military effectiveness in 
the specific context of democracies is highly relevant to the topic at hand.  
Furthermore, if the study at hand finds that PSCs have an impact on military 
effectiveness, then PSCs are likely to affect the argument and implications of the 
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democratic advantage literature as well.  Indeed, democratic advantage theorists 
neglect the economic dimensions of market democracies in their analyses.  Some of 
these economic dimensions – particularly the privatization and outsourcing trends seen 
increasingly in democratic states over the past few decades – could adversely affect 
military performance and undermine some of the expectations of democratic 
advantage theory, or vice versa.  This study thus speaks to a broader body of theory 
and literature than that simply focused on military power and military effectiveness.   
This project examines the military effectiveness side of the democratic 
advantage literature in depth, but PSCs do have implications for the selection effects 
argument as well.  For instance, Avant has examined the possibility that PSCs reduce 
transparency in democratic decision-making and, in the U.S. Government in 
particular, advantage the executive branch relative to the legislative branch, thus 
making it easier for democracies to become involved in conflicts.74  She illustrates 
several cases in which PSCs have weakened democratic structures that cause 
democracies to be selective in their wars, and in doing so she shows how PSCs very 
plausibly can weaken the selection effects argument of democratic advantage theory.  
In particular, the selection effects argument of democratic advantage theory implies 
the expectation that the democratic advantage would be less likely in cases where 
PSCs are deployed in place of national military forces, because the electorate is less 
likely to learn of such a deployment – or to consider it to be an actual act of war-
making – and thus is less likely to pressure policymakers to be selective with regard to 
conflict involvement.  Following this logic, the selection effects argument also implies 
the expectation that situations of PSC-military co-deployment and private forces’ 
integration into the regular military would hold prospects for the democratic advantage 
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similar to those of a regular military deployment.  In such situations, the deployment 
of national military forces would attract the electorate’s attention to the conflict in 
question, causing the public to put pressure on policymakers to be selective with 
regard to conflict involvement. 
One potential challenge to the democratic advantage literature that emerges in 
this study, however, is that some of the structural constraints noted by democratic 
advantage theorists as being unique to democracies – in particular, the structural 
constraints and processes relevant to the military effectiveness and selection effects 
arguments of democratic advantage theory – appear to play a role in non-democratic 
regimes as well.  This is shown in the cases examined in Chapter Three, for instance, 
and speaks directly to an emerging research agenda in the International Relations 
field.75  Future research on this issue might further evaluate some of the cases explored 
here to examine the prevalence of these structural constraints in non-democracies as 
opposed to democracies.  
 
Theories of Military Effectiveness 
 There is a substantial body of literature on military effectiveness itself, of 
which the democratic advantage arguments mentioned above constitute only a small 
portion.  As Risa Brooks highlights, various different notions of what constitutes 
“military effectiveness” abound: 
 
Some studies eschew a formal definition of military  
effectiveness . . . Some political scientists analyze  
military effectiveness in terms of a military  
organization’s capacity to prevail over an adversary –  
in terms of victory or defeat . . . Other scholars place 
greater weight on the degree to which military 
organizations and their personnel exhibit particular 
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attributes essential to the planning and preparation for 
war . . . The term military effectiveness is also often used 
by military professionals and defense officials and 
analysts.  In this context it has a variety of different 
meanings.  Sometimes effectiveness is used to refer to 
the readiness of forces to deploy to the theater of war.  
Sometimes it indicates a mission accomplished in a 
combat zone . . . Sometimes it refers to the attributes of 
a particular military organization and the quality of its 
leadership, training, and systems, and the organization’s 
preparation for war.76  
The realist stance on the issue of military effectiveness is the most traditional, 
emphasizing the relative quantity of material resources in the hands of the military 
institution in question.77  A slightly more nuanced view of this perspective is found 
among offense-defense theorists, who illuminate the benefits of offensive versus 
defensive military technology.78  Stephen Rosen expands upon traditional realist 
conceptions of military effectiveness when arguing for the relevance of social and 
cultural factors in determining a state’s military power.  Rosen examines the effects of 
social structures and social divisions, along with the degree to which a military 
organization divorces itself from society, on the amount of offensive and defensive 
military power that can be generated from a given quantity of material resources.79  To 
do so, he looks at India’s military over various historical periods, each of which 
represents an evolution in the country’s social structures.  Rosen’s work is significant 
for the project at hand in its recognition of the ways that social divisions can cause 
unit fissures and decrease military cohesion, or what I will later refer to as integration 
in line with Risa Brooks’ definition.  Yet, Rosen does not employ a very nuanced or 
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detailed view of what constitutes military power, and by extension, military 
effectiveness – in his terms, offensive military power is “the surplus of military power, 
beyond what is needed to maintain domestic order, that can be projected beyond the 
boundaries of a country,” while defensive military power is “the ability to resist 
foreign military invasion.”80  Rosen’s conception of military power thus depends on 
the enemy’s strength in any given situation, focuses only on territory lost and gained, 
and is measured in terms of relative capabilities, weapons, and equipment. 
In Military Power, Stephen Biddle also responds to traditional realist 
assumptions that military power rests solely on issues of weaponry, equipment, and 
supplies.  Biddle argues that military capability does not depend on technology alone, 
but on how that technology is used – what he terms “force employment.”  Utilizing 
this notion, Biddle develops a theory of military capability in terms of three 
“irreducible capacities”: the ability to control territory, the ability to inflict and limit 
losses, and the ability to prevail quickly.81  In doing so, Biddle expands beyond 
traditional realist conceptions of military effectiveness, yet chooses to focus only on 
the tactical aspects of military effectiveness.   
In an earlier article, Biddle and Stephen Long speak directly to the democratic 
advantage literature, looking at the effects on military effectiveness of various unit-
level variables including human capital, civil-military relations, and culture.  In doing 
so, they branch out from realist conceptions of military effectiveness which are based 
solely on the quantity of materiel, and return to Rosen’s examination of the role of 
culture in military power.82  The article, however, similarly conceives of military 
effectiveness narrowly, in terms of victory in a particular battle or war.  While their 
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model considers the results of the conflict, it omits any analysis of the means to 
achieving those results.  Biddle and Long do find that the unit-level variables other 
than regime type are significant for military effectiveness, yet they are unable to 
definitively prove the direction of the causal arrow linking these unit-level variables 
and regime type.  Thus, they leave open the question of whether a certain regime type, 
such as democracy, causes the particular configurations of civil-military relations, 
culture, and human capital essential for military effectiveness, or whether it is these 
variables that cause regime type.  In its focus on unit-level variables and its suggestion 
of this causal indeterminacy, Biddle and Long’s study encourages this study’s focus 
on the effects of unit-level variables – in this case, PSCs – on military performance. 
The most recent, and arguably most complete, scholarly conception of military 
effectiveness to date is found in a recent chapter by Risa Brooks.  Brooks defines 
military effectiveness as “the capacity to create military power from a state’s basic 
resources in wealth, technology, population size, and human capital,” and focuses on 
four “crucial attributes” that militaries may or may not display: “the integration of 
military activity within and across different levels; responsiveness to internal 
constraints and the external environment; high skill, as measured in the motivation and 
basic competencies of personnel; and high quality, as indicated by the caliber of a 
state’s weapons and equipment” (emphasis added).83  
Brooks defines integration as “the degree to which different military activities 
are internally consistent and mutually reinforcing,” and states:  
 
An integrated military is one whose activities at the 
tactical level are consistent with those at the operational 
level and also support broader strategic objectives.  
Integration also involves maintaining consistency in 
force development activities, such as procurement, 
training, and education, with strategy, operations, and 
                                                
83 Brooks, 2007: 9-10. 
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tactics.  Integration means the achievement of 
consistency within and across levels and areas of all 
military activity.”84  
She defines responsiveness as “the ability to tailor military activity to a state’s own 
capabilities, its adversaries’ capabilities, and external constraints.”85  Skill measures 
“military personnel and their units against some objective standard or benchmark in 
assessing their ability to achieve particular tasks and to carry out orders,” and “ also 
captures a military’s capability to motivate soldiers and to ensure that they carry out 
orders, fight hard, and seize the initiative in combat.”86  Finally, quality is the 
military’s “ability to provide itself with highly capable weapons and equipment.”87  
Brooks’ categorization of military attributes is a useful and comprehensive 
method for disaggregating and measuring the effectiveness of particular military 
actions. This study adopts her definitions of integration, responsiveness, skill, and 
quality, taking note of the expectations implied by these criteria: that PSCs will best 
impact military effectiveness when integrated into a national military (for they will 
have the best effect on integration and skill in such cases), and that PSCs’ impact may 
also be beneficial in situations where they are deployed in place of national forces  
(when they may have a positive effect on responsiveness, skill, and quality).  In 
adopting these criteria, the study subsumes Reiter and Stam’s notions of battlefield 
leadership and initiative under Brooks’ skill, for they are essentially one and the same.  
Indeed, Reiter and Stam note “effective leadership consists of the ability of officers to 
persuade troops to execute commands, especially under fire, and to competently 
execute tactics and seize the initiative when opportunities present themselves.”88  This 
closely matches Brooks’ definition of skill, although it should be noted that Reiter and 
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Stam explicitly refer to tactical effectiveness.  Such a focus is especially appropriate 
with regard to the issue of skill.  Thus, this study’s references to skill focus primarily 
on activities at the tactical and – to a lesser degree – the operational levels.  However, 
this study goes beyond Brooks’ definition of military effectiveness to focus on the 
distinction between the tactical, strategic, and operational elements of warfare.  This 
distinction is highlighted here because a military can clearly be effective in one realm 
and ineffective in another – comprehensive military effectiveness requires the 
achievement of the goals of all three realms.   
Therefore, in this study an effective military is considered to be one that 
displays high levels of integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality, while: (a) 
accomplishing its tactical goals, or the maneuvers pertaining to the most immediate 
battlefield goals; (b) accomplishing its strategic goals, or the broader politico-military 
goals equaling the sum of its tactical goals across various theaters of operation; and (c) 
accomplishing its operational goals, or the sum of the tactical goals pertaining to a 
particular theater of operation.  This definition encompasses both the ends and means 
of achieving military effectiveness, yet maintains the traditional scholarly focus on 
military power as an indicator of military effectiveness.   
Notably, Brooks’ definition of military effectiveness emphasizes the military-
technological aspects of warfare – particularly under the rubric of the quality 
component of military effectiveness – even as the volume in which the definition is 
included claims to focus on cultural and political elements of military effectiveness.  
This military-technological focus presupposes a certain type of warfare; namely, Type 
I warfare or “major war.”  Because the study at hand focuses in large part on Type III 
warfare or counterinsurgency (COIN), I test the potential for an additional variable to 
be considered as a component of military effectiveness – the level of PSC compliance 
 44 
with legal and ethical norms of Just War – through two sub-hypotheses subsumed 
under H1, as elaborated below.89 
 
Underlying Determinants of PSC-Military Coordination 
 We now have a solid conception of what constitutes military effectiveness to 
guide the study, but how do we proceed when we find situations in which PSCs hinder 
military effectiveness?  By more deeply examining the sources of coordination 
problems within cases of PSC-military co-deployment, we can learn how best to 
remedy them, and thus how best to improve PSCs’ impact on military effectiveness.  
In order to examine the underlying sources of such problems, the analysis in Chapter 
Five draws upon the distinction in the social sciences between structure and identity, 
as well as the literatures on the professions and civil-military relations.  These four 
distinct theoretical tools, when brought together, create a synthesis from which a 
policy-relevant framework of analysis can be developed.  
In recent years there has been a vibrant debate within the International 
Relations (IR) literature regarding the relative importance of structural and identity 
factors in shaping international events.  However, this IR debate functions mainly at 
the state or systemic level, giving little attention to analysis of the effects of unit-level 
structures and individual identities on international relations.  While much is written 
on the effects of domestic political structures on military performance, rarely does this 
structural analysis come down to the structure of particular military operations.  
Meanwhile, individual (as opposed to state) identities are rarely seen as relevant to the 
occurrence of international events, with the exception of political-psychological 
                                                
89 Norms of Just War include noncombatant immunity, military necessity, utility, and proportionality, 
among others.  For a comprehensive analysis of the principles underlying Just War theory see Michael 
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic 
Books, 1977). 
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analyses of particular leaders’ identities and perceptions.90  The introduction of a new 
tactical and strategic actor – for example, private security contractors – requires 
disaggregation of the relevant issues down to sub-systemic levels, using different 
analytical tools than those most commonly used in International Relations scholarship.  
Thus, I employ measurements of structure at the operational and intra-institutional 
levels (looking at the structure of particular deployments and at military rules, 
doctrine, and training), and of identity at both the collective and individual levels.91 
 The term “structure” has many meanings across numerous disciplines.  Wendy 
Pullan argues that “the desire to define structure in a complete or finite manner is 
counterproductive . . . structure is an inclusive and open-ended theme that offers itself 
to interpretation in many disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities.”92  In a 
statement particularly significant for this project’s study of structure, Pullan also notes, 
“If structure intact may be considered as the normal scheme of things, that which fades 
into the background when all is well and in order, it is when structure fails that we 
take notice and consider its merit and significance.”93  Meanwhile, the Random House 
Unabridged Dictionary defines structure as: “the organization of a society or other 
group and the relations between its members, determining its working.”94  Other 
conceptions of “structure,” and particularly “social structure,” include “methods of 
                                                
90 See for example Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976). 
91 This practice is far from unprecedented in the social sciences.  The structure – identity debate applies 
to many levels of analysis other than that of the state and international system, as shown in sociological 
and psychological works incorporating these concepts at the individual and small group levels. See 
Henri Tajfel, “Aspects of National and Ethnic Loyalty,” Social Science Information 9 (1970): 119-144; 
Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); 
John C. Turner, “Social Categorization and the Self-Concept: A Social Cognitive Theory of Group 
Behavior,” in Advances in Group Processes, Vol. 2., ed. E.J. Lawler (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985), 
77-121; John C. Turner et al., Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory (New 
York: Blackwell, 1987). 
92 Wendy Pullan, “Structuring Structure,” in Structure in Science and Art, eds. Wendy Pullan and 
Harshad Bhadeshia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 8. 
93 Pullan, 2000: 6. 
94 structure. (n.d.). Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1). Accessed February 1, 2007 at 
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interaction,” “the social organization of individuals and groups,” “a system organized 
by a characteristic pattern of relationships,” and “the arrangement of components in a 
complex entity.”95  Of particular relevance to the International Relations sub-field is 
Kenneth Waltz’s definition of political structures: “A domestic political structure is 
thus defined, first, according to the principle by which it is ordered; second, by 
specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; and third, by the 
distribution of capabilities across those units” (emphasis added).96  Waltz’s definition 
is useful in guiding this study’s conception of “structure.”   
In the case of PSC-military coordination, one can contrast the ordering 
principles for the military against those for PSCs in terms of their varying levels of 
hierarchy, as well as analyze the ordering principles for their mutual deployment 
alongside one another (in terms of the chain of command over contractors).  For 
instance, I conceive of the military as more strictly hierarchical than PSCs, which I 
conceive of as loosely hierarchical.  Differences in pay scales also reflect the divergent 
ordering principles of the military versus PSCs, reflecting the fact that PSCs place 
different values on positions similar to military positions, and do not necessarily value 
particular configurations of expertise in the same order – relative to other 
configurations of expertise – as the military does.  Furthermore, the functions that each 
group fulfills are clearly distinct from one another (at least in theory), with private 
security contractors only allowed to fight defensively and working primarily to guard 
a person or static site, not fighting offensively to secure a larger strategic goal as the 
military does.   Finally, each group has a distinct level of capability associated with it, 
due to factors such as training and institutional support (the Reconstruction Operations 
Center in Iraq, for instance), as well as the quality of equipment to which each group 
                                                
95 structure. (n.d.). WordNet 3.0. Princeton University.  Accessed February 8, 2008 at 
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96 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 82. 
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is given access.  Interestingly, in some cases PSCs have access to better equipment 
than do military units, which would have a beneficial impact on PSC capability 
relative to military capability in those cases.  The multiple, continuous references in 
the interview data to these structural factors as causes of PSC-military coordination 
problems will provide support for the notion that structural factors have significant 
ramifications for the success of PSC-military field coordination. 
 Measurements of identity are similarly varied across the social sciences.  
Identity has not been analyzed frequently at sub-state levels within the field of 
International Relations, at least not in a systematic manner.  As a recent work by 
Abdelal et al., in conjunction with the Harvard Identity Project, notes, “Despite – or 
perhaps because of – the sprawl of different treatments of identity in the social 
sciences, the concept has remained too analytically loose to be as useful a tool as the 
literature’s early promise had suggested.”97  Abdelal et al. develop a framework for the 
operationalization of collective identity, arguing for a distinction between the content 
and level of contestation of collective identities.  They further disaggregate the content 
of an identity into four non-mutually-exclusive types: (1) constitutive norms; (2) 
social purposes; (3) relational comparisons with other social categories; and (4) 
cognitive models.98  Constitutive norms refer to “the formal and informal rules that 
define group membership,” while social purposes refer to “the goals that are shared by 
members of a group.”99  Relational comparisons, meanwhile, refer to “defining an 
identity group by what it is not, i.e., the way it views other identity groups, especially 
                                                
97 Rawi Abdelal, et al, “Identity as a Variable,” Perspectives on Politics 4 (2006): 1. 
98 Abdelal et al., 2006: 7-16. 
99 Abdelal et al., 2006: 5-6.  Note here the distinction and overlap between the types of “rules” cited in 
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making up the structure of PSC-military co-deployments are formal, institutionalized rules defining 
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where those views about the other are a defining part of the identity.”  Finally, 
cognitive models refer to “the worldviews or understanding of political and material 
conditions and interests that are shaped by a particular identity.”100  In addition to the 
four types of content, the degree to which a group agrees on its identity (contestation) 
is an element of collective identity.101  Table 2.1 below depicts these abstract structural 
and identity variables. 
Both the civil-military relations literature and the professions literature are key 
to an understanding of military identities and the potential for friction between 
military and private security contractors’ identities.  First, both literatures highlight 
robust indicators of “constitutive norms” and “social purposes.”  In his renowned work                      
on civil-military relations, Samuel Huntington suggests that a profession is a particular 
type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics, distinguished by its 
expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.102  In the military context, “the modern 
officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer is a professional 
man.”103  The military officer’s professional expertise is “the direction, operation, and 
control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of 
violence.”104 Regarding his professional responsibilities, “The officer is not a 
mercenary who transfers his services wherever they are best rewarded . . . The 
motivations of the officer are a technical love for his craft and the sense of social 
obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit of society” (emphasis added).105  This 
sense of social obligation clearly speaks to the military officer’s social purposes,  
                                                
100 Abdelal et al., 2006: 6. 
101 Abdelal et al., 2006: 17. While this study focuses more on identity content than levels of contestation 
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present.  The variety of services that PSCs provide, as well as the various means they employ to 
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102 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1959), 7-8. 
103 Huntington, 1959: 7. 
104 Huntington, 1959: 11. 
105 Huntington, 1959: 15. 
 49 
                                       Table 2.1: 
                   Structural vs. Identity Variables 
             Structural Variables                                Identity Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
PSC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Military 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ordering Principles: 
• Loosely hierarchical 
• Chain of command  
• Order as laid out in doctrine 
 
Functions: 
• Defensive fighting to guard a 
person, static site, or convoy 
 
Capability: 
• Depends upon the firm in 
question 
• In general, training is not 
standardized & institutional 
support varies 
• Sometimes better access than 
military to high-tech. 
equipment  
 
Constitutive Norms: 
• Previous military 
service and desire to 
maximize financial 
earning power 
• Professional jurisdiction 
 
Social Purposes: 
• Range from defending 
country to defending          
economic enterprise 
 
Relational Comparisons: 
• PSC personnel self-
perceptions relative to 
their perceptions of 
military identities 
 
Cognitive Models: 
Private sector as innovative 
and profitable alternative to 
military service 
Ordering Principles: 
• Strictly hierarchical 
• Chain of command 
• Order as laid out in doctrine 
 
Functions: 
• Offensive and defensive 
fighting to secure strategic 
object 
 
Capability: 
• More standardized training 
and better institutional support 
than PSCs 
• Equipment sometimes worse 
than PSCs 
Constitutive Norms: 
• Personal ethic of civic 
duty 
• Professional jurisdiction 
• Corporateness 
• Technical love of craft 
 
Social Purposes: 
• Aim to protect the 
country, using both 
offensive and defensive 
methods 
• Sense of social 
obligation to utilize 
craft for society’s 
benefit 
 
Relational Comparisons: 
• Soldiers’ perceptions of 
their own identities in 
relation to those of PSC 
personnel 
 
Cognitive Models: 
• Military as profession 
• Military as organization 
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while the love for his craft is a norm constituting his identity.   Another norm 
constituting the military officer’s identity is corporateness: 
 
The functional imperatives of security give rise to 
complex vocational institutions which mold the officer 
corps into an autonomous social unit . . . The corporate 
structure of the officer corps includes not just the 
official bureaucracy but also societies, associations, 
schools, journals, customs, and traditions.”106   
Huntington thus gives us an idea of the constitutive norms and social purposes 
comprising a military professional’s identity, and of its significance in the context of 
civil-military relations.  A leading theorist on the professions, Andrew Abbott, adds to 
these identity characteristics when he notes that the Army is unique in that it is 
simultaneously a profession and an organization (cognitive models), and that it is one 
of the few professions to still develop lifelong careers for its workforce (a constitutive 
norm).107  
The second contribution of these literatures - particularly the professions 
literature – is found in its insights on professional jurisdiction and the potential for 
friction to develop between different professions and professional identities.  Abbott 
notes that societal trends are causing professions to change in one direction and 
organizations to change in another direction, and that the experience and ideal of a 
career are disappearing from the workforce in almost all professions besides the 
military.  Therefore, he argues, the ability of formal careers to reconcile the dual 
demands of the military as profession and the military as organization is dwindling: 
 
The Army is changing like most other producing 
organizations on the one hand, and the Army is 
changing like most other professions on the other.  Since 
                                                
106 Huntington, 1959: 16. 
107 Abbott defines “career” in this context as “the idea of a single occupational skill or identity 
characterizing individuals for their entire working lives.”  Andrew Abbott, “The Army and the Theory 
of Professions,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins 
(Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 530-531.   
 51 
those trends are moving in unrelated directions, the 
result has been to put a well-nigh unbearable strain on 
the Army’s longstanding attempt to be an organization 
and a profession at the same time . . . The development 
of formally patterned careers is the Army’s chief 
mechanism for reconciling the demands of its dual 
nature as an organization and as a profession . . . The 
experience, and to some extent even the ideal, of career 
is disappearing from the labor force.  Military officers, 
clergy, and professors are among the few holdouts. 108   
This statement clearly indicates the potential for friction to develop between identities 
within a particular profession, thus challenging the ability of that profession to 
survive, at least in its current form.   
Friction can develop between the identities of different professions as well, as 
the professional jurisdiction arguments of the professions literature demonstrate.  
Abbott claims that professions are “exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat 
abstract knowledge to particular cases,” and says that the interrelations between 
professions are determined by how each group controls its knowledge and skill.109  He 
develops a “turf-war model” to explain competition between professions, writing of a 
“system of professions” in which “each profession has its activities under various 
kinds of jurisdiction,” and in which “jurisdictional boundaries are perpetually in 
dispute.”110  Although Abbott later argues that the Army does not fall into this static 
“turf war” model, Richard Lacquement recognizes the propensity for jurisdictional 
competition over the core competencies traditionally associated with the professional 
military:  
Many responsibilities traditionally associated with the 
Army have been challenged and claimed by others.  
                                                
108 Abbott, 2002: 530-531.  Interestingly, the proliferation of PSCs that recruit senior military officers, 
particularly Special Operations Forces, has the potential to change the military’s ability to develop long-
standing career trajectories.  According to Abbott’s logic, this could seriously impair the military’s 
ability to reconcile its dual roles as an organization and a profession. 
109 Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1988), 8. 
110 Abbott, 1988: 2. 
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Moreover, laudable Army service in missions that have 
little to do with the use of coercive force blur public 
understanding of the Army’s core roles, thus making it 
easier to challenge those core roles.  Strategic leaders 
must recognize this dynamic context as they define the 
Army’s appropriate roles.”111  
Deborah Avant makes a related point: 
 
Its ready use of contractors for tasks that are crucial to 
both the development of the profession in the future and 
to the success of new missions . . . has generated 
competition between the Army and private security 
companies over who will shape the development of 
future professionals and has degraded the Army’s ability 
to undertake successful missions on its own.”112  
The extent to which PSC personnel can challenge the military’s jurisdiction over its 
core competencies – which Lacquement suggests include major combat operations 
(war), stability operations, strategic deterrence, and homeland security – is clearly 
open to question.113  Thus, one questions the extent to which competition over 
professional jurisdiction contributes to PSC-military resentment and coordination 
problems in the field.   
Abdelal et al.’s framework, along with the characteristics of military 
professionals which Huntington, Abbott, and Lacquement noted, guide the 
conceptualization of military and PSC identities used here.  For instance, in this study 
I conceive of military identities in terms of a personal ethic of civic duty (a 
                                                
111 Richard Lacquement, “Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of 
Practice,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: 
McGraw Hill, 2005), 226.  See also Abbott, 2002: 534-535. 
112 Deborah Avant, “Losing Control of the Profession Through Outsourcing?,” in The Future of the 
Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2005), 272. 
113 Lacquement, 2005: 226.  A related question exists regarding how such a takeover of the military’s 
professional jurisdiction by the private military and security sector would affect U.S. civil-military 
relations.  Theoretically, it would appear that this competition – if the end result were a decrease in 
military professionalism and a strengthening of the private sector’s professional hold over formerly 
military functions - could decrease objective civilian control over the U.S. military.  While this issue is 
not the main focus of this paper, it is worth mentioning as a theoretical consideration for future 
research. 
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constitutive norm), the aim of defending and protecting the country (a social purpose), 
relational comparisons in terms of how soldiers perceive their own identities in 
relation to the identities of PSC personnel, and cognitive models in terms of soldiers’ 
patriotically-motivated worldviews.  In contrast, I conceive of norms of previous 
military service and a desire to maximize financial earning power as constituting the 
identities of PSC personnel.  The social purposes of PSC personnel encompass but are 
not limited to those of the military, as PSCs may be hired to guard private business 
installations in addition to governmental sites and targets.  Thus, their social purposes 
range from defending the country to defending an economic enterprise.  I conceive of 
relational comparisons in terms of how PSC personnel perceive their own identities in 
relation to military identities.  Because most PSC personnel have military 
backgrounds, which I expect will have been instrumental in shaping their worldviews, 
I do not anticipate vast differences between PSC and military cognitive models.   
If any of these identity characteristics are repetitively cited in the interview 
data as causes of or motivations for poor coordination between PSC personnel and 
soldiers in the field, such statements will support the notion that identity factors play a 
significant role in controlling PSC-military field coordination.  Continuous references 
to competition over either group’s professional jurisdiction will support this notion as 
well, as professional jurisdiction is a constitutive norm defining each group’s 
collective identity.  Analysis of interview data illustrates the relative salience of these 
identity characteristics versus structural factors as explanations for particular PSC-
military field interactions.  
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PSCs’ Impact on Military Effectiveness & the Democratic Advantage:  
Theory & Hypothesis Development 
 
 This study now has a conception of military effectiveness to guide it, as well as 
an understanding of how military effectiveness fits into arguments regarding the 
democratic advantage, the state, civil-military relations, the professions, and the 
structure-identity dichotomy.  As relatively new actors in the field of combat, private 
security companies and their personnel are likely to have some effect both on military 
effectiveness and, by extension, on the democratic advantage.  The task at hand is to 
determine what these effects are, and how the relevant actors can best deal with them. 
 Media reports abound about friendly fire incidents between PSC personnel and 
the military in Iraq, about the decrease in military retention rates as senior military 
professionals leave the service for the private sector, and about increasing numbers of 
security contractors killed in Iraq.114  These events have ramifications for military 
effectiveness, as do many other issues related to PSCs.  On one side of the debate, 
scholars and PSC industry representatives argue that PSCs constitute force multipliers 
who are highly skilled, usually have prior military training, and serve only defensive 
purposes on the battlefield.115  Such claims lead to the hypothesis that PSCs will cause 
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a net increase in military effectiveness by augmenting both the quantity and quality of 
existing forces, by increasing the military’s responsiveness, and by increasing skill 
through the strengthening of commanders’ tactical leadership capabilities as they are 
relieved of non-core military tasks: 
   
H1: PSCs should cause a net increase in democracies’  
       military effectiveness, by: 
• Increasing responsiveness  
• Increasing quality by providing highly-capable weapons 
and equipment and/or by acting as force multipliers 
• Increasing skill by strengthening commanders’ 
leadership capabilities 
If H1 is strongly supported by the data, it will indicate that the growth in PSC hiring 
will make those actors hiring PSCs more militarily effective.  Assuming that the PSC 
trend continues to operate primarily amongst democracies, growth in PSC hiring will 
also increase the prospects for these democracies to experience the military 
effectiveness side of the democratic advantage.  Greater PSC use will translate into 
more battlefield success for democracies, as long as the use of private force does not 
negatively impact the selection effects side of the democratic advantage to an equal or 
greater degree than its positive impact on military effectiveness.  This in turn 
strengthens the arguments relating to the myriad benefits of democratic systems of 
government.  This logic is depicted below: 
 
                             
                        +                                                     +                     
 
 
The findings presented in the following chapters show that a situation such as that 
depicted above is most likely when PSCs are deployed in theaters in place of the 
PSCs 
increase 
military 
effectivenes
s 
PSC hiring 
increases 
(mainly 
among 
democracies) 
More 
democratic 
states will 
be militarily  
effective 
Democracies will 
experience more 
battlefield success, 
if their conflict 
selectivity is not 
disproportionately 
affected 
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military or when they are structurally integrated into the military alongside which they 
are deployed, as both of these scenarios avoid the problems of PSC-military field 
coordination which can effectively decrease military effectiveness.  History has shown 
that PSCs are typically deployed instead of the military in relatively small or covert 
conflicts, particularly in situations where major state powers want to shape conflict 
outcomes without highly visible involvement.  However, such situations do not 
necessarily involve democratic actors, or at least not only democratic actors.  
Furthermore, the selection effects side of the democratic advantage is more likely to 
be negatively impacted in situations in which PSCs substitute for national military 
forces.  Thus, the effects of PSCs on the democratic advantage in these scenarios must 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
I derive four sub-hypotheses related to H1 from the debate surrounding the 
legal and ethical basis for warfare, and the opaque status of PSCs under the laws of 
war.  Numerous reports have emerged detailing legal and ethical abuses in the field by 
contractors who, by and large, are not held responsible for their actions by any legal 
authority.116  As illustrated by the local outrage caused by the highly publicized 
                                                
116 The Associated Press, “Legal Avenues Against Blackwater Murky,” The New York Times (October 
3, 2007).  Accessed October 3, 2007 at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/us/AP-Blackwater-
Legal.html?pagewanted=print.  Alissa J. Rubin and Paul von Zielbauer, “Blackwater Case Highlights 
Legal Uncertainties,” The New York Times (October 11, 2007).  Accessed October 11, 2007 at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/11/world/middleeast/11legal.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewan
ted=print.  “Blackwater Christmas Eve Shooting and Immunity,” September 12, 2007.  Accessed 
October 14, 2007 at http://www.blackwaterblogger.com/2007/09/accountability1.html.  Mark 
Hemingway, “Blackwater’s Legal Netherworld: Private Contractors Are Subject to Military Justice – 
Or Are They?,” National Review Online (September 26, 2007).  Accessed September 26, 2007 at 
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MmYzMTkwMzQ2OTVhNGY2MGQzMDY0MTJiM2ExYmY3
YmY=.  David Stout and John M. Broder, “Report Depicts Recklessness at Blackwater,” The New York 
Times (October 1, 2007).  Accessed October 1, 2007 at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/01/washington/01cnd-
blackwater.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print.  James Glanz and Alissa J. Rubin, “From 
Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths,” The New York Times (October 3, 2007).  Accessed 
October 3, 2007 at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/world/middleeast/03firefight.html?hp=&pagewanted=print.  
David Johnston and John M. Broder, “F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause,” The New 
York Times (November 14, 2007).  Accessed November 14, 2007 at 
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September 2007 incident in which Blackwater USA personnel shot and killed 
seventeen Iraqi civilians and wounded twenty-seven others in Baghdad’s Nisour 
Square while guarding a diplomatic convoy, private security personnel can undermine 
the military’s war for the “hearts and minds” of local civilians by failing to abide by 
the laws and norms of Just War.  A strong line of argument exists which insists that 
compliance with the laws of war better enables militaries to fight effectively, 
particularly in counterinsurgencies (the so-called “hearts and minds” approach), while 
another line of argument states that reliance on brutality toward civilians and 
noncompliance with the laws of war better serves military effectiveness (the so-called 
“draining the sea” approach).117  For instance, recent research by Lieutenant Colonel 
Isaiah Wilson III and Jason Lyall indicates that the development of on-the-ground 
information networks and good relations with local civilians are the keys to waging a 
successful counterinsurgency.118  Others argue that brutality against civilian 
populations is an approach that is frequently pursued in counterinsurgency warfare and 
protracted wars of attrition, in an attempt to weaken the enemy quickly and end the 
conflict as soon as possible.119  Interestingly for the study at hand, Gil Merom’s 
research shows that democracies have difficulty employing the brutal tactics that, he 
argues, are essential to waging a successful counterinsurgency.  This difficulty stems 
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14blackwater.html?_r=1&hp=&pagewanted=pri
nt.  
117 See for instance Max Boot, “The Lessons of a Quagmire,” The New York Times (November 16, 
2003).  Accessed February 8, 2008 at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9803E5DD1038F935A25752C1A9659C8B63&sec=&s
pon=&pagewanted=print; Max Boot, “An Iraq To-Do List: How We Can Help the Surge Succeed,” The 
Weekly Standard 12, 34 (May 21, 2007).  Accessed February 8, 2008 at 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=13643&R=139501DB68; 
Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, “’Draining the Sea’: Mass Killing and 
Guerilla Warfare,” International Organization 58 (Spring 2004): 375-407; Alexander B. Downes, 
“Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War,” International 
Security 30, 4 (Spring 2006): 152-195. 
118 LTC Isaiah Wilson III and Jason Lyall, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in 
Counterinsurgency Warfare,” International Organization, forthcoming. 
119 Valentino et al., 2004: 376; Downes, 2006: 155-156. 
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mainly from the structural constraints of democratic systems combined with the 
electorate’s normative antipathy for brutal tactics.120  Because there is a vigorous 
debate at present regarding PSCs’ accountability under the laws of war, and due to this 
study’s focus on counterinsurgency warfare, it is appropriate here to test the impact of 
private security contractors’ compliance with legal and normative rules of ethical 
warfare on military effectiveness.  Hence, the first sub-hypothesis, drawn from the 
“hearts and minds” school of thought, is as follows: 
  
H1a: Private security contractors’ compliance with the  
         laws of war  increases military effectiveness by: 
• Supporting the war for the “hearts and 
minds” of the citizenry, and thus 
increasing responsiveness 
Looking at the issue in another light, from the view that IHL non-compliance is a 
means of hindering guerilla warfare (the “draining the sea” approach), we get a second 
sub-hypothesis regarding IHL compliance: 
 
H1b: Private security contractors’ compliance with the 
laws of war decreases military effectiveness by: 
• Limiting PSCs’ ability to take on the dirty 
jobs necessary to defeat insurgencies, thus 
decreasing responsiveness. 
It is, of course, necessary to test the opposing hypotheses as well.  The third sub-
hypothesis is therefore: 
   
H1c: Private security contractors’ non-compliance with  
         the laws of war decreases military effectiveness  
         by: 
• Undermining the war for the “hearts and minds” of the 
citizenry, thus decreasing responsiveness. 
And the fourth sub-hypothesis, drawn from the “draining the sea” perspective, is: 
 
H1d: Private security contractors’ non-compliance with the      
         laws of war increases military effectiveness by: 
                                                
120 Merom, 2003: 15. 
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• Enabling PSCs to take on the dirty jobs 
necessary to defeat insurgencies, thus 
increasing responsiveness. 
If H1a or H1c are supported by the data, it will indicate to governments and 
companies purchasing PSCs’ services that they should discriminate against those firms 
not employing practices and rules of engagement that comply with international 
humanitarian law and other laws of war.  Thus, the findings related to this hypothesis 
could have grave ramifications for the conduct of PSCs, putting certain firms at risk of 
losing business unless they modify their practices.  If the data strongly support H1b or 
H1d, this will indicate to purchasers of PSC services that firms’ records of compliance 
with International Humanitarian Law are irrelevant to contracting decisions, or even 
that poor records of adherence to international laws of war are desirable traits when 
seeking out a private security firm.121 
In contrast to H1, reports from the field in Iraq indicate that the presence of 
PSCs is causing coordination problems between the military and PSCs, and among 
military units themselves.122  These reports lead to another hypothesis, which holds that 
PSCs cause a net decrease in military effectiveness by: (a) decreasing integration; and 
(b) decreasing skill by hindering commanders’ leadership capabilities and soldiers’ 
motivation levels.123  
                                                
121 A potential future research agenda might examine whether PSC compliance with IHL impacts 
military effectiveness differently in weak versus strong states.  Because PSCs enable leaders of weak 
states to retain power despite the lack of a state infrastructure and bureaucracy, one could sensibly 
hypothesize that brutality and noncompliance with IHL would occur more commonly in such scenarios.  
Conversely, because strong states use PSCs increasingly to perform SSTR missions, it is sensible to 
hypothesize that IHL compliance would best serve the goals of such missions.   
122 United States Government Accountability Office, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use 
of Private Security Providers,” Publication No. GAO-05-737 (Washington, DC: July 2005); United 
States Government Accountability Office, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve Use of 
Private Security Providers,” Publication No. GAO-06-865T (Washington, DC: June 13, 2006).  
123 These reports indicate that PSCs lower military skill by weakening officers’ abilities to competently 
execute tactics and to seize the initiative when opportunities present themselves. Because it is 
impossible to separate PSC and military actions completely in situations of side-by-side deployment, 
both hypotheses consider PSCs to constitute at least a portion of the total deployed force in the country 
in question. 
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H2: PSCs should cause a net decrease in military effectiveness by: 
• Decreasing integration 
• Decreasing skill 
If H2 is strongly supported by the data, it will indicate that the growth of the PSC 
hiring trend will make actors hiring PSCs less militarily effective.  Assuming that 
PSCs continue to be prominent mainly amongst democracies, support for H2 will also 
indicate a decrease in the propensity for democracies to win the conflicts into which 
they enter, and a corresponding decrease in the strength of arguments touting the 
benefits of democracy.  This logic is depicted below. 
 
 
                             +                                                                  + 
 
 
The primary mechanisms through which PSCs cause such a net decrease in 
military effectiveness in these situations are coordination problems with the 
professional military.  As detailed in Chapter Five, breakdowns in communications, 
shortcomings in training and doctrine, and resentment are all instrumental in causing 
coordination problems between PSC and military personnel deployed alongside each 
other in the field of combat.  The professional competition and other identity-related 
issues noted earlier in this chapter are key factors causing PSC-military resentment, 
while the communications, training, and doctrinal issues are all clearly structural 
issues.  These coordination problems decrease the integration of the entire occupying 
force (comprising both professional soldiers and PSC personnel).  Furthermore, by 
failing to communicate with military units when traveling through their area of 
responsibility and then requesting quick-reaction forces (QRFs) when they run into 
trouble with the enemy, PSCs detract from the military’s ability to achieve particular 
PSCs decrease 
military 
effectiveness 
PSC hiring 
increases 
(mainly
among 
democracies
) 
Fewer 
democratic 
states will 
be militarily 
effective 
Democracies will 
experience fewer 
military successes 
if their conflict 
selectivity is not 
disproportionately 
affected 
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tasks and to carry out orders – thus decreasing the force’s skill as defined above.  
These coordination problems occur predominantly in cases where the military and 
PSCs are co-deployed alongside each other in the field.  Notably, doctrinal and 
technological improvements are being developed which may, over time, remedy these 
coordination issues to a large extent.  This will, however, take time and consistent 
analysis to ensure that effective rules and systems are implemented.124  
Finally, we must leave open the possibility that PSCs have no discernible 
impact on military effectiveness.  The study’s null hypothesis is thus as follows: 
  
H0: PSCs should have no discernible effect on  
       democracies’ military effectiveness.  Either they do  
       not affect military effectiveness in any manner that  
       would show up in this study, or their positive and  
       negative effects on military effectiveness   
       completely offset one another.125 
                                                
124 Colin M. Alberts, Gerard J. Christman, and Michael P. Dowdy, “Achieving Interoperability: 
Information Sharing via DoD’s Extranet in Stability Operations,” Journal of International Peace 
Operations 3, 2 (September-October, 2007): 10.  See also Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Pentagon 
Sees One Authority Over Contractors,” The New York Times (October 17, 2007).  Accessed November 
14, 2007 at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/17/washington/17blackwater.html?ei=5070&en=c257b0742b5a6103
&ex=1193284800&adxnnl=1&emc=eta1&adxnnlx=1195045958-w7UnPIjzvdNLbjO6ySux3Q. 
125 There is a candidate hypothesis worth mentioning here: that democracy type impacts military 
effectiveness and the democratic advantage.  The usefulness of including this hypothesis in the study 
depends upon whether there is any relevant variation in military organizations across different types of 
democracies, such that different democracies may be affected differently by PSCs.  Although this may 
be a relevant hypothesis to keep in mind in the context of this topic, it is not included in this study for 
two reasons.  First, given the dearth of cases it may be impossible at this point to test whether any 
variation in democracies’ military organizations causes different democracies to be affected differently 
by PSCs.  Only the United States and its coalition partners have deployed modern-day PSCs alongside 
the military to any sizable extent, and we would most expect to see the effects of variation in 
democracies’ military organization in cases where the military is deployed alongside PSCs.  Second, the 
type of democracy may not matter for the effects of PSCs on democracies and their militaries for the 
foreseeable future, given the current nature of warfare and the growing propensity to fight in 
multilateral coalitions or alliances.  Indeed, as more and more democracies fight together in coalitions, 
the relevance of the type of democracy to the question of PSCs’ effects on military effectiveness is 
diminished.  In addition to this transnationalization of warfare, the United States’ hegemonic position 
and ideology of democracy-promotion make it likely that any war involving democracies fought in the 
foreseeable future will be led by the United States.  Thus, we can omit this hypothesis from the study at 
hand, simply noting its potential relevance in future studies of this nature.  
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Using these hypotheses, the analysis in the following chapters seeks to build 
upon several of the dominant works in the International Relations field examining 
private security forces and military effectiveness in the context of democracies and 
counterinsurgency warfare.  In particular, I aim to draw from, synthesize, and expand 
upon the works of Deborah Avant, Risa Brooks, and Gil Merom.   
The study builds upon Avant’s research on how PSCs impact the state, 
adopting her notion of PSCs’ different effects on state building in weak versus strong 
states to inform its conceptualization of how PSCs interact with democracies in 
counterinsurgency scenarios.  As noted above, PSCs allow weak state leaders to 
outsource their violent activities in order to be able to remain in power without having 
to develop a state apparatus.  Meanwhile, PSCs allow strong interventionist states such 
as the United States to outsource the operations traditionally thought of as “operations 
other than war,” in order to maintain their military capacity for more traditional war-
fighting roles.  In doing so, PSCs hinder the prospects for the development of long-
term viable state apparatuses in the target regions of the world where strong states 
have an interventionist presence.   
PSCs also allow both weak and strong states to outsource violence in order to 
distance themselves from the normative implications of potentially unethical actions in 
warfare.  This rationale for outsourcing violence is particularly relevant in the context 
of democracies fighting counterinsurgencies, which, as Merom notes, are often 
difficult wars for democracies to win due to the democratic electorate’s unwillingness 
to use brutal tactics.  Yet, because there is a strong argument in the International 
Relations and Strategic Studies fields that focuses on winning the war for the “hearts 
and minds” of the public as opposed to the use of these brutal tactics, this study 
questions whether outsourced brutality in counterinsurgency warfare or PSC 
compliance with international humanitarian law has a better impact on military 
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effectiveness.  This addition of an IHL component to Brooks’ otherwise 
comprehensive definition of military effectiveness is necessary due to her definition’s 
apparent focus on major wars as opposed to counterinsurgencies. 
In light of this synthesis, the view espoused in the following pages is that PSCs 
allow states to circumvent structural constraints on leaders’ behavior, often at the cost 
of the public’s normative preferences.  Simultaneously, PSCs have varying effects on 
military effectiveness, depending on the consistency between their own structure and 
identity and that of the relevant military forces, as well as on whether the public learns 
of their deployments and the possible moral implications of such deployments.   
 
Variables & Case Selection 
The topic of modern-day military and security privatization carries with it the 
problem of very few available cases, owing to the relative novelty of the security 
privatization trend (at least in its current form) and the inherently secretive nature of 
the industry and its work.  This problem is compounded by the fact that the few cases 
that do exist show little variation in the democracies involved in them, with the United 
States and Britain accounting for almost all of the democratic state involvement in 
these cases.  Yet, both the transnationalization of warfare and the United States’ 
hegemonic position make it likely that future democratic wars will be fought in 
multinational coalitions that include the United States.126  Above all, this study focuses 
on cases involving the United States because security privatization is a serious issue 
facing U.S. policymakers at present, and because the U.S. is a major democracy, a 
major military power, and a major innovator.  Indeed, the fact that U.S. defense 
expenditures are greater than the next twenty-four countries combined means that the 
                                                
126 On the issue of future wars being fought in multinational coalitions, see General Rupert Smith, The 
Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publishers, 2007), 
303-307. 
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United States will likely continue to be one of the most relevant actors for the private 
security industry.127  Therefore, it makes sense to examine PSCs’ impact in the context 
of the United States.  Furthermore, because the United States is a major democracy 
with arguably the strongest military in the world, cases relevant to this topic that 
involve the United States are hard cases in which we would expect PSCs to have very 
little incremental effect on military effectiveness and the democratic advantage. 
There are three variables at play in the hypotheses elaborated above.  The 
independent variable (IV1) for H1 and H2 is the use of private security companies in 
conflicts, and the dependent variable (DV1) for H1 and H2 is military effectiveness, 
measured as detailed above.  There is a second independent variable (IV2) at play in 
the four sub-hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H1c, and H1d): level of PSC compliance with 
international laws of war.   
This study categorizes the available historical and modern cases into three 
different “types” of cases, each selected on the first independent variable (IV1): cases 
in which the democratic state’s military is directly involved in the conflict alongside 
PSCs in their current corporate form (“co-deployed”), cases in which democratic 
states hire PSCs to become involved in a conflict instead of the democratic state’s 
professional military (substitution), and cases in which a mercenary force is 
assimilated into a regular military force (integration).128  
In selecting cases to include in Chapter Three, I looked first at the pool of 
historical cases in which grouped mercenary forces were integrated into the regular 
military, in order to inform modern cases in which PSCs must coordinate smoothly 
with regular military forces.  I then narrowed my pool of possible cases by looking for 
                                                
127 Avant, 2005b: 38. 
128As noted by King, Keohane, and Verba, “the best ‘intentional’ design selects observations to ensure 
variation in the explanatory variable (and any control variables) without regard to the values of the 
dependent variables.”  Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 140. 
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cases that included a normative element, and could speak to the issue of compliance 
with humanitarian norms of warfare.  Chapter Three therefore examines the French 
Foreign Legion in Indochina and Algeria, and the Hessian forces fighting alongside 
the British in the American Revolution.  
 In selecting cases to include in Chapter Four, I looked first for cases in which 
modern PSCs were substituted for the regular military.  I then narrowed that pool of 
possible cases by looking only at those cases in which a democratic state was 
involved.  To further narrow down the pool of cases, I conducted preliminary research 
to determine how easily data and evidence could be accessed for each case, choosing 
to include in Chapter Four only those cases on which ample evidence existed in the 
public domain.  While this last selection criterion leaves open the possibility of 
selection bias, I included four cases in Chapter Four – more than in any of the other 
chapters – in an effort to minimize selection bias and to see general trends across the 
cases.  Chapter Four therefore looks at MPRI in Croatia, DynCorp in Colombia, 
Executive Outcomes and Sandline in Sierra Leone, and Sandline in Papua New 
Guinea.   
Finally, in selecting my cases for Chapter Five, I looked first for cases in 
which modern PSCs were deployed to the same theatre but not integrated into the 
regular military, in a relatively high ratio of PSCs to military personnel.  I also aimed 
to consider the most policy-relevant cases for the United States.  Chapter Five 
therefore examines the United States’ use of PSCs in both the Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflicts from 2003-2007. 
 
Data Sources & Methods of Analysis 
 Owing to the sensitive nature of research focused on private security 
companies and the military, primary source data on this topic are extremely difficult to 
 66 
come by.  Yet, the topic of military privatization has been gaining popularity in recent 
years among the media and academics, and it is thus possible to glean a considerable 
amount of information from newspaper and magazine articles, as well as from the 
numerous secondary accounts being published on the subject.  In addition, democratic 
governments (particularly in the United States and Britain) are publishing an 
increasing number of unclassified reports relating to military and security privatization 
issues.  The private security industry and its trade associations also increasingly 
publish articles relevant to the study at hand, including some authored by government 
officials.  This project thus relies extensively on such media, industry, government, 
academic, and secondary-source documents, particularly in Chapters Three and Four.   
Chapter Five similarly draws on media, industry, academic, and secondary 
source accounts for background information, but also strongly relies on two types of 
interview data.  The first is a set of transcripts of interviews conducted by researchers 
for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in connection with its 2005 and 
2006 reports on “Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers in 
Iraq.”  I acquired these transcripts through a written request to the GAO in October 
2006.  They comprise twenty-four individual and small group interviews of military 
personnel of all ranks, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) officials, U.S. and 
international private security company personnel and officials, officials from the 
Project Contracting Office (PCO) in Iraq, and U.S. government officials.  Of these, I 
analyzed only the GAO’s interviews of PSC and military personnel who had 
experience fighting or working in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  These included 
interviews with fourteen military and thirty-three PSC personnel, conducted between 
2004 and 2006. 
The second type of interview data that Chapter Five relies upon is a 
comprehensive set of thirty-two original semi-structured interviews that I conducted in 
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2006 and 2007 specifically for this study.  These interviews include conversations 
with academic experts on the issue of military privatization, high-level private security 
company officials, private security company operators (lower-level personnel), and 
U.S. Army soldiers of various ranks, ranging from non-commissioned officers to 
colonels.  The private security company personnel and professional soldiers 
interviewed possessed experience in various theatres, ranging from Iraq to 
Afghanistan, the Balkans, South America, and several regions in both Africa and Asia.  
I intentionally sought out several of my interviewees due to their position – for 
instance, I selected various high-level PSC officials in this manner – and selected the 
remainder of my interviewees via “snowball” sampling, in which each interviewee 
referred one to three other potential interviewees.  Due to the relatively small number 
of respondents, the sample cannot be said to be representative of all military or PSC 
views.  The interviews do, however, illustrate distinct trends among the responses.  
Furthermore, they reinforce many of the things seen in the GAO interview transcripts, 
indicating that the findings elaborated in Chapter Five are robust. 
While most of these interviews were conducted in person, approximately thirty 
percent of the interviews – mostly on the military side – were conducted as online, 
asynchronous, in-depth interviews.  These are semi-structured interviews conducted 
via e-mail, involving multiple e-mail exchanges between the interviewer and 
interviewee over an extended period of time.  This technique has several benefits, 
particularly given the sensitive nature of the topic at hand in this study, and the busy 
schedules and geographic distance separating many of the relevant interview 
participants from the researcher.  This method has been shown to cost considerably 
less to administer than in-person interviews, allowing researchers to invite the 
participation of geographically-dispersed samples of people, and to “democratize and 
internationalize research,” enabling researchers “to study individuals or groups with 
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special characteristics or those often difficult or impossible to reach or interview face-
to-face or via telephone.”129  Owing to the bureaucratic difficulties involved in 
attempting to attain formal U.S. military approval to interview military personnel for a 
study on a relatively sensitive topic, this method was found to be especially 
appropriate for this study.  Some potential weaknesses with this method should be 
noted, however.  For instance, it is easier in an e-mail interview for respondents to 
give false responses, deceiving the researcher.  Furthermore, there is a related risk that 
e-mail interviews lack the media richness of in-person interviews, owing to both 
parties’ inability to pick up on visual or nonverbal cues.  Yet, there is evidence that “in 
many cases e-mail facilitates greater disclosure of personal information, offering 
further benefits to both the researcher and participants.”130  
I analyzed the content and discourse of both my own and the GAO’s 
interviews, looking specifically at instances where PSC-military coordination 
successes and failures were mentioned, and coding the causes of these coordination 
successes and failures as either structural or identity-based causes.  I employed a 
similar method in analyzing the newspaper and secondary source data relevant to 
Chapters Three through Five, looking for structural- and identity-based indicators that 
PSCs were having a positive or negative impact on military integration, 
responsiveness, skill, or quality.  In doing so, I traced the processes through which 
PSCs and their historical predecessors impacted military tactics, operations, and 
strategy in all of the cases examined in this study.  While the data do not lend 
themselves to a highly quantified analysis, particular answers to the interview 
questions used in Chapter Five are broken down into proportions in order to 
                                                
129 Lokman I. Meho, “E-Mail Interviewing in Qualitative Research: A Methodological Discussion,” 
Wiley Interscience (May 25, 2006): 2, 5.  Accessed October 20, 2007 at 
http://www.interscience.wiley.com. 
130 N. Bowker and K. Tuffin, “Using the Online Medium for Discursive Research About People With 
Disabilities,” Social Science Computer Review 22, 2 (2004): 228-241. 
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demonstrate the relative frequency of different responses amongst various groups of 
respondents.  Due to the difficulty in acquiring extensive, accurate, and quantifiable 
data on the topic of military privatization at this juncture, primarily qualitative 
methods of analysis are appropriate to the types of data collected and to the purposes 
of the project at hand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
HISTORICAL INSIGHTS: 
MERCENARY FORCES INTEGRATED INTO NATIONAL MILITARIES 
 The cases examined in the next two chapters are all relatively recent cases of 
modern private security companies acting as middlemen between the state and 
individual soldiers-for-hire.  As will be seen, one critically significant issue 
determining the degree to which modern PSCs have a beneficial impact on military 
effectiveness is the degree to which PSCs are required to work alongside regular 
military forces, and the extent to which the two groups are able to work together 
harmoniously.  The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to explore the question of 
what it would take to make PSCs and the military work together well.  To that end, 
and in an effort to generate insights that will be explored further in the following 
chapters, this chapter examines two historical cases that suggest relationships between 
certain uses of PSCs and particular outcomes.  The analysis below explores the case of 
the Hessian Army hired to fight for the British in the American Revolution from 1776 
through 1783, and the French Foreign Legion in Indochina in 1885 and in Algeria 
from 1954 to 1962.  
 These cases were selected for several reasons.  Aside from constituting 
examples of successful integration of mercenary and regular forces, both cases entail a 
grouped mercenary force analogous in many ways to a modern PSC.  Furthermore, 
both were engaged in counterinsurgency warfare to at least some extent in the 
conflicts examined, fighting on the part of major powers seeking to put down 
rebellions in their colonies.  The style of warfare seen in these two cases is therefore 
comparable to the other cases explored in this study.  Questions of compliance with 
normative expectations of humanitarian conduct arise in both cases as well.  They are 
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therefore model cases from which to extrapolate lessons relevant to the study at hand 
and modern situations of PSC use.  Both of these cases provide unique insight into the 
major theoretical issues probed in this study: the impact of private security companies 
on military effectiveness and the democratic advantage, the impact of force 
privatization on the state, and the relevance of structural and identity-based factors in 
defining PSC-military relations.  Of primary importance, though, they provide insight 
into the policy-relevant questions examined herein, particularly the overarching 
question of how best to insure that PSC deployment has a beneficial impact on 
military effectiveness and, by extension, the democratic advantage.   
With these contributions in mind, the remainder of this chapter proceeds first 
with an examination of the Hessian case, followed by an exploration of the French 
Foreign Legion case.  Finally, the chapter examines the relationship of the state to the 
force in question in these two cases, with the aim of comparing this relationship with 
the state’s role in the cases explored in Chapters Four and Five.  Through this analysis, 
it becomes clear that structurally integrating a mercenary force into the regular 
military is quite effective in helping the overall force to overcome its identity 
differences with the mercenary force, improving the prospects that the mercenaries 
will improve rather than harm military effectiveness.  Yet, such a strategy is not 
foolproof, as illustrated by the Hessian case and the case of the Foreign Legion in 
Algeria.  The chapter’s overall message, therefore, is that both structural and identity 
variables are significant in determining a hired force’s impact on overall military 
effectiveness.  The cases herein also indicate that: (a) regular military forces may be 
no more likely to comply with humanitarian norms than are mercenary forces; and (b) 
the structural constraints argued by democratic advantage theorists to be unique to 
democracies – and to lead to the theorized propensity for democracies to be 
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disproportionately victorious in their conflicts – might, in fact, occur in some non-
democracies as well. 
 
The Hessian Army in the American Revolution, 1776-1783 
 On June 16, 1775, Britain sustained huge losses at the Battle of Bunker Hill 
while striving to put down its American colonists’ rebellion.  The British government 
subsequently began to panic regarding its military capabilities to quell the rebellion in 
America.  Fearing that the colonists could field 50,000 militiamen against the 30,000-
man British Army (half of which was otherwise engaged in Ireland), the British 
proposed to hire 20,000 Russian mercenaries from Catherine the Great.  Catherine, 
however, refused to hire out any of her soldiers on grounds of principle “simply to 
calm a rebellion which is not supported by any foreign power.”131  The British then 
made an attempt to hire the Scots Brigade from the Dutch, but the States General only 
offered to hire it out “on condition that it should not be used outside Europe.”132  As a 
last resort, Britain turned to the German provinces for mercenaries.  Though the first 
few German princes refused the British request, in the end six different German rulers 
sold their troops to Britain to join the approximately 16,500 British soldiers fighting in 
the American Revolution at that point: Frederick II, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel sent 
16,992 troops, Duke Charles I of Brunswick sent 5,723 troops, Count William 
(Frederick II’s son) of Hesse-Hanau sent 2,422 men, Margrave Charles Alexander of 
Anspach-Bayreuth sent 2,353 men, Prince Frederick of Waldeck sent 1,225 troops, 
and Prince Frederick Augustus of Anhalt-Zerbst sent 1,160 men.133  Because Hesse-
Cassel was the largest single contributor of the Germans deployed to America, the 
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entire German mercenary force deployed to America were commonly referred to as 
“Hessians.”134  Many of the Hessian soldiers deployed to America were forcibly 
recruited into the Hessian army in order to fill the quota of soldiers promised to 
Britain.  By one account, Hessian recruiters either successfully delivered the recruit to 
the place of deployment or shot him; desertion was not considered acceptable, whether 
or not you were caught.135  Another account notes several instances in which deserters 
were brutally punished, but not killed.  In his diary, Hessian officer Johann Ernst 
Prechtel – when listing deserters – notes, “Private Schaeffer, of the first recruit 
shipment was brought back to the regiment and punished by having to run the gauntlet 
twelve times a day for two days in a row.”136  On another occasion, Prechtel notes that 
on February 17, 1780, “Private Katzenwinkel, who deserted on 10 March 1778, was 
not punished for his desertion, but because he had used the false name Major Ernst 
von Reitzenstein for a time, he was made to run the gauntlet twelve times.”137  
These two characteristics of the Hessian deployment call into question whether 
the Hessian soldiers were motivated to fight wholeheartedly in the American 
Revolution.  Indeed, this was a foreign conflict in which they had no personal stake, 
and many did not want to be there to begin with.  Some analysts and historians have 
argued that because of their lack of personal stake in the conflict, the Hessians were 
“reluctant soldiers at best.”138  The discussion below demonstrates that because the 
Hessian troops were structurally integrated into the British military as auxiliaries, they 
could benefit the British force without the risk that integration problems between the 
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Hessian and British troops would hamper the prospects for success.  More beneficial 
than this, though, was the Hessians’ impact as force-multipliers for the British 
military.  Yet, despite these structural pre-conditions for success, identity variables – 
namely, the Hessian reputation for unwonted cruelty – as well as the forcible 
recruitment structure for these forces, led them to have an overall impact on British 
military effectiveness ranging from negligible to negative. 
 
“The Most Militarized Society in All Germany” 
 Mercenaries were prevalent in most European conflicts in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, many of them employed by the Prussian Army of Frederick the 
Great.  After the Seven Years War ended in 1763, Frederick’s foreign mercenaries 
returned to their home, causing the German princes to realize that they had a major 
war-fighting force available for export.  The treaty concluded between Frederick II of 
Hesse-Cassel and Britain on January 31, 1776 followed almost a year of negotiations 
between the two states, and was easily the most lucrative of the six treaties that Britain 
entered into with German rulers for the provision of troops.  This was partly due to the 
fact that the British expected that quick dispatch of the Hessian forces would end the 
revolt in one or two campaigns, and thus agreed to pay Frederick II twice the rate per 
soldier agreed on by the other German rulers until at least one year beyond the end of 
hostilities.139  Furthermore, the British agreed to indemnify Hesse-Cassel for the 
destruction suffered during its last war, backdated the treaty by two weeks in order to 
give Hesse-Cassel a large amount of cash up front in order to stimulate recruitment 
efforts, and pledged military assistance to Hesse-Cassel in case of an attack against its 
territory.  Significantly for the military deployment, the British promised not to break 
                                                
139 Charles W. Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
137. 
 75 
up the Hessian forces or to commit them outside of North America, and allowed them 
to be led by their own Hessian commanders.140   
 Frederick II anticipated that the beneficial treaty terms would allow him to 
reduce the country’s taxes and otherwise improve its economy by bolstering the 
Hessian weapons and war-provisions industries and increasing soldiers’ pay.141  
Recent crop failures had aggravated the country’s dual burdens of food shortages and 
rural overpopulation, and he hoped that this treaty could alleviate these problems.  The 
fact that Hesse-Cassel was clearly the most heavily militarized state in Europe 
certainly helped to cement the deal.  The country maintained a 12,000-man field army 
and another 12,000 militia served in garrisons; in other words, there was one soldier 
for every fifteen citizens, a ratio double that of Prussia’s soldier to civilian ratio.142  It 
was relatively easy to maintain the military at these levels, as both economic and 
cultural incentives kept recruitment levels high.  The many rural and urban poor in 
Hesse-Cassel often enlisted in the army in order to avoid starvation, and military 
families were exempt from paying income taxes.  Furthermore, Hesse-Cassel’s long 
history of wars against the Catholics and the French had instilled in the citizenry a 
general sense of obligation to defend the country.  A sense of enthusiasm for military 
life grew out of the high esteem in which military life and glory were held, and the 
popular mythology of military adventure passed between generations.143  Hence, 
Hesse-Cassel’s entire identity was so enveloped in its military presence that one 
traveler described it as “the most militarized society in all Germany,” and another 
noted “before I came to Hesse I hardly knew what a military nation was.”144  This 
military identity stemmed from Hesse-Cassel’s relationship with the outside world as 
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well as the previously noted domestic influences, for its military was undisputedly the 
country’s primary export industry.  Scholar Charles W. Ingrao writes: 
 
Though it had originally been created as a means of 
defending the country, the mercenary army had become 
an end in itself by virtue of its importance to the 
economy and state finances.  The public welfare, which 
had always been associated with successful economic 
and fiscal policies, now became tied to the well-being of 
the military establishment.145  
 When the time came to recruit additional soldiers to send to America, however, 
public support for the maintenance of a large military were in many cases subjugated 
to personal concerns of losing family members overseas in a conflict in which Hesse-
Cassel itself had no stake.  Indeed, many deserters were more concerned with the 
perils of the ocean crossing and the American wilderness, as well as the inevitable 
separation from their families, than they were opposed to fighting a foreign war.  This 
is not to say, however, that deserters outnumbered volunteers signing up for the 
American deployment.  Many joined the army specifically hoping to start a new life in 
America, a trend that the government could do little to forestall, as it was desperate to 
recruit the soldiers promised to Britain.  Recruiters were also successful in their efforts 
by recruiting – forcibly at times – non-German citizens.  
 
Hessian Forces’ Impact on Military Effectiveness &  
The Democratic Advantage 
 Both identity and structural factors were relevant in determining the Hessian 
forces’ impact on British military effectiveness. Three structural factors, all of them 
ordering principles as discussed in Chapter Two, were significant: the fact that the 
Hessian troops were allowed to remain in their own units under their own 
commanders, the fact that they were simultaneously integrated into the British military 
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as auxiliary forces, and the fact that many of the Hessians were forcibly recruited to 
serve in this war in which they had no personal stake. They acted as a massive force 
multiplier, thus increasing the quality of the British deployment.  Furthermore, the fact 
that they were a structured military force and were included in the structure of the 
British forces themselves meant that the Hessian troops knew their position in the 
chain-of-command and thus did not harm the integration of the overall British force.  
Yet, their forcible recruitment meant that many were not motivated to fight to the best 
of their abilities, which lowered their demonstrated level of skill.  In fact, a large 
proportion of the 17,313 surviving German mercenaries at the end of the war had been 
wounded or captured without winning a single battle in which Hessians or other 
Germans were pitted exclusively against Americans.146  
The key identity factor was, as mentioned above, the Hessian military identity 
(a constitutive norm).  Faith in this aspect of their identity likely contributed to the 
Hessians’ few military successes in the American Revolution, such as the Battle of 
Long Island.  Yet, another identity characteristic recognized early on by the other 
parties to the conflict – the Hessians’ tendencies for unwonted cruelty (a relational 
comparison) – led them to become the subject of ridicule and to become much less 
feared by the other parties to the conflict.147  Hessian soldiers’ journal entries from the 
American Revolution provide some indication of the Hessian forces’ alleged cruel 
tendencies.  Johann Georg Zinn, auditor and regimental quartermaster of the Hesse-
Cassel von Donop Regiment, noted in his journal during the Battle of Long Island in 
August 1776, “Another patrol from our regiment brought in many prisoners, 
however.”  The translator of Zinn’s journal and an expert on Hessian forces in the 
Revolution, Bruce Burgoyne, notes following this statement “[Code – Many high 
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ranking individuals at this time shed their ideas of being heroes.  The prisoners who 
knelt and sought to surrender were beaten.]”148  Another journal entry by Carl 
Friedrich Rueffer, an ensign and later a lieutenant in the Hesse-Cassel von Mirbach 
Regiment, writes of Hessian treatment of suspects in a string of arson incidents during 
the Battle of Harlem Heights in September and October 1776: 
 
There was a great fire behind our front at twelve o’clock 
at night, which we assumed to come from New York, 
and which we found to be the case as soon as it was 
light.  About 100 rebels, who had remained hidden in 
the empty houses and cellars, set the fire and even 
though the English garrison, which consisted of three 
battalions, turned out at once, two churches and 400 
houses to windward were laid in ashes.  One of these 
criminals was thrown into the fire, another hung by the 
legs and burned . . . Several other suspicious persons 
were now and again thrown into the flames.149  
The rebel forces wrote of the Hessians’ cruelty in more descriptive terms.  In a Letter 
to the Editor published in the New York Times in 1819, an anonymous writer quoted a 
“letter written by one John A. Gillett to his wife:” 
 
I was prisoner by the 27th day of August by a people 
called heshens (Hessians) and by a party called Gagers 
(Yagers or Jagers) the most Inhuman of all mortals.  I 
can’t give Room to picture them here; but thus much I at 
first Resolved not to be taken but by the Impertunity of 
the Seven taken with me and being surrounded on all 
sides by numbers I unhappily surrendered; would to God 
I never had then I should never (have) known their 
unmerciful cruelties; they first disarmed me they 
plundered me of all I had, watch Buckles money and 
sum clothing after which they abused me by bruising my 
flesh with the Butts of their (guns).  They knocked me 
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down.  I got up and they (kept on) beating me almost all 
the way to there (camp) where I got shot of them – the 
next thing was I was almost starved to death by them . . . 
After giving you a small sketch of myself and troubles, I 
will Endeavor to faintly lead you into the poor situation 
the soldiers are in, especially those taken at Long Island, 
where I was; in fact, there cases are deplorable and they 
are Real objects of pity – they are still confined and in 
houses where there is no fire – poor mortals, with little 
or no cloths, perishing with hunger . . . occasioned for 
want of food their natures are brook and gone, some 
almost loose their voices and some their hearing.  They 
are crowded into churches and there guarded day and 
night.  I can’t paint the horrible appearance they make – 
it is shocking to human nature to behold them.  Could I 
draw the curtain from before you there expose to your 
view a lean Jawd mortal . . . surrounded with tattered 
garments, Rotten Rags close beset with unwelcome 
vermin.150  
Such actions likely did not contribute to British military effectiveness, as 
American defeats of primarily German forces handily outnumbered German victories 
in the American Revolution, as discussed in detail below.  Of particular importance 
were the Hessian defeats at Trenton, Bennington, and the attempted Springfield, New 
Jersey raid of Knyphausen.151 
This is not to say that the Hessians had a consistently negative impact on 
British military effectiveness.  They were a significant force-multiplier, if nothing 
else.  The impact of the significant number of Hessians troops is recounted by 
nineteenth-century historian Edward J. Lowell, who notes that a German magazine 
editor during this period remarked that many letters from Hessian officers printed in 
newspapers ascribed a great deal of the victory in the Battle of Long Island in August 
1776 to themselves, and that, in view of the “well-known valor of the Hessian 
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soldiery, they undoubtedly deserve it,” but that they understate the fact that the British 
and Hessians together outnumbered the Americans by a ratio of five or four to one 
(20,000 British and Hessians to 4,000 or 5,000 Americans).152  It is notable that this 
battle occurred almost immediately following the arrival of the first dispatch of 
Hessians to America, and that they numbered approximately 8,000, thus substantially 
increasing the size of the British forces available for the Battle of Long Island.153  
Thus, these auxiliary forces clearly improved military effectiveness in certain cases. 
 The Hessian forces failed, however, to assist the British in outmaneuvering the 
Americans at all junctures.  Indeed, on December 26, 1776, George Washington’s 
army attacked the main force of 1,400 Hessians in Trenton, on the Delaware River.  
Washington’s troops achieved a significant level of surprise, killing thirty Hessians 
and capturing over nine hundred Hessian prisoners, using them through the winter as 
free labor.154  A week later, Washington again surprised the British and Hessian forces 
in Princeton, New Jersey, killing or capturing four hundred.  These two battles 
shocked those back home in Britain, who had expected that with Hessian troops they 
would be able to quickly put down the colonists’ rebellion.155  The Hessians’ overall 
impact on British military effectiveness thus appears to range from negligible to 
negative.  Although the Hessians did act as force-multipliers and increased military 
effectiveness in limited instances, their relative lack of motivation and reputation for 
unreasonable cruelty ultimately decreased military effectiveness by reducing skill and 
responsiveness.  Although International Humanitarian Law was not established at this 
point, the fact that large numbers of non-Hessian forces ridiculed the Hessians for 
their unwonted cruelty indicates that the normative anathema regarding unethical 
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behavior in warfare was pervasive during this time period.  This case can therefore be 
said to also provide support for the notion underlying H1a and H1c: that ethical 
behavior in warfare is more likely to benefit military effectiveness than is unethical 
behavior, due to the impact of such behavior on the war for the “hearts and minds” of 
the civilian population. 
 
Hessian Forces’ Impact on The Democratic Advantage 
 Neither Hesse-Cassel (or any of the other German provinces) nor Britain were 
democracies at the time of the American Revolution.  Nonetheless, the process of 
hiring Hessian mercenaries sheds light on decision-making relevant to democratic 
advantage theory.  The key question is whether British officials purchased mercenary 
services from the Hessians for the explicit purpose of reducing domestic political 
opposition to the war.  Such data would indicate that the Hessian forces allowed the 
British government to be less selective in its conflict choices, as without them, the 
government might have been forced by domestic political will to pull out of the war or 
to avoid war through compromise.  This would provide evidence against democratic 
advantage theory, for it will indicate that there is nothing special about democracies in 
this regard.  Indeed, the analysis below does provide a preliminary indication that 
some of the structural constraints argued by democratic advantage theorists to be 
unique to democracies may, in fact, occur in some non-democracies as well. 
 Britain’s motives for hiring the Hessian forces are central to the analysis at 
hand, since its role as the hiring state is roughly analogous to the situation of modern 
states hiring PSCs.  The parliamentary debate regarding the treaties with Germany 
showed that proponents of hiring the Hessian and other German forces justified doing 
so on grounds of necessity.  On February 29, 1776, Lord North argued in Parliament 
that the German troops would: 
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. . . be the best and fastest means of reducing America to a 
proper constitutional state of obedience, because men could 
be readier had and upon much cheaper terms in this way 
than they could possibly be recruited at home . . . and that 
the force which this measure would enable them to send to 
America would be such as, in all human probability, must 
compel that country to agree to terms of submission, 
perhaps without further effusion of blood.156  
Even more telling is Lord Barrington, who reluctantly conceded that recruits could be 
“obtained on no other terms,” and that while the bargain was not advantageous to 
Britain, it was the best possible.157   
The notion that recruits could not be obtained in any other way – or at least, 
not as inexpensively and quickly – than by hiring foreign forces indicates that the 
ability to hire the Hessians and other German troops allowed Britain to be less 
selective than it might otherwise have been with regard to whether and how to 
continue fighting the American colonists.  It is clear that hiring the Hessians alleviated 
the direct military burden on the British citizenry, thus making them less likely to 
express any criticisms about the conflict in America.  If Britain had been a democracy 
at the time, the “selection effects” argument of the democratic advantage would tell us 
that hiring the Hessian troops likely caused Britain to continue the war longer than it 
would have otherwise.  Because Britain was not a democracy, however, this case 
provides evidence to contradict the basic assumption of democratic advantage theory, 
for it indicates that both democracies and non-democracies can experience the 
processes that democratic advantage theory insists are unique to democracies. 
 
 
 
                                                
156 Lowell, 1884: Chapter 3. 
157 Lowell, 1884: Chapter 3. 
 83 
French Foreign Legion 
 The French king, Louis Philippe, formed the ‘legion composee d’etrangers’ in 
March 1831 as a political expedient to cope with the dual problems posed by his desire 
to expand his kingdom in the face of French war-weariness following the Battle of 
Waterloo just sixteen years earlier, and the existence of a collection of political 
refugees, revolutionaries, criminals, and fugitives in his kingdom.158  In other words, 
the Legion came into existence at least in part to increase the French military’s 
capacity, and is an example of the outsourcing of violence according to a logic of 
capacity.  The French army was otherwise occupied with the French war in North 
Africa, and could not be concerned with keeping the peace at home.  Furthermore, 
King Louis Philippe was concerned about rebellion in his territories, as he had come to 
power directly following a rebellion that ousted his predecessor, Charles X.  Recent 
uprisings across Europe had resulted in a flood of political refugees and army deserters 
into France.   
The mercenary tradition was not foreign to France, which had been recruiting 
mercenaries from Switzerland since the imposition of the Perpetual Peace in 1516.159  
Jean Lacroix, a Belgian adventurer and lieutenant-general in the French army, 
therefore assembled a group of foreigners and proposed to the king that he send them 
to Algeria to either fight with the French army or to settle as colonists.  The king did 
not hesitate to accept Lacroix’s suggestion, issuing a decree on March 9-10, 1831 that 
authorized the formation of “A legion of foreigners to be known as the Foreign Legion 
for service outside France” (emphasis added).160  Recruiting stations were then set up 
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across the French provinces, and volunteers were encouraged to sign up by the 
promise of French citizenship at the end of their service.161  
 
Legionnaire Training 
 The early attempts to enforce discipline in the Legion, while successful, 
created a legacy of extremely harsh and even cruel training methods that would last up 
through modern times.  This reglement – the Legion’s conditions of disicipline and 
training – was enforced so severely that many former legionnaires have described their 
commanders as sadistic.162  Marching has been at the core of the Legion reglement 
throughout history.  Foreign legionnaires were expected to be able to march up to 
thirty miles a day, wearing a full uniform and carrying an oversized backpack, rifle, 
bayonet, pick or shovel, three hundred rounds of ammunition, and wood for their fires.  
Aside from reports of thirty-mile marches up and down hills in the stifling African 
heat, former legionnaire Simon Murray – a British citizen who served in the Legion 
from 1960-1965 – writes of his comrades being regularly hurt and/or beaten by their 
commanders during training exercises: “Krueger broke Martinez’s leg today while 
demonstrating a judo throw . . . He is now in the infirmary well plastered up, and 
Krueger doesn’t give a damn.”163  Of another incident, in which a fellow legionnaire 
was caught by a commander during weapons inspection having jammed a 9mm 
submachine gun bullet in the breech of his 7.5 mm rifle and pointing it at another 
legionnaire in jest, Murray writes: 
 
[Crepelli] of course found the rifle and bullet and 
quickly extracted a confession from the now gibbering 
Dahms.  Then as we watched in stunned shock, he 
suddenly hit Dahms with the rifle butt across the side of 
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the head as cold-bloodedly as a man chopping wood 
with an ax.  And as Dahms lay half senseless on the 
floor, Crepelli kicked his body mercilessly, all the while 
cursing him with a stream of volatile Italian blasphemy.  
Nobody moved a muscle; we just stood frozen like 
gaping gargoyles, hardly daring to breathe lest the wrath 
of Crepelli be turned on one of us.  It ended as abruptly 
as it had started, and Crepelli stormed from the room 
yelling threats of instant death to anyone unwise enough 
to point a loaded gun in the barracks again.164  
The treatment doled out to deserters, once caught, was even worse.  Murray 
recounts the story of two men from his unit who deserted, only to be caught later that 
day by the regular army.  Murray accompanied two of his superiors to the regular 
army camp to pick them up: 
 
On our arrival at the regular army camp, the two  
prisoners were dragged forward and Westof staggered 
everybody including myself by pulling out his pistol and 
dropping both of them to the ground by a blow to the 
head with the butt of his gun.  Lefevres’s head started to 
bleed like hell . . . The mixture of horror and 
astonishment on the faces of the French soldiers was 
something to see . . . We returned to Sully, and the two 
prisoners were paraded in front of Captain Glasser in his 
office . . . He beat the living daylights out of them . . . 
[then] they were given three hours of la pelote.  This 
takes the form of the prisoner being equipped with a 
sack of stones on his back (the sack has wire shoulder 
straps), and a steel helmet on his head without the 
interior, and then he runs.  The sergeant stands over him 
with a whistle and a rope’s end, and according to the 
number of blasts on the whistle, one, two, or three, the 
prisoner punctuates his running by doing a forward roll, 
crawling on his stomach, or marching with knees bent.  
When there is a slow in the pace, then the rope’s end 
comes into play . . . When they were exhausted and not 
an ounce of strength left in their bodies, they were made 
to crawl through an open sewer.165  
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Despite the threat of such treatment, many legionnaires since the Legion’s creation 
have deserted or attempted to desert.  While desertion itself was generally considered 
acceptable, being caught was a disgrace and, as shown above, no sympathy was spared 
for the deserter once captured and brought back to the Legion.166  Others resorted to 
suicide to escape their fate.167  
 As a result of both this training regimen and the severe punishment for 
attempted deserters, legionnaires were in many cases willing to fight to the death 
against incredible odds.  Foreign Legion units were therefore often deployed in the 
tactically most dangerous positions.  In this case, the legionnaires’ perceived 
willingness to die – bolstered by multiple reports of legionnaires’ superior 
effectiveness in the field over the course of multiple conflicts – led to the development 
of a brave Legion identity that, in turn, impacted future deployment and tactical 
decisions.  The below analyses of the Legion in particular conflicts are intended to 
illustrate how both the Legion’s identity and its structural integration with the regular 
French military impacted French military effectiveness and IHL compliance. 
 
The Legion in Indochina:  
The Siege of Tuyen-Kwang, 1885 
The French war in Indochina officially lasted from 1883 to 1891.  However, 
the roots of the conflict extended as far back as the 1840s, when the French had begun 
to search for a base in the Far East to offset the British base in Hong Kong.  Over the 
next forty years, a combination of this fear of British colonial rivalry, the desire to tap 
the supposedly rich markets of China’s Hunan province via Tonkin, pressure by the 
French Catholic Church to protect its missionaries, and the existence of several French 
officers ambitious to advance France’s future in Indochina culminated in French naval 
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captain Henri Riviere’s storming of the Hanoi citadel in 1883, against formal orders.  
Riviere was killed shortly thereafter, and the Chamber of Deputies in Paris 
consequently voted to send 3,000 men to the Far East to support operations in 
Tonkin.168 
Two battalions of the Foreign Legion were deployed to Indochina during this 
period, and they were used in every campaign for the eight-year duration of the 
conflict.169  The Legion was thus instrumental in helping France to achieve victory in 
this war.  A particularly vivid example of the Legion’s superior fighting skills and 
stalwart determination is seen in the defense of the French fort at Tuyen-Kwang in 
Indochina.  Tuyen-Kwang was a jungle fort located approximately 100 miles north of 
Hanoi on the Claire River.  It lay in a valley surrounded by heavily forested 
mountains, and was therefore impractical to defend against a modern army.  In 
January 1885, the Third and Fourth companies of the Legion joined 210 French 
soldiers defending the fort at Tuyen-Kwang against Black Flags (a group of pirate-like 
warriors led by local barons) and regular Chinese soldiers.  The Black Flags and 
Chinese regulars were able to advance in stages by means of trenches and tunnels, 
some of which led right up to and inside the walls of the fort.  The Legion attempted to 
keep the attackers pinned down in their trenches with siege guns, but the 
approximately 20,000 Black Flags made frequent frontal assaults on the fort.  The 
Legion was nonetheless successful on multiple occasions in pushing them back.  The 
siege against the fort lasted for thirty-five days, with thirty-two casualties in the 
French units and another 126 wounded.  Yet, the French units were ultimately 
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successful, and the majority of casualties were from Legion battalions, as was typical 
at that time.170   
Three battalions of the Foreign Legion remained in Indochina until World War 
I, as guerilla warfare continued even after the French army had suppressed most 
organized military opposition throughout Tonkin.  Because the Legion specialized in 
fighting guerillas, a legacy of its history of fighting in North Africa, legionnaires were 
the obvious choice when selecting French units to remain in Indochina.  In recognition 
of the Legion’s unique identity in comparison to the regular French troops, British 
volunteer George Manington compared the Legion to the French regulars stationed in 
Indochina at the same time.  Manington noted that the French soldiers hated the 
country, the army, and the expedition itself.  These conscripts were “town-bred, 
beardless boys of from eighteen to twenty years of age, and unfortunate enough to 
draw a low number from the conscription urn.”  While these soldiers sat by their 
campfires talking morosely of their homes and loved ones, the legionnaires were 
older, more experienced, inured to danger, hardship, and disease.  Manington writes 
that they enjoyed the lives they had chosen, and could go to meet their deaths light-
heartedly.171  Such statements reflect a legionnaire identity clearly distinct from that of 
the French regular military at the time, and one that had a direct impact on the 
Legion’s abilities and effectiveness as a fighting force. 
 
The Legion in Algeria, 1954-1962 
 As noted above, the French Foreign Legion was created in part to keep order in 
the French colony of Algeria.  Consequently, the Legion was frequently deployed to 
Algeria over the course of its history as a fighting force.  In late 1954, nationalist 
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Algerians started the last of Algeria’s uprisings against France and, because the only 
political option open to the French government at this point was to keep Algeria by 
means of force, the Legion once again found itself fighting in Algeria.172 
 Algiers, the capital city, was particularly crucial to both the French forces and 
the nationalist Algerian Front for National Liberation (FLN).  The FLN hoped to make 
Algiers the site of a decisive battle in order to discredit French rule, and therefore the 
FLN leadership considered the city a separate operational zone in which they 
proceeded to launch a relentless campaign of urban terrorism.  Because Algiers was 
equally important to the French due to its symbolic importance as the capital city and 
the gravity of the nationalist threat there, the French Minister-in-Residence in Algiers 
gave General Jacques Massu and his 10th Paratrooper Brigade full powers to restore 
order in the capital in January 1957.173  Massu and his troops were successful in this 
endeavor by employing a combination of massive arrests of suspected FLN members, 
summary executions, torture, and the resettlement of perhaps as many as one million 
Algerians from the territories that were considered strategic.174 
Wellard notes that Legion paratroopers countered the terrorist tactics of the 
FLN in Algeria by “sealing off the Casbah, patrolling the alley night and day, keeping 
in touch with headquarters by walkie-talkie telephones, raiding suspect houses, paying 
for information, and torturing known members of the FLN.”175  Historian Douglas 
Porch elaborates upon the French military’s use of torture in Algeria, noting, “for the 
paras in Algiers in 1957, torture appeared to offer a quick and effective way to break 
up the FLN infrastructure.”176  Porch goes on to quote the justifications provided by 
Massu for the use of torture by his troops: 
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It is imperative that we obtain urgent operational 
intelligence, upon which depended the lives of innocent 
human beings, deliberately sacrificed by the FLN to gain 
its objectives.  Such cruelty did not inspire one with the 
desire to spare those whose confessions could interrupt a 
fatal course of events.  Therefore, practically speaking, 
if to make them ‘cough up’ it was necessary ‘to rough 
‘em up a bit,’ the interrogators were obliged to submit 
suspects to physical pain, whose violence was graduated 
to achieve the confession . . . The procedure most often 
employed, beyond slaps, was electricity, by using the 
generators of field radios . . . and the application of 
electrodes on different points of the body.177  
One of Massu’s subordinates in Algeria, General Paul Aussaresses, wrote a similar 
explanation for the use of torture in his memoir: 
 
I don’t attempt to justify my actions, but only to explain 
that once a country demands that its army fight an enemy 
who is using terror to compel an indifferent population to 
join its ranks and provoke a repression that will in turn 
outrage international public opinion, it becomes impossible 
for that army to avoid using extreme measures.178  
Massu and others argued that torture was decisive in winning the Battle of 
Algiers, which did indeed turn out to be one of the largest battles of the war in Algeria.  
Yet, it is ironic that Aussaresses invokes terrorism’s impact on international public 
opinion as a justification for the use of torture by the French in Algeria, as such 
methods in reality harmed international support for the French cause.  As Porch notes: 
 
The defeat of the FLN was more apparent than real, for 
the methods employed by the paras to win the battle had 
probably done more than anything to discredit the cause 
of Algerie francaise in the eyes of both French and 
world opinion.  For the issue upon which the swarms of 
                                                
177 Quoted in Porch, 1991: 585-586.  Note that General Massu denounced his employment of torture 
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journalists who had covered the Battle of Algiers for the 
world press had concentrated upon was that of torture     
. . . the realization that the paras were willing to sacrifice 
legality for expediency did much to contribute to the 
loss of faith in France in the war, and, because this was 
carried out before the world press, it also helped to 
undermine the French position in international 
opinion.”179  
Murray supports the notion that torture hindered long-term French military 
effectiveness in Algeria: 
 
This type of guerilla war is won or lost by the 
relationship one has with the local population.  Once 
their support is lost, then so is the war, and from then on 
it just becomes a matter of time . . . The French have not 
been very subtle in their treatment of Arabs in the 
towns, either.  The Battle of Algiers in 1957 must have 
lost them many friends.  There are terrible stories of 
French interrogation of Arab prisoners at this time.  The 
effectiveness of torturing people to make them betray 
their cause cannot be disputed.  But with all the good 
results – the ‘fingering’ of many fellagha, the betrayal 
and subsequent capture of many of the rebel leaders – 
was a steady buildup of hatred against the French, a 
hatred that comes from living in fear and terror.  And 
this antagonism drew the Arabs, so often before divided 
among themselves, into a common cause; it made them 
feel the necessity of combining for survival, and it made 
them finally aware of their own strength.  The French 
became the foreign intruder and the concept of 
nationalism was born in the Arabs, which was never 
there before.180  
The use of torture certainly appears to have had a negative impact on long-term 
French military effectiveness in the war in Algeria, as demonstrated by Algeria’s 
victory in the conflict and its achievement of independence in 1962.  This occurred 
despite the short-term benefits of such interrogation methods; for instance, the French 
victory in the Battle of Algiers.  Indeed, Gil Merom argues that the French enjoyed 
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clear military victory in Algeria, citing the relatively low numbers of French casualties 
(between 25,000 and 30,000 total, compared with an estimate of between 140,000 and 
500,000 FLN casualties), the fact that the French successfully recruited many 
Algerians to their side of the conflict, and the fact that the FLN never managed to 
organize a massive popular uprising or strike.181  Yet, France gave in to Algeria’s 
political demands in large part because of extensive media coverage of the torture 
tactics used there and the resulting decline in support for the war among the French 
citizenry.182  In terms of this study’s examination of the effects of IHL compliance, 
then, the case of the French Foreign Legion in Algeria provides support for both the 
notion underlying the “draining the sea” approach and that underlying the “hearts and 
minds” school of thought, depending upon the timeframe of analysis.  In the short-
term, this case supports the logic of H1d, that mercenary forces’ non-compliance with 
IHL benefits military effectiveness.  In the long-term, however, the case appears to 
support H1c, that IHL non-compliance decreases military effectiveness. 
The Algerian case raises the question of whether the regular French military 
units were any better at adhering to international rules and norms of ethical warfare 
than were legionnaires.  Porch is quick to note, “This is not to say that the Legion was 
necessarily more savage than other French units, all of whom were liable to act in [an 
unethical] way.”183  Yet, he goes on to say, “That said, however, it is possible that the 
Legion was particularly liable to behave in a harsh and ruthless manner.  This sprang 
in part from its tradition of unquestioned obedience to superiors and the unit’s sense of 
racial separateness, especially its dislike of Arabs.”184  Merom, moreover, notes, “the 
forces assigned to Algiers – the paratroopers and Foreign Legion units – were those 
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with the least affinity for civic values.”185  This supports the notion that there may 
have been something relatively unique about the legionnaire identity – though shared 
by the paratroopers from the regular military – that made Foreign Legion units more 
willing to engage in torture than were other soldiers.  Yet, admissions by General 
Aussaresses and others in 2001 and 2002 of the regular French military’s involvement 
in torture, summary executions, and rape indicate with certainty that regular French 
troops did indeed participate in these brutal tactics in Algeria.186  Nonetheless, 
however, it is very likely that legionnaires’ compliance with IHL would benefit overall 
long-term military effectiveness, as illustrated by the results of non-compliance with 
IHL in the Algerian war.   
 
The French Foreign Legion’s Impact on Military Effectiveness &  
The Democratic Advantage 
The specific identity characteristics of the French Foreign Legion noted above 
are key components of the Legion’s impact on French military operations.  These 
identity characteristics include the brutal training methods for which the French 
Foreign Legion are famous, and its lack of affinity for civic values (both constitutive 
norms in this context).  The identity differences between legionnaires and other 
professional soldiers stemmed from the earliest origins of the Legion: the fact that it 
had developed such rigorous and cruel norms of training to deal with its fugitive 
members, and as such, these members were much more willing to die in battle.  Such 
identity differences translated into different tactical, strategic, and operational roles for 
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the Legion as opposed to other units.  The fact that legionnaires were drawn from 
multiple different nationalities posed little obstacle to their cohesiveness as a fighting 
force, and a recruit’s past and his last name were of no concern once he joined the 
Legion.  According to Mockler, both of these traditions were extremely successful in 
erasing individual identities and enforcing conformity to the Legion’s collective 
identity.187  
Thus, as illustrated above, not only did Legion units act as force multipliers to 
enhance the regular French army, their unique training and resulting proficiencies in 
guerilla warfare and as an assault force similarly enhanced the French army’s skill and 
responsiveness in Indochina and Algeria.  Because commanders understood the 
implications of each unit’s identity, they were able to use each in a manner that 
benefited military effectiveness.  Meanwhile, the fact that the Legion has always been 
structured in an identical fashion to the regular army, and is actually part of the overall 
French army, has helped legionnaires and regular soldiers to overcome their identity 
differences such that the Legion does not hinder military integration when deployed 
with regular French army units.  Thus, this case illustrates that the thorough structural 
integration of a mercenary force into the regular military can help overcome the 
identity cleavages between this force and the regular military when deployed together 
in the field.  This case also shows that when such structural integration is successful, 
the mercenary force’s distinctive identity characteristics can even work to the benefit 
of overall military effectiveness.  The Legion was in large part responsible for the 
French victory in Indochina from 1883-1891, and for many of the military successes 
enjoyed by France in Algeria from 1954-1962.  Yet, the Legion’s use of unethical 
practices, such as torture – although not unique to the Legion as opposed to regular 
units – hindered overall military effectiveness in Algeria as described above. 
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The French Foreign Legion’s Impact on The Democratic Advantage 
The dual questions of whether and how the Foreign Legion impacts the 
democratic advantage can be answered by referring to the rationale for the Legion’s 
initial creation: to avoid domestic political unrest.  Because France was not a 
democracy in 1831 when the Legion was formed, this rationale for the Legion’s 
creation may seem at first glance to be an argument against democratic advantage 
theory, showing that non-democracies can be just as sensitive to public opinion as can 
democracies.  Yet, in 1831, France was ruled by “the citizen king,” brought to power 
by an agreement between the liberal bourgeoisie, the Republicans, and the people of 
Paris.  King Louis-Philippe’s regime was known as the “July Monarchy,” a 
constitutional monarchy under which censorship was abolished and suffrage was 
nearly doubled.188  Thus, this was an unusual monarchy resembling a democracy in 
several meaningful ways, and it would be unreasonable to generalize from this case to 
non-democracies in general.  Rather, the king was sufficiently concerned with the 
people’s will that we can examine this case to determine whether the processes 
relevant to the democratic advantage are apparent herein.   
As noted above, Louis Philippe was quite anxious to avoid the fate of his 
predecessor, who had been ousted from power, and thus devised the Legion as a 
means of sending revolutionaries, fugitives, and other undesirable elements of the 
population overseas.  He also did this in order to free the regular military from some of 
its overseas commitments in North Africa, so that it could keep order at home.  Did 
these actions impact either the “military effectiveness” or “selection effects” 
arguments of the democratic advantage?  One could argue that the Legion allowed 
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Louis Philippe to both maintain France’s international position in the North African 
conflict while simultaneously maintaining order at home, whereas if the Legion had 
never been formed, the king would likely have had to choose between maintaining 
domestic order and sustaining involvement in the African conflict.  In other words, the 
Legion may have allowed Louis Philippe to be less selective regarding where to utilize 
his troops, a tendency which, if mimicked by a democratic state, would make the 
democratic advantage less likely.  Yet, the French won the nineteenth-century war in 
North Africa, mainly due to the Legion’s superior military effectiveness, and the fact 
that the Legion has had a beneficial impact on military effectiveness in many cases 
since then makes it unlikely that the French Foreign Legion has a negative impact on 
France’s ability to achieve the democratic advantage.   
Furthermore, it is extremely unlikely that modern French leaders would send 
the Legion into conflict areas where it was politically unpalatable to send regular 
troops – with the possible exception of African deployments – because the Legion is 
structurally integrated into the regular French military.  The public therefore associates 
the Legion with the regular military too closely for such actions to escape public 
recognition.  The French Foreign Legion is therefore very unlikely to decrease 
France’s prospects to realize the democratic advantage either in terms of the “military 
effectiveness” or the “selection effects” arguments. 
 
Historical Mercenary Forces: Theoretical Contributions 
 The historical cases in this chapter contribute theoretical leverage and policy-
relevant knowledge to the overall study in four ways: (1) by illustrating the 
significance of structural force integration for military effectiveness; (2) by illustrating 
a particular relationship between the state and for-profit forces; (3) by indicating that 
the structural constraints argued by democratic advantage theorists to be unique to 
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democracies may, in fact, be present in non-democracies as well; and (4) by indicating 
that regular military forces may be as likely as mercenary forces to violate the norms 
of humanitarian conduct in war.  Both the French Foreign Legion up through 1965 and 
the Hessians in the American Revolution were somewhat irregular or auxiliary forces 
deployed alongside regular military forces and yet were structurally integrated into the 
forces with which they were deployed.  These cases thus illustrate that by structuring 
private or for-profit forces similarly to the military, and integrating their structure into 
the professional military’s structure, the identity cleavages between auxiliary for-profit 
forces and the regular military are not as apparent or potentially divisive as they are in 
situations where public and private forces are not structurally cohesive.  Yet, as 
illustrated by the Hessian case and the case of the Foreign Legion in Algeria, structural 
integration cannot always overcome the disturbing identity characteristics of a hired 
force, particularly when those characteristics include unethical behavior in warfare.  
The lessons of these cases thus provide insight into how to ensure that modern PSCs 
work together well with regular military forces. 
The second critically important theoretical contribution of these two cases is 
apparent when one considers the position of the state in these cases as opposed to its 
position in the cases examined in Chapters Four and Five.  The state’s role in the 
historical cases examined in this chapter is a central one; it is the seller, buyer, and 
creator of mercenary military services.  Furthermore, the state’s role in the 
international arena during the time period examined in the Foreign Legion and 
Hessian cases was also quite central.  Transnational activity was apparent in the late 
eighteenth, the nineteenth, and the early twentieth centuries, but was much less 
pronounced than it has been in recent decades.  The state, then, figured much more 
prominently in these cases, both in general and in its direct involvement in the military 
actions discussed here.  In contrast, modern-day private security companies act as 
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middlemen between the sovereign or intervening state and the individual who desires 
to sell his military abilities for a profit.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the evolution of the 
state’s role in force provision.  The next two chapters illustrate how the state’s 
situation has shifted in the context of modern PSCs, and how the state has maintained 
a significant role in force provision despite these shifts. 
 
French Foreign Legion 
State <--------------------------------------Individual Soldier for Hire 
 
Hessians in American Revolution 
State ----------------------------  State --------------------  Individual Soldier for Hire 
 
Modern Cases of Hiring PSCs 
State (Sovereign or Third-Party)  <----  Corporation <----Individual Soldier for Hire 
 
Figure 3.1:189 
 Conceptual Map of the Evolution of the State’s Role in Force Provision 
 
Conclusion 
 As noted above, the French Foreign Legion and the Hessian troops fighting as 
British auxiliaries in the American Revolution were both state-organized mercenary 
forces, and both contributed to the military effectiveness of the regular militaries with 
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cases, the arrows point both ways: the state approaches certain PSCs for particular tasks, and the 
companies also approach the state at times with proposals for work in a certain area.  Furthermore, the 
individuals approach the companies when they hear of an employment opportunity, but the companies 
also approach particular individuals with whom they are familiar for certain jobs. 
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which they were deployed, primarily by acting as force multipliers.  This benefit was 
not overshadowed by integration problems because, despite the identity differences 
between these foreign forces and the militaries with which they were deployed, they 
were structurally integrated into the military such that they were able to communicate 
and coordinate with the regular military effectively.  Both cases thus indicate the 
importance of effectively structurally integrating modern private forces into the 
professional military with which they are often deployed.  However, both the Hessian 
case and the case of the French Foreign Legion in Algeria illustrate that structural 
measures are not always sufficient to overcome identity-related issues detracting from 
the hired force’s impact on military effectiveness.  Clearly, both identity and structural 
variables must be considered when assessing a hired force’s potential impact on 
overall military effectiveness.   
Furthermore, special attention must be paid to issues of unethical behavior in 
warfare, as these can have a significant impact on military effectiveness and, in some 
instances, non-state actors such as mercenary or private forces might be more likely to 
perpetrate such abuses.  The case of the French in Algeria, however, provides 
evidence that regular military forces are also prone to violations of humanitarian 
norms.  One final insight from this chapter focuses on the state’s central role in force 
provision in the Hessian and French Foreign Legion cases.  Seeking to expand upon 
this chapter’s insights regarding the state’s evolving role in force provision, the next 
chapter demonstrates one way in which the state controls military forces in the context 
of modern private security companies, exploring cases in which the state has opted to 
hire private forces instead of using its own or allied states’ militaries.   
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CHAPTER 4 
TRADING PLACES: 
PRIVATE FIRMS HIRED IN PLACE OF NATIONAL MILITARIES 
Chapter Three examined issues facing historical private forces that were 
structurally integrated into the military.  The cases of the French Foreign Legion and 
the Hessians in the American Revolution illustrate the benefits accruing to military 
effectiveness from the structural integration of private forces with the regular military.  
While instances of private forces deployed alongside national militaries are again 
becoming increasingly common (as explored in Chapter Five), they are by no means 
the only deployment scenarios for private military and security companies.  Indeed, 
until recently these private firms were more commonly hired to train and equip 
struggling state militaries behind the scenes, to fulfill international objectives in place 
of a state military (as proxy intervening forces) in politically-sensitive areas, and/or to 
supplant state militaries in situations of civil war or open rebellion against a state’s 
government.   
What are the consequences of such PSC deployment scenarios for military 
effectiveness and the democratic advantage, and how do they compare to the other 
case studies that this project explores?  This chapter endeavors to answer this question, 
focusing on a range of cases varying both in terms of the actors involved and in the 
purposes for which the PSC is hired: MPRI in Croatia in the mid-1990s, Executive 
Outcomes (EO) and Sandline in Sierra Leone from 1995-1998, DynCorp in Colombia 
from 1991-2005, and Sandline in Papua New Guinea in 1997.  Despite this variation, 
all four cases reflect a deployment situation in which a PSC was used in place of a 
regular military force.   
Analysis of these four cases illustrates that hiring private military and security 
firms to carry out back-door assistance roles is fairly likely to result in tactically, 
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strategically, and operationally effective military actions – assuming these operations 
are based on sound strategies in the first place – due to the beneficial impact of such 
deployments on skill, responsiveness, and quality.  Yet, integration and PSC-military 
coordination may pose a problem in those situations where the state military resents 
being supplanted by a private security firm, as seen in the Papua New Guinea case.  
This resentment may be tempered by the involvement of a third party in brokering the 
deal to hire the PSC, as illustrated by the Croatian case.  Additionally, by reducing 
transparency and accountability to democratic processes, such deployments may be 
predisposed to entail behavior at odds with international legal rules and norms of 
ethical warfare.  Furthermore, because democratic intervening states’ militaries are not 
involved in these conflicts to a large extent (if at all), these deployments enable 
democratic states to become involved in outside conflicts at a reduced risk of political 
discord from their domestic publics.  This increases the likelihood that democracies 
utilizing PSCs as proxy intervening forces will be less selective about the conflicts in 
which they become involved, and, as such, less likely to experience the democratic 
advantage.190   
 The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: the next section examines 
the Croatian case, analyzing MPRI’s impact on the Croatian Army’s military 
effectiveness and the prospects for the United States – as the third party intervening to 
broker the business arrangement between the Croatian government and MPRI – to 
experience the democratic advantage.  This section highlights the ethnic cleansing 
campaign pursued by the Croatian Army directly following the majority of its training 
with MPRI, questioning MPRI’s impact on the legality with which force was 
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same mechanism as the democratic peace hypothesis (i.e., the ability of a democratic electorate to 
constrain its leaders from entering into war), the fact that modern PSCs are used in such a manner poses 
a strong challenge to the hypothesis that the democratic peace exists in modern warfare. 
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employed in this case.  The following section assesses the role of Executive Outcomes 
and Sandline in Sierra Leone, looking especially at Britain’s involvement in this case 
and their desire for a covert force to supply weapons to Sierra Leone during a U.N. 
arms embargo – a need easily fulfilled by a PSC.  The third case section analyzes the 
role of DynCorp in Colombia, particularly focusing on the lack of progress made 
under Plan Colombia and the United States’ heavy reliance on contractors – as 
opposed to U.S. military forces – to fulfill the goals of Plan Colombia.  Human rights 
concerns are also paramount in this case, raising questions as to DynCorp’s impact on 
the legality and morality of operations relating to Plan Colombia.  All three of these 
cases are examples in which PSCs are used as proxies for an intervening state’s 
military, at the behest of the intervening state.  The final section examines a somewhat 
different case in which an intervening state is not present, and in which the PSC in 
question never actually commenced its work because its presence in the country 
stimulated a coup: Sandline in Papua New Guinea (PNG).  The PNG case is 
instructive in its demonstration of the potential consequences a government faces 
when it hires a PSC in lieu of receiving military assistance from a state ally.  In 
concluding, I re-articulate the circumstances under which private security companies 
and their personnel may have a beneficial impact on military effectiveness when used 
in place of a state military, and examine the prospects for the democratic advantage 
under these circumstances. 
 
Democratic Use of a PSC as a Proxy Intervening Force: 
MPRI in Croatia 
 Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) is an Alexandria, Virginia-based 
firm specializing in private military and government services, primarily security sector 
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reform and development.191  Founded in 1988 by former Army General Vernon Lewis 
and several other retired generals, MPRI has a reputation within the private military 
community for professionalism - indeed, an official at MPRI’s corporate headquarters 
notes that the company is reputed to be a “military organization in civilian clothing,” 
although the leadership is working to ensure that this is not the company’s brand 
recognition, since MPRI has now diversified into many areas other than simply Army 
support.192  The firm employs dozens of retired top-ranked generals and over 10,000 
former military personnel, many of them elite Special Forces.193  MPRI has a long 
history of high-paying government contracts – both from the United States and foreign 
governments.  It is approximately 75% dependent on Pentagon contracts, and is 
currently deployed to approximately sixty countries, mostly to build “institutional 
capacity” – for example, training and restructuring military forces.194  
In March 1994, the Croatian Minister of Defense requested permission from 
the U.S. government to negotiate with MPRI over the provision of training in civil-
military relations and program and budget services to the Croatian Armed Forces 
(Hrvatska Vojska, or HV).195  This action followed Croatia’s declaration of 
independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991, and the ensuing civil war across the 
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region.  Washington’s involvement was piecemeal throughout most parts of the 
conflict, and analysts have cited the lack of a well-coordinated and persistently 
enforced international strategy to end this conflict as contributing to the long-term 
destruction and loss of lives in Croatia.196  This was partially a result of Western 
jubilation at the recent end of the Cold War, and the tendency to see the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia as a necessary transitional by-product of this geopolitical restructuring.197  
By 1994, however, Washington realized that strong leadership was needed in 
brokering a cease-fire in the war between the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia.  Through 
extensive diplomatic contacts between the United States and Croatian and Bosnian 
Muslim representatives, Washington was able to convince Croatian President Franjo 
Tudjman to abandon the idea of a Croat statelet in Bosnia.  In return, the U.S. 
negotiators promised U.S. help in hastening Croatia’s economic, political, and military 
integration into the West.198  The 1994 Washington Agreement thus set the stage for 
U.S. military aid to be provided to Croatia. 
Despite Tudjman’s efforts to consolidate the Croat forces into an effective 
military (the HV), some analysts argue that by 1994 the Croatian Armed Forces still 
suffered from poor leadership and an unprofessional organizational structure.  Its 
troops were poorly disciplined and poorly supplied.199  Others, however, point to the 
January 1993 Maslenica offensive in which Croatian troops launched a lightning strike 
across U.N. lines to capture the straits of Maslenica.  This offensive was strategically 
quite significant - it linked central Croatia with the Dalmatian coast, as well as linking 
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the capital city of Zagreb with the country’s second city, Split.  Some say it was thus 
an early indicator of growing Croatian military strength and self-confidence.200   
Regardless of whether Croatian troop strength was increasing on its own or 
not, the Croatian Defense Minister and MPRI President Carl Vuono signed two 
contracts in September 1994, arguing that MPRI’s services were intended to prepare 
Croatian forces to participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program.  The first 
contract, which began in January 1995, provided for long-range management designed 
to help Croatia restructure its defense department for long-term strategic capabilities.  
The second contract developed the Democracy Transition Assistance Program 
(DTAP), providing for the “military education and training of staff officers and 
uncommissioned officers of the Croatian army.”201  Under the DTAP, MPRI trained 
Croatian army officers and personnel for fourteen weeks, in eight-hour sessions five 
days a week.  In this endeavor, MPRI used translated textbooks identical to those used 
at U.S. professional military academies, graduating their first officers in April 1995.202   
Many analysts take issue with MPRI’s work for the Croatian government, 
citing the Croatian military’s “Operation Storm” in early August 1995 as proof that 
MPRI’s military assistance stretched beyond classroom training and resulted in 
humanitarian atrocities.  In Operation Storm, the HV quite easily recaptured the 
Krajina territory, which constituted twenty percent of all Croatian territory – in other 
words, a sizable portion of land.  As journalist Esther Schrader notes, “the operation 
played a key role in reversing the tide of war against the Serbs and, consistent with 
American policy, in bringing both sides to the negotiating table.”203  The Croatian 
forces’ tactics in this operation were reportedly strikingly similar to NATO-style 
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movements, drawing suspicion from observers of the U.S. role in bringing about the 
results of Operation Storm.  As Colonel Leslie of the U.N. garrison in Knin put it, “It 
was a textbook operation, though not a JNA textbook.  Whoever wrote that plan of 
attack could have gone to any NATO staff college in North America or Western 
Europe and scored an A-plus.”204  Deborah Avant, meanwhile, speculates on the 
causes of using MPRI as a conduit for such military assistance, as opposed to the 
professional military: “Given the awkward nature of sending U.S. military assistance 
to Croatia during a U.N. arms embargo, a private contract between the Croatian 
government and MPRI allowed U.S. expertise to flow to Croatia without direct U.S. 
government involvement.”205  Some argue that MPRI provided doctrinal advice and 
possibly scenario planning to the Croatians, while others think that MPRI allowed the 
U.S. government to share satellite information with Croatia.206  Ken Silverstein, for 
instance, notes: 
   
A Croatian liaison officer told the local press that just  
weeks before the offensive General Vuono held a secret 
top-level meeting at Brioni Island, off the coast of 
Croatia, with General Varimar Cervenko, the architect 
of the Krajina campaign.  In the five days preceding the 
attack, at least ten meetings were held between General 
Vuono and officers involved in Operation Lightning 
Storm.207 
Meanwhile, MPRI denies any claims that it rendered military advice to Croatia, 
insisting that its classes focused on the sole topics licensed in the contract, and the 
Croatian government claims that its military success resulted from the government’s 
consolidation of power directly before Operation Storm and the Serbs’ simultaneous 
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demoralization due to increasing international pressure.  Retired Army Lieutenant 
General Harry E. Soyster, an executive at MPRI, told a journalist in 2002: 
 
I can assure you if we had the capability to train an 
army in a month to turn it around that fast, I wouldn’t 
be talking to you, I’d be flying you over the Riviera on 
the way to see it for yourself.  If we could do that in 
Croatia, we could straighten out Afghanistan in a 
couple of months.208   
MPRI’s work in Croatia gradually expanded, including an Army Readiness 
Training Program and, later, assistance in implementing the Partnership for Peace 
Program’s requirements after Croatia was admitted to the program in 2001.  Even as 
MPRI’s role in Croatia was expanding, the Croatian government began paying less of 
the bill for its work – Pentagon contributions to MPRI’s efforts in Croatia grew from 
$105,000 in 1995 to $6,000,000 in 2003.209  
 
Impact on Military Effectiveness & The Democratic Advantage 
Operation Storm, with its successful “lightning quick” and NATO-like tactics, 
illustrates that MPRI had a beneficial effect on the tactical abilities of the Croatian 
military – whether only through classroom training, or through other, more covert 
assistance.  In doing so, MPRI increased the Croatian Army’s levels of skill and 
responsiveness – its ability to achieve particular tasks and to carry out orders, and its 
ability to tailor military activity to Croatia’s capabilities, its adversaries’ capabilities, 
and external constraints, respectively.  It also likely played a role in increasing the 
Croatian military’s quality, or its ability to provide itself with highly capable weapons 
and equipment.  Indeed, analysts speculate that MPRI may have given advice on 
procurement and weapons acquisition to the Croatians, as Croatia spent approximately 
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$1 billion on Eastern European weapons during MPRI’s initial training mission.210  
Integration, moreover, was not hindered in the Croatian case, mainly due to the fact 
that MPRI was the only PSC involved here, and it is unlikely that the firm even 
provided on-the-ground operators to work side-by-side with the Croatian military 
during combat.  Thus, the issue of PSC-military coordination problems never arose.  
This is a key distinction between the types of PSC deployment discussed in this 
chapter and those examined in Chapter Five.  In fact, the Croatian military’s 
integration most likely improved due to MPRI’s training, as suggested by the HV’s 
success in Operation Storm and subsequent operations. 
Beyond this improvement in tactical effectiveness, MPRI arguably enhanced 
the Croatian Army’s operational and strategic effectiveness as well.  By November 
1995, President Tudjman’s army had recaptured all but 4% of Croatian territory, and 
was occupying 20% of Bosnia as well.211  Clearly, the broader operational and 
strategic aims of the Croatian military had been realized.  Whether this improvement 
is wholly attributable to MPRI is debatable, but the improvement clearly correlates 
with the time period in which MPRI began providing its assistance to Croatia.  
Furthermore, a Washington Times International Special Report notes that MPRI also 
helped Croatia to establish a military system that works in harmony with a democratic 
government, thus easing the military aspects of the democratic transition.212  
While MPRI’s assistance to the Croatian military certainly coincides with the 
military’s improved tactical, strategic, and operational performance, this is not purely 
a success story for private military assistance to a professional military.  This case 
illustrates the potential for private military and security firms to allow unethical 
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behavior in warfare.  In the wake of Operation Storm, the Croatian military engaged in 
an abhorrent ethnic cleansing campaign against the Serbs in the Krajina region.  This 
campaign comprised the largest single forcible displacement of people in Europe since 
World War II, with the Croatian army attacking the road that the Serbian refugees 
were using to flee into neighboring Bosnia.  Refugees were also forced to run through 
towns filled with angry Croatians who took to the streets to stone them.  “The Croatian 
authorities had mapped out the route for refugees.  An old woman died, her face 
swollen beyond recognition, of injuries suffered when hit by a rock.”213  Later, the 
Croatians burned and looted over 20,000 houses in this region owned by Serbs, killing 
the elderly Serbs who had failed to evacuate.  A U.N. report stated “The lady was tied 
by fish net and a tire was put around her neck before she was set on fire.  The old man 
was burned to death a few yards away.”214  
MPRI, while expressing regret at these incidents, simply claimed that such 
behavior indicated the Croatian army’s need for democratic assistance and thus did not 
suspend their training efforts.215  While it is impossible to conclusively determine 
whether regular military forces would be any less likely to allow or perpetrate 
violations of IHL in this case, one must consider the possibility that these regular 
military institutions – the U.S. military, in this case - would be under much greater 
public scrutiny and would crack down on such behavior, were they to become directly 
involved.  It is therefore plausible – though by no means certain – that substitution of 
MPRI for U.S. forces had a negative impact on adherence to IHL in this case.  As one 
military analyst noted, Operation Storm “was followed by massive ethnic cleansing.  
Now, had American troops been on the ground, we would have been held accountable 
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for that.  The fact that it was a private company made the connection a lot less 
clear.”216  
MPRI’s beneficial impact on the Croatian forces’ military effectiveness 
therefore coincides with MPRI’s failure to ensure the Croatian forces’ adherence to 
IHL, serving as evidence for H1d and the “draining the sea” school of thought with 
regard to treatment of civilians in counterinsurgency warfare.  It is difficult to argue, 
however – in terms of the logic underlying H1d – that ethnic cleansing could ever be a 
necessary tactic of counterinsurgency.  Furthermore, it was the Croatian Army which 
engaged in these IHL abuses, therefore making it difficult to conclusively place the 
blame for the ethnic cleansing campaign on MPRI.  Stepping in during the ethnic 
cleansing campaign may have been interpreted as undermining the Croatian army’s 
professional jurisdiction, and/or MPRI might have worried that its contract with the 
Croatian government would have been placed at risk through such intervention.  This 
is not to say that such intervention by MPRI would not have been desirable from an 
ethical standpoint, only that the firm’s failure to intervene does not unequivocally 
support H1d. 
While military effectiveness in this case is generally high in terms of tactical, 
operational, and strategic effectiveness – through MPRI’s impact on responsiveness, 
skill, and quality – the case of MPRI in Croatia bodes ill for the United States’ 
prospects for experiencing the democratic advantage.  Recall that democratic 
advantage theorists focus on two aspects of democratic states that make them more 
likely to win conflicts: their relatively high propensity to have effective militaries, and 
the democratic political constraints to prevent them from entering into “unwinnable” 
wars (the selection effects argument).  When PSCs are deployed in place of the 
professional military to allow a democratic intervening state some influence in an 
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outside conflict, the electoral checks and balances intended to prevent policymakers 
from involving the democracy in such an outside conflict do not function as intended.  
As such, the executive in the democracy in question is able to militarily influence an 
outside conflict in large part without the knowledge of the domestic public.  This leads 
the democracy to become less selective about the conflicts into which it enters (or to 
whose parties it provides support), and subsequently, less likely to experience the 
“selection effects” aspect of the democratic advantage.   
As noted above, the MPRI contract in the Croatian case allowed U.S. 
government support to flow to the Croatian military without direct U.S. government 
involvement in the conflict.  While the extent of U.S. government support flowing to 
Croatia via MPRI is debatable, the U.S. government’s involvement could be said to be 
substantial at the very least, as indicated by the above figures showing U.S. 
government payments to MPRI for the firm’s work in Croatia.  Meanwhile, Western 
governments turned a blind eye to the attack on Krajina in Operation Storm, with 
Western politicians remaining quiet.  Prior to the offensive and upon his return from a 
trip to Washington, U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith told President 
Tudjman that the United States would tolerate a military offensive to recapture 
Krajina, provided it was “short and clean.”217  Although then-U.S. Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher later denied that Washington had played any role in encouraging 
Operation Storm, he did admit that Croatian success in this operation aided the process 
of a broader peace settlement in the region.  The idea of the United States or other 
democratic governments utilizing PSCs in such a manner, to bypass electoral risks on 
politically sensitive foreign policy issues, has even been acknowledged to be a 
“plausible hypothesis” by an official at MPRI.218 
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Executive Outcomes & Sandline in Sierra Leone:  
Sovereign vs. Third-Party State Involvement in Hiring a PSC 
 Britain founded Sierra Leone, one of the most tumultuous states in West 
Africa, in 1787 as a homeland for freed British slaves.  Britain introduced a unitary 
constitution for Sierra Leone in 1951, providing for universal suffrage.  The Sierra 
Leone People’s Party (SLPP), led by Milton Margai, won the first elections.  A decade 
later, in 1961, Sierra Leone gained independence, though it retained close ties with 
Britain.  Soon after gaining independence, the economy began to stagnate, despite 
Sierra Leone’s rich mineral deposits of diamonds, bauxite, and rotile (titanium 
oxide).219  In March 1967, the All-People’s Congress (APC) led by Dr. Siaka Stevens 
gained the majority of seats.  However, a military coup prevented Stevens from taking 
office, foreshadowing a pattern of military takeovers of civilian politics for the 
ensuing years.220 
 On April 30, 1992, Captain Valentine Strasser and a group of soldiers seized 
power in a coup, forcing President Joseph Saidu Momoh to flee to Guinea.  Originally, 
Strasser’s government promised to return Sierra Leone to civilian rule within a year, 
but in 1993 changed the date for transformation to 1996.  Meanwhile, the Strasser 
government was challenged by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which had 
launched its first attacks against the Sierra Leone government in 1991.  Holding 
positions near Sierra Leone’s diamond-mining centers, the RUF was able to threaten 
the principal source of the nation’s wealth, and the war with these revolutionaries 
continued through 1995.   
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Sierra Leone’s history with PSCs began when President Strasser met with 
representatives from the South African-based private military firm Executive 
Outcomes in April 1995, asking the firm to intervene in the civil war in Sierra 
Leone.221   Executive Outcomes’ involvement in Sierra Leone was a significant 
precursor to Sandline’s involvement, as EO achieved key tactical and strategic 
successes in fighting the RUF, and had multiple ties to Sandline.  In fact, some critics 
argue that Sandline was a mere reincarnation of EO, and that each company was a 
member of the Branch-Heritage Group (a British-based mining company).222  The 
deployment of EO fighters and trainers to Sierra Leone led to the recapture of key 
diamond-mining areas by August 1995.  EO also helped to establish a militia of 
“Kamajor” fighters who were loyal to the central government, collected intelligence 
on rebels, and defended local towns from RUF attacks.  Strasser promised to hand 
over power to a democratically-elected president in January 1996, but was himself 
ousted by a coup on January 16, 1996 and replaced by his deputy, Brigadier General 
Julius Maada Bio.  By March 1996, EO had secured enough of the country to make 
possible the first free elections in Sierra Leone since 1967.223  The country went 
forward with elections for a return to civilian rule, and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah became 
president.  Bio handed power over to Kabbah, who signed a peace agreement with the 
RUF in November 1996.  Throughout this entire period – from 1990 up through EO’s 
departure from Sierra Leone in January 1997 – the British government took little 
interest in the country’s military problems, even refusing the local government’s 
request for military support in May 1991.224  This was a clear instance in which a 
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sovereign nation hired a PSC of its own accord, with no interference by the 
international community. 
Upon Executive Outcomes’ exit from Sierra Leone – following a dispute 
regarding their contract – the firm warned Kabbah’s administration that a coup would 
occur within ninety days without EO’s presence to maintain order in the country.  Sure 
enough, on May 25, 1997 (eighty-nine days later), Kabbah was ousted by yet another 
coup mounted by junior officers.225  Kabbah fled the country and Major Johnny Paul 
Koroma declared himself head of state, abolishing the constitution and prohibiting the 
existence of political parties.  The international community immediately condemned 
Koroma’s coup, but lawlessness had spread through most of the country by June 
1997.226 
 At an October 1997 meeting in Conakry, Guinea, with the foreign ministers of 
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, and Nigeria, Koroma agreed to restore power 
to Kabbah in April 1998.  In return, he was promised immunity from prosecution.  At 
this meeting, it was also promised that “foreign troops, private armies, mercenaries, 
and irregular troops” were to be banned from Sierra Leone, as a concession to the 
rebels.  Meanwhile, prior to the 1997 coup, both Executive Outcomes and Sandline 
representatives had met with Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) officials in 
Washington at a workshop on the Privatization of National Security in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.227  In March 1998, the London Observer revealed that Britain’s High 
Commissioner to Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold, had held talks with Sandline.  The 
British Foreign Office admitted that this was true, but justified the talks as occurring 
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under “extraordinary circumstances.”228  Also in March 1998, Kabbah was restored to 
power with help from Nigerian troops.229  
Then, in May 1998, the extent of Sandline’s involvement in the region began 
to come to light, starting with a massive arms shipment to war-torn Sierra Leone that 
Sandline arguably had made in defiance of a U.N. Security Council embargo on the 
shipment of arms to any of Sierra Leone’s warring factions.  Security Council 
Resolution 1132, paragraph 6, stated: 
 
[The Security Council] decides that all states shall 
prevent the sale or supply to Sierra Leone, by their 
nationals or from their territories, or using their flag 
vessels or aircraft, of petroleum products and arms and 
related materiel of all types, including weapons and 
ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, 
paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the 
aforementioned, whether or not originating in their 
territory.230  
Due to the wording of this paragraph, specifically the reference to “Sierra Leone” 
instead of to the parties involved in the conflict, much confusion arose in the aftermath 
of the so-called “Sandline Affair” regarding whether the provision of arms by 
Sandline was prohibited by the arms embargo.231  Sandline had shipped approximately 
1,000 AK-47 rifles, 60mm mortars, light machine guns, and ammunition to Sierra 
Leone, where they were handed over to Nigerian peacekeepers, who later distributed 
the weapons.  The Nigerians replaced some of their own older equipment with 
equipment from the Sandline shipment as well.232   
Sandline president Timothy Spicer then made a statement directly implicating 
Britain in the affair, saying that he “understood and still believed that we were acting 
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with the approval of Her Majesty’s Government in assisting to restore President 
Kabbah.”233  When further details emerged, it became clear that Sandline’s military 
consultants had met with Foreign Office officials, led by the Deputy Head of the 
Africa Department, on at least three separate occasions.234  At least one of these 
meetings took place in the Foreign Office prior to Sandline’s dispatch of arms to 
Sierra Leone.  Sandline’s lawyers sent a letter to the British Foreign Secretary in April 
1998, providing further clues as to British involvement in hiring Sandline.235  It states, 
in part: 
   
As you will be aware, the coup in Sierra Leone which  
removed President Kabbah was roundly condemned . . . 
and you, Sir, were widely reported as offering President 
Kabbah the full support of Her Majesty’s Government in 
restoring the lawful government to power in Sierra 
Leone . . . At the suggestion of your High Commissioner 
in Freetown, Mr. Peter Penfold, President Kabbah  
asked our clients to provide [military] assistance.   
Thereafter negotiations proceeded with President 
Kabbah and . . . full briefings were given both 
personally and by telephone to representatives of Her 
Majesty’s Government . . . our clients were led to 
believe that clearance was given at the Head of 
Department level . . . Our clients were assured . . . that 
the operation had the full support of Her Majesty’s 
Government.236  
This revelation proved to be an embarrassing scandal for the British government, 
whose Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, had earlier insisted that he wanted Britain to 
pursue an “ethical” foreign policy.237  In response, Cook initiated an inquiry, denying 
that ministers were involved in the decision-making process that led to Sandline’s 
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involvement in Sierra Leone.238  Kabbah was restored to power pursuant to the 
Conakry agreement, but Sandline had supplied the weapons carried by the Nigerian 
force supporting his return, with the knowledge and approval of high-level officials in 
Britain and possibly the United States. 
 
Impact on Military Effectiveness & The Democratic Advantage 
 Both Executive Outcomes and Sandline were effective at promoting 
democracy and/or restoring the democratic regime to power in Sierra Leone, and thus 
both can be said to have improved the effectiveness of military components friendly to 
the democratic regime and outside democracies.  In the case of EO, the firm improved 
military effectiveness by creating a militia of Kamajors loyal to the central 
government, and by directly fighting the RUF to restore order in Sierra Leone.  EO 
troops thus acted as force multipliers to improve quality and trained Kamajors to 
improve skill, and in doing so, improved the responsiveness of the entire force fighting 
the RUF.  The extent of EO’s impact on military effectiveness is illustrated by the fact 
that another coup followed EO’s departure from the country, as predicted by EO 
officials.  Meanwhile, Sandline improved the quality and skill of the force that restored 
Kabbah to power by supplying it with weapons and training.   
 Sandline increased the potential that the aims of outside democracies involved 
(Britain and the United States, primarily) would be reached by improving the military 
effectiveness of the pro-democracy forces in this case.  However, the Sierra Leone 
case clearly illustrates the process through which major democracies seek to utilize 
private military and/or security firms as proxies to intervene in conflicts against the 
will of the domestic public or the international community.  The fact that Sierra Leone 
was under a U.N. arms embargo when Sandline attempted to import large quantities of 
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weapons into Sierra Leone, with the knowledge and support of the British and 
possibly the U.S. government, illustrates that private military and security firms are 
sometimes used as conduits for back-door assistance in contravention of 
internationally-imposed restraints.  The domestic backlash in Britain following the 
media’s revelation of the British government’s involvement in the “Sandline Affair” 
suggests that the public would not have supported the British involvement in Sierra 
Leone – either directly through British military assistance or indirectly through 
Sandline – had they been aware of it at the time.  British recognition of this fact is 
presumably the reason that the government allowed EO to operate in Sierra Leone 
without any British intervention during the early years of the conflict.  EO thus 
replaced allied military intervention in this case, and the fact that a sovereign state 
hired EO provided the justification for the lack of British involvement in the matter.   
Force privatization may support the democratic advantage when the private 
firms in question bolster military effectiveness.  This was seen when Executive 
Outcomes restored Sierra Leone to democratic rule in 1996.  The Sierra Leone case, 
however, also illustrates that these same private firms enable democracies such as 
Britain to circumvent the political constraints on conflict involvement that are at the 
core of democratic advantage theory’s “selection effects” argument.  This decreases 
the prospects for the intervening democracies to experience the democratic advantage 
in such situations.   
 
Democratic Third-Party Supply of a PSC to Fight the Drug War:  
DynCorp in Colombia 
The case of DynCorp in Colombia illustrates another instance of relatively 
back-door U.S. involvement in an outside conflict through contracts with a private 
security firm.  DynCorp was formed at President Truman’s behest in 1946 for the 
purpose of putting surplus World War II equipment to use and to create jobs for 
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veterans.  Today the firm is a member of the Fortune 500, the foremost private 
employer in the Washington DC area, and the third-largest employee-owned business 
in the United States.239  DynCorp is based in Reston, Virginia and has over $1.8 billion 
in annual revenues, a $4.4 billion contract backlog, and over 23,000 employees 
worldwide.  Its contracts with over thirty-seven federal agencies account for ninety-
eight percent of its business.240  
Since 1991, DynCorp has held a U.S. State Department contract worth $600 
million to participate in coca eradication missions in Colombia, as well as training and 
drug interdiction.  The majority of the firm’s work in Colombia centers on the aerial 
herbicide fumigation program, spraying herbicides to kill the coca crops and hinder 
cocaine production.  It also participates in air transport, reconnaissance, search and 
rescue, airborne medical evacuation, ferrying equipment and personnel from one 
country to another, and aircraft maintenance. In its work in Colombia, DynCorp 
operates several different types of State Department helicopters and crop dusters.   
DynCorp’s work in Colombia preceded, and later became part of, a larger U.S. 
effort to stem drug production and hinder the actions of the highly capable guerilla 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the paramilitary United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).  This larger effort, Plan Colombia, was 
developed by former Colombian President Pastrana to end the Colombian 
government’s long-standing armed conflict, eliminate drug-trafficking, and promote 
economic and social development.  The U.S. devoted $4.5 billion to Plan Colombia 
between FY2000 and FY2005, mainly hoping to prevent the flow of illegal drugs into 
the United States and to help the Colombian government promote peace while 
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simultaneously contributing to South American regional security.241  Such levels of 
assistance are understandable when one considers that during the late 1990s and early 
part of the twenty-first century, Colombia was the most difficult challenge facing the 
United States in the Western hemisphere – and it arguably still is.  In 1997-98, 
Colombia replaced Peru and Bolivia as the primary source of coca production, a major 
concern to U.S. policymakers due to the fact that 3.5 million Americans are addicted 
to cocaine.  Meanwhile, violence in Colombia has displaced over 1.5 million people, 
intensifying already high levels of poverty.242  
Despite the intervention’s financial breadth, the U.S. Congress originally 
capped U.S. troop levels in Colombia at 500 troops, and prohibited the presence of any 
more than 300 U.S. contract personnel in the country.243  The total number of U.S. 
military personnel in Colombia nearly doubled following the passage of the 2005 
Defense Department Authorization Act in the U.S. Congress, which called for 800 
U.S. troops to be deployed there.  This change actually decreased the ratio of U.S. 
soldiers to private contractors in Colombia, however, because the legislation also 
allowed President Bush to increase the number of U.S. citizens working for private 
contractors in Colombia to 600.244  The U.S. government claims that while the troop 
cap has never come close to being exceeded, the contractor cap has constantly posed a 
challenging obstacle.  However, DynCorp and other contractors in Colombia have 
ways of getting around these obstacles: in August 2001, the Los Angeles Times 
reported that DynCorp was maintaining 335 civilians in Colombia, but only one-third 
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of those were U.S. citizens.  The remainder consisted of local nationals and third-
country nationals (TCNs) from places such as Guatemala and Peru; thus, the 
contractor cap did not apply to them.245   
While the U.S. military did have a small presence in Colombia, this case can 
be contrasted with cases of co-deployment (such as the current conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan) in that the United States is not serving in a declared war or even an open 
conflict there.  Rather, as of 2001, U.S. troops in Colombia were employed in training 
and equipping the Colombian Army, training counternarcotics staff and equipping the 
Colombian counternarcotics brigade headquarters, and providing design, contract, and 
oversight services for a variety of Colombian Army infrastructure projects to support 
the UN-1N, Huey-II, and UH-60 helicopter programs.  The largest single category of 
U.S. military personnel in Colombia as of May 2001 was a group of approximately 
ninety Special Forces trainers, with other short-term U.S. military training teams there 
to work with the military and police.246  Thus, while the U.S. military and U.S.-
commissioned contractors are both present in Colombia to a (relatively) small extent, 
there is a low ratio of soldiers to contractor personnel, and a limited number of 
different private security firms operating there (with DynCorp having by far the 
largest number of PSC personnel in the country).  The military and PSCs are each 
responsible for relatively distinct aspects of Plan Colombia – neither of which is 
supposed to entail direct war-fighting.247  For these reasons, this case closely 
resembles those situations of deployment where PSCs are hired in place of 
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professional militaries, as opposed to the situations of PSC-military co-deployment 
explored in the next chapter. 
 
Impact on Military Effectiveness & The Democratic Advantage 
Because the effort to combat drug trafficking and to counter guerilla and 
paramilitary forces in Colombia is an extended conflict with no clear end in sight, 
measurements of success – in terms of military effectiveness or otherwise – are 
difficult to make with regard to this case.  However, a 2005 Staff Report to the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations clearly illustrates the failure of Plan Colombia on 
several counts, including its coca eradication aspects: 
   
The lack of reliable evidence of well-documented  
progress in the war against drugs and neutralizing 
paramilitaries is disappointing considering the billions 
of dollars the U.S. Congress has appropriated to finance 
drug interdiction and eradication since 2000.  In 2005 
coca eradication broke the 136,000 hectare record and 
destroyed the equivalent of 160 metric tons of cocaine, 
and though cocaine seized in 2004 almost tripled to 325 
metric tons of cocaine, and is expected to be larger for 
2005, Colombia continues to provide about 90 percent 
of the cocaine available in the U.S., in spite of the 
appropriated funds being earmarked for Department of 
State programs in Colombia to fight drug trafficking and 
terrorism through Plan Colombia.248  
While this statement indicates that DynCorp has achieved tactical success in 
eradicating large areas of coca crops, the mission’s operational and strategic goals 
have apparently not been met.  This is not to say that the U.S. military would be better 
able than DynCorp to achieve these goals, however.  In fact, multiple reports on the 
effectiveness of coca eradication strategies, and particularly those used in Latin 
America, indicate that “eradication has not succeeded by any measure.  Since efforts 
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began in earnest in the 1970s, cultivation has consistently increased.”249  The strategies 
of Plan Colombia themselves, then – at least with regard to coca eradication – appear 
to foreclose any possibility of military effectiveness.                                                      
Aside from being ineffective, these strategies have also proven to be unethical 
and unpopular, putting the war for the “hearts and minds” of civilians in jeopardy: 
They run counter to local customs, place the environment at unnecessary risk, damage 
food crops, and cause medical problems.250  In September 2001, the International 
Labor Rights Fund, a U.S.-based non-profit, brought a class-action lawsuit against 
DynCorp on behalf of 10,000 Ecuadorian peasant farmers and Amazonian Indians 
reportedly harmed by aerial fumigation in Colombia.  The lawsuit charged DynCorp 
with torture, infanticide and wrongful death for its role in the aerial spraying of highly 
toxic pesticides in the Amazonian jungle, along the border of Ecuador and Colombia. 
The lawsuit’s claims are based on an investigation by Accion Ecologica – one of 
Ecuador’s largest environmental organizations – of pesticide drift from DynCorp's 
Colombian spraying operations.  The investigation found that DynCorp had been 
using a modified version of Round-Up herbicide, called Round-Up Ultra.  It is an 
indiscriminate killer, capable of poisoning not only coca fields but also vegetable 
crops, wildlife, forests, waterways and people.  Even the manufacturer, Monsanto, 
warns that it should not be used near humans or water sources.  The effects of Round-
Up Ultra are not drastically different from Agent Orange, the defoliant used by the 
United States in the Vietnam War; there is thus an easy comparison to make to 
national forces acting with such disregard for IHL, as explored below.  Notably, 
however, the herbicides that DynCorp uses have been made more toxic by the addition 
of surfactants, increasing the plant-killing power of the fumigations and also its 
                                                
249 Phillip Coffin, “Coca Eradication,” Foreign Policy in Focus 3, 29 (October 1998): 1. 
250 Coffin, 1998: 2. 
 124 
lethality to humans.  The Accion Ecologica study uncovered significant pesticide drift 
in the Sucumbos region of Ecuador, an area comprised of Amazonian forests and 
villages populated by the Quechua subsistence farmers.  It concluded that the spraying 
had caused "harm to the health and crops of 100 percent of the population within five 
kilometers of the border with Colombia." More than 1,100 cases of illness have been 
documented, including the deaths of at least two children.251  DynCorp moved to 
dismiss the case, arguing that it raised nonjusticiable questions because the action did 
not call U.S. foreign policy in Colombia into question.  In May 2007, a U.S. district 
court granted DynCorp’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims under the Torture 
Victim Protection Act, but ordered that the balance of the plaintiff’s claims should 
stand.252  
One might consider the counterfactual of whether such crop eradication 
procedures would be accepted by the U.S. public if the U.S. military were practicing 
them on the scale seen in the Colombian case.  As noted above, a comparison can be 
made to the U.S. military’s use of Agent Orange in Vietnam.   Between 1961 and 
1971, U.S. forces sprayed approximately eighty million liters (twenty-one million 
gallons) of Agent Orange and other herbicides on southern and central Vietnam as part 
of “Operation Ranch Hand,” with the aim of depriving enemies of forest cover and 
food crops.253  The use of Agent Orange and other chemicals (such as napalm) was 
particularly upsetting to Americans protesting the war, and in 1967 Bertrand Russell 
led a group of distinguished American academics in establishing an International War 
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Crimes Tribunal to hear evidence regarding the U.S. military’s use of Agent Orange 
and other alleged atrocities in Vietnam.  The Tribunal found that the United States was 
guilty of using weapons against the Vietnamese that were prohibited by international 
law.254  The pressure imposed by this tribunal, combined with the 1969 scientific 
revelation that one of the components of Agent Orange caused birth defects in 
laboratory animals, led U.S. President Richard Nixon to announce a halt to the use of 
Agent Orange in Vietnam in December 1970.  The last application of the chemical to 
Vietnamese territory, however, did not occur until October 1971.255  
The mere fact that an international tribunal was convened to investigate the 
U.S. military’s use of Agent Orange demonstrates that such military actions do not go 
unnoticed, and furthermore, that public knowledge of and action regarding such acts 
can affect a change in policy.  The relative lack of public knowledge of DynCorp’s 
coca eradication campaign in Colombia speaks to the fact that PSCs are inherently less 
likely than the national military to spur public outcry, and thus have more leeway to 
pursue unethical strategies. 
 All in all, the ethical implications of this coca eradication strategy may impact 
the ability of the U.S. and Colombian governments to achieve the goals of Plan 
Colombia, as eradication programs hold strong potential to foster alliances between 
peasant coca farmers and guerilla forces such as FARC against the Colombian 
government.  This possibility is illustrated by the fact that, since Colombia 
reinvigorated widespread herbicidal eradication programs in 1995, guerilla groups 
have steadily expanded their areas of control and now represent a significant threat to 
the government.  As analyst Phillip Coffin notes, “By defending impoverished 
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farming communities that grow coca from what are seen as U.S. imperialist forces and 
goals, guerillas gain political and financial strength.”256  Such evidence, while negating 
H1, nonetheless supports H1a and H1c, indicating both that DynCorp’s eradication 
efforts diminish local support and that this local support is key to military 
effectiveness in this case.   
 Thus, the coca eradication strategies tied to Plan Colombia are both ineffective 
and unethical.  The ability of PSCs like DynCorp to circumvent Congressional caps on 
levels of U.S. troops and contractors in Colombia indicates that these coca eradication 
strategies are also dependent upon PSCs.  The availability of PSCs in this case 
therefore allows the U.S. and Colombian governments to perpetuate this ineffective 
and unethical strategy, negatively impacting military effectiveness in the strategic 
sense.  Furthermore, as of January 2007, Colombian military involvement in human 
rights abuses continued to go unpunished, as Plan Colombia’s aim of ending military 
impunity had not been achieved.257  While this is not directly related to DynCorp’s 
mission in Colombia, U.S. efforts to end the Colombian military’s impunity are surely 
not aided by the U.S. funding of hundreds of private security personnel, who are 
themselves allowed to operate with impunity in Colombia. 
The details of the case outlined above make clear that the prospects for the 
democratic advantage are significantly challenged in this case, as demonstrated by the 
ability of contractors to hire third-country and local nationals to get around 
Congressional limits on the numbers of U.S. civilians allowed in Colombia.  While the 
Congressionally-imposed U.S. troop limit has never been in danger, this is solely due 
to the fact that companies such as DynCorp (in addition to MPRI and several others) 
have hundreds of contractors operating in Colombia to fulfill U.S. objectives there.  
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Because of this significant contractor base, professional soldiers are simply not 
necessary in large quantities, a fact that allows Plan Colombia to operate below the 
radar of most major U.S. media markets and the average U.S. voter.  Because voters 
are unlikely to constrain U.S. actions in Colombia, the United States is more likely to 
be risk-acceptant in its Colombia operations – and thus less likely to experience the 
democratic advantage in this case. 
 
 
Sovereign State Employment of a PSC in Place of Allied Military Support:  
Sandline in Papua New Guinea 
 The previous three cases illustrate efforts by an intervening democracy to 
influence events in a target state, using a PSC as a military proxy.  In Croatia, the PSC 
in question was tasked with providing various elements of training and military 
organizational guidance.  In Sierra Leone, Sandline supplied weapons to pro-
democracy forces with the knowledge – and perceived consent – of the British 
government.  Meanwhile, in the Colombian case, DynCorp was tasked with one 
distinct aspect of the political mission – coca eradication – and several related duties.  
The case of Sandline in Papua New Guinea differs from all three of these cases in 
terms of the actors involved and the reasons for employing a PSC.   
Papua New Guinea is a tropical former Australian colony slightly larger than 
California, comprising approximately half of the island of New Guinea (off 
Australia’s north coast) and several islands scattered across the Pacific to the 
northeast.258  In the late 1980s, Papua New Guinea’s (PNG’s) primary export was 
copper, which it mined on the tiny island of Bougainville, over 800 miles away.  
Bougainville, displeased at this continual exploitation of its natural resources and the 
ensuing environmental degradation of its territory, mounted a secessionist movement 
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against the PNG government in the late 1980s.  The fighting continued for a decade, 
during which time 10,000 people in Papua New Guinea were killed and 35,000 were 
displaced – both highly significant figures for such a small country.  Meanwhile the 
PNG Defense Forces (PNGDF) were poorly funded and ill-equipped.  Neither 
Australia nor New Zealand would agree to provide the equipment and/or training 
necessary to crush the Bougainville Revolutionary Army’s (BRA’s) rebellion.259  
PNG President Julius Chan turned to the British firm Sandline in desperation 
in 1996, asking for Sandline’s help in acquiring helicopter gunships, which the PNG 
government considered to be war-winning weapons.  This initial request evolved into 
a $250,000 contract for a consultancy study, a so-called “commander’s estimate,” of 
the problems in Bougainville and how Sandline could help.260  Former British Special 
Air Services (SAS) Lieutenant-Colonel Timothy Spicer, Sandline’s President, wrote 
the estimate, suggesting a combination of helicopters, training for the PNGDF Special 
Forces unit, an electronic surveillance capability to track the BRA and pinpoint their 
vital command centers in the mountainous, rugged terrain, and propaganda to win the 
local population over to the PNG government’s side of the conflict.261  Papua New 
Guinea leaders signed a contract with Sandline in January 1997 to train the PNGDF’s 
Special Forces and to gather intelligence on the BRA, to recapture the Panguna mine 
in Bougainville, and to provide necessary follow-up support.  The primary objective 
stated in the contract was “the rendering of the BRA militarily ineffective,” and the 
maximum initial period of the contract was three months.262  This contract was never 
approved by the parliament of PNG, and so was only questionably legal to begin with.  
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Notably, the level of firepower and the tactics envisioned by Sandline would have 
entailed a substantial escalation of the PNG conflict, though the ultimate goal was to 
demonstrate enough strength to bring the Bougainville Revolutionary Army to the 
negotiating table.263  
However, Sandline’s vision never came to fruition, as the overall PNGDF 
commander, Jerry Singirok, publicly condemned the Sandline contract and called for 
President Chan’s resignation.  This was surprising, considering that Singirok had been 
involved in the original negotiations to hire Sandline.264  Though Singirok and his 
supporters insisted that they were not staging a coup, many reports refer to Singirok’s 
actions as a coup.265  Sandline’s Tim Spicer was taken hostage by the PNGDF for the 
better part of a week in the midst of the coup.  Some reports indicate that the PNGDF 
as a whole – or at least 1,000 of its soldiers - was resentful of its government’s 
decision to hire Sandline and demanded that the “mercenaries” be sent home.266   
The motives of those staging the coup, however, were clarified a few months 
later when an Australian journalist revealed that General Singirok was paid 31,000 
British Pounds by a British arms dealer seeking involvement in Papua New Guinea.267  
Following Singirok’s disgrace, President Chan fired him.  His replacement, Acting 
Commander Colonel Jack Tuat, invited Singirok to address the PNGDF parade at 
Murray Barracks on March 24, 1997, hoping that this would calm the troops.  
Singirok, however, had the opposite effect, bellowing several times, “The Defence 
Force is intact!”268  He claimed that Sandline would have destroyed the PNGDF, 
stating, “They are international terrorists as far as I’m concerned.  They go to third 
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world countries, banana republics, they make national forces totally useless.  That’s 
what they nearly did here.”269  Resentment of Sandline is clearly evident in the former 
PNGDF Commander’s statements, as are indicators of identity cleavages.  Such 
cleavages are illustrated, for instance, by Singirok’s relational comparison between 
“national forces” and PSCs as “international terrorists.”  
Singirok and opposition politicians subsequently leaked the details of the 
Sandline contract to the public, spurring violent riots and, consequently, the Chan 
regime’s resignation in favor of an interim government.  In fact, Chan and his 
colleagues had to flee from the parliament building in disguise, as thousands of 
students, unemployed citizens, civil servants, and soldiers surrounded the building.270  
 This episode demonstrated that the PNGDF was not entirely in line with the 
position of its civilian government regarding the Bougainville issue, and thereby 
resulted in negotiations between moderates on both sides of the conflict.  A power-
sharing arrangement was reached and the conflict came to an end after more than a 
decade of fighting.271   
 
Impact on Military Effectiveness & The Democratic Advantage 
Analyst Peter Singer cites this case as evidence that hiring private military or 
security firms can have a negative influence on the local military’s status, thus 
disrupting civil-military relations.272  This is certainly one conclusion that can be 
drawn from this case, but it is far from the only conclusion. In fact, given that 
Singirok’s accepted a bribe to instigate the coup, the identity-based justification of the 
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coup as stemming from professional competition and resentment loses some validity.  
Perhaps more accurately, the case demonstrates the political backlash that can occur 
when relatively covert attempts to hire PSCs are publicly exposed.  This case therefore 
shows that the electoral processes relevant to the selection effects side of the 
democratic advantage – in particular, the role of the domestic electorate in 
constraining leaders from international conflict involvement – can be affected in 
unexpected ways by the employment of a private force.  Because the conflict had been 
going on for over a decade by the time that President Chan hired Sandline, Chan could 
not be said to have been trying to avoid domestic knowledge of his country’s 
involvement in the Bougainville conflict.  However, when the domestic public learned 
of Sandline’s contract with their government, they were outraged at what they saw as 
an affront to democracy.  For example, the Papua New Guinea Trade Union Congress 
(PNGTUC), a consortium of local trade unions, adopted a resolution in early 1997 
dismissing the Chan government’s decision to hire “mercenaries” as “an outright 
affront to the democratic cause and stability.”273  The PNGTUC was primarily 
concerned with the fact that Sandline had subcontracted out some of its tasks in Papua 
New Guinea to Executive Outcomes, which the PNGTUC associated with South 
Africa’s former apartheid regime, repression, and possible human rights abuses in 
Angola.   
As noted above, President Chan was forced from power by this and similar 
domestic political criticism of his decision to hire Sandline.  We can see in this case 
that decisions to hire PSCs can politically backfire just as easily as can decisions to 
devote a state’s military to an unpopular conflict; hence, the processes relevant to the 
“selection effects” argument of democratic advantage theory may be reversed if public 
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knowledge of the use of PSCs becomes widespread.  Although this conclusion is 
based on a slightly different logic than that found in democratic advantage theory, it 
nonetheless holds policy relevance for existing and future cases whereby the state 
hires PSCs to deploy in place of the regular military. While democratic advantage 
theory conceives of an electorate that chooses or approves of conflict involvement 
based on a concern with casualties, this conclusion predicts that if a majority of the 
electorate becomes aware of the PSC deployment, the entire operation may be even 
less successful – politically, at least - than if the regular military had been sent in the 
first place.  The democratic advantage, then, is even less likely to be seen in cases 
where public knowledge of a PSC deployment in place of allied military assistance 
becomes widespread. 
 In terms of Sandline’s impact on military effectiveness, this case points to the 
co-deployment issues studied in the next chapter; in particular, the difficulty in 
facilitating battlefield coordination between two groups having divergent identities 
and enmeshed in a situation of professional jurisdictional competition.  One of the five 
goals of the Command, Administration, and Training Team (CATT) that Sandline was 
to supply to Papua New Guinea, as outlined in their contract, was to “establish links 
with the PNG defence forces.”274  Obviously, key players in the PNGDF were not 
open to the establishment of such links, as illustrated above by General Singirok’s 
hostile categorization of Sandline personnel as “international terrorists.”  It is thus 
clear that the same PSC-military co-deployment problems apparent in Iraq and 
Afghanistan – driven by structural shortcomings in deployment scenarios and identity-
based resentment – are prone to happen in situations where the government in question 
hires a PSC to help its own military, in place of receiving support from an allied state 
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military. 275  The two types of cases, while involving different actors and scenarios, 
share the structural and identity-based hindrances to peaceful, efficient, and effective 
civil-military coordination.  Furthermore, the case preliminarily indicates that when 
PSCs are hired to supplant a relatively weak professional military in situations of 
revolution or civil war, they can actually decrease military effectiveness by distracting 
the military’s attention from its core purposes, causing it to focus instead on the 
newfound challenge to its professional jurisdiction posed by the firm in question. 
 One final observation regarding military effectiveness in this case is that 
Sandline, had it been allowed to act, may have improved the PNGDF’s military 
effectiveness in terms of its compliance with legal and ethical norms of Just War and 
International Humanitarian Law.  Citing an incident in which the PNGDF mortared a 
Bougainville church, killing a number of the civilian congregation, Spicer himself 
notes that “the PNGDF soldiers needed a grip taken on them, and I had put that in my 
proposals as well.”276  This indicates that there is no guaranteed formula for discerning 
which actors are more or less likely to comply with IHL.277  Of course, in cases like 
this where the military has such a questionable record of compliance with 
humanitarian laws and norms, such attempts by a PSC to “take a grip on them” open 
the possibility of further engendering resentment between the two groups and 
hindering PSC-military relations. 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has analyzed a spectrum of different cases involving a PSC hired 
in place of the regular military; be it to replace the domestic military in a conflict 
abroad, or to replace allied military support in a domestic conflict.  In Croatia, a third 
party (the United States) brokered a deal to hire MPRI to train the Croatian military, 
whereas in Colombia, a third party (also the United States) has devoted substantial 
resources over a long period of time to send both its own military and PSC personnel 
to assist in drug eradication efforts.  In Papua New Guinea, the government hired a 
PSC on its own without third party involvement, and the military and opposition 
politicians used it as an excuse to stir up public unrest and force the government’s 
resignation, before the PSC’s work had even commenced.  In Sierra Leone, British 
and possibly American officials approved the actions of a PSC in funneling weapons 
to friendly actors in contravention of a U.N. arms embargo, approval of which led to a 
huge scandal in Britain. 
 Though their facts vary, these cases – when taken as a whole – indicate that 
PSCs deployed in place of the regular military often bolster the tactical, operational, 
and/or strategic military effectiveness of the actors they are tasked with assisting, as 
long as the long-term strategy underlying the entire operation is sound in the first 
place.  However, as seen in the Colombian case, non-compliance with IHL combined 
with an ineffective overarching strategy can undermine other aspects of military 
effectiveness.  The Croatian case similarly suffers from issues of non-compliance with 
IHL, but this case appears to provide support for the “draining the sea” approach as 
opposed to the “hearts and minds” approach to counterinsurgency warfare, as IHL 
non-compliance in this case coincides with increased military effectiveness.  Notably, 
however, it is difficult to draw a conclusive causal link between non-compliance and 
increased effectiveness in the Croatian case.  The democratic advantage also suffers in 
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all four cases, as hiring PSCs in place of the regular military allows states to engage in 
military actions outside of the public eye.  This hinders the electorate’s capability to 
limit their government’s involvement in risky conflicts and, according to the reasoning 
of the selection effects argument, makes it less likely that democratic governments 
hiring PSCs in this manner will tend to enter into “winnable” conflicts. 
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CHAPTER 5 
BROTHERS IN ARMS? 
PSCS DEPLOYED ALONGSIDE THE NATIONAL MILITARY 
Governments increasingly hire private security companies to operate alongside 
the state-run professional military in theatres of combat – mainly in close-protection, 
convoy security, and static site security roles.  The practice of placing the military and 
private security contractors in the same theatre of combat has led in some cases to a 
surprising outcome: multiple reports of hostilities, tensions, and a general lack of 
coordination between these forces have emerged from the field.  Other reports indicate 
that PSC personnel act in a hostile or threatening manner towards civilians in their 
area of operation.  Such actions, if pervasive, can have a grave impact on the overall 
military operation and long-term strategic goals in that region.  To what extent do PSC 
personnel coordinate well with professional soldiers in the field and vice versa, and 
how does their co-deployment with the military impact overall military effectiveness?  
This chapter attempts to answer these questions, seeking to address also whether and 
how it is possible for the state, the military, or PSCs to remedy any PSC-military 
coordination problems through particular policy changes.  
Focusing on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early period of the 
twenty-first century, this chapter seeks to improve our limited understanding of PSCs 
in several ways.  First, it contributes original interview data to a research topic 
suffering from a dearth of accessible evidence, using these data to illuminate the 
difficulties and successes that private security firms have interacting with the 
professional military in conflict zones.  Because PSC-military coordination problems 
can impact the military’s levels of integration, skill, responsiveness, quality, and 
compliance with the legal norms of Just War, they can impact military effectiveness 
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and the democratic advantage.  Therefore, the chapter’s second contribution is in its 
analysis of how PSC-military co-deployment impacts military effectiveness.  
Analyzing these data, and drawing upon the theoretical literature on both civil-
military relations and the professions, the chapter then questions the extent to which 
PSC-military field interactions are caused by structural factors (such as shortcomings 
or incompatibilities in deployed military and PSC units’ ordering principles, 
capabilities, and/or functions) as opposed to identity factors – the norms, social 
purposes, relational comparisons, and cognitive models constituting PSC and military 
identities, respectively.  The structure-identity dichotomy is crucial to understanding 
the underlying causes of PSC-military coordination issues, and thus is significant for 
determining appropriate policy recommendations to remedy coordination problems.  
In performing this undertaking, I find that both structure and identity are indeed 
significant shapers of PSC-military interactions: when confronting weakness in the 
structures guiding their interactions, PSC and military personnel base their actions on 
actual and perceived identity-based factors.  The chapter then develops a framework of 
analysis that demonstrates this connection between structure and identity at both the 
individual and collective levels, therefore contributing to the “structure versus 
identity” debate within the field of International Relations.   
The chapter’s fourth contribution is in its development of a typology of firms 
based upon their levels of “operational professionalism” – in other words, their pursuit 
of the practices most likely to have a beneficial impact on military effectiveness.  The 
chapter concludes with an analysis of the chapter’s implications for policy.  In Chapter 
Seven, I argue for a revised set of policy recommendations based upon what can 
realistically be achieved. 
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The Problem:  
PSC-Military Coordination in Iraq & Afghanistan  
 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a revealing report 
in July 2005 titled Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers in 
Iraq.  In this report, the GAO noted: 
 
The military and private security providers in Iraq have 
an evolving relationship based on cooperation and 
coordination of activities and the desire to work from a 
common operating picture.  However, U.S. forces in 
Iraq do not have a command and control relationship 
with private security providers or their employees.  
Initially, coordination between the military and private 
security providers was informal.  However, since the 
advent of the Reconstruction Operations Center in 
October 2004, coordination has evolved into a structured 
and formalized process.  While contractors and the 
military agree that coordination has improved, some 
problems remain.  First, private security providers 
continue to report incidents between themselves and the 
military when approaching military convoys and 
checkpoints.  Second, military units may not have a 
clear understanding of the role of contractors, including 
private security providers, in Iraq or of the implications 
of having private security providers in the battle 
space.278  
This passage clearly indicates that PSC-military coordination in Iraq is problematic.  
The GAO authored a follow-up to its 2005 report in June 2006, noting that PSC-
military coordination problems still remain in Iraq.  In both reports, the GAO 
recommended structural changes to the system of PSC-military co-deployment in Iraq, 
pushing specifically for a pre-deployment training program to better train both military 
and PSC actors to coordinate with each other in the field.  The 2006 report noted 
improvements that had been made, focusing particularly on the development of the 
five regional Reconstruction Operations Centers (ROCs).  The ROCs were established 
                                                
278 United States Government Accountability Office, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use 
of Private Security Providers,” Publication No. GAO-05-737 (Washington, DC: July 2005), p. 20. 
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in 2004 to remedy the lack of communication and coordination between private 
security forces and coalition forces by serving as information coordination hubs for 
the U.S. military and private security and military companies operating in Iraq.279  
Evidence of such improvements suggests that PSC-military coordination is the sum of 
multiple dynamic processes capable of producing comprehensive change over time, 
either positively or negatively, as the groups become more accustomed to working 
alongside one another.   
The GAO reports, as well as other media reports, would lead us to believe that 
PSC-military coordination problems occur on a regular basis in co-deployment 
situations such as Operation Iraqi Freedom.280  The 2006 GAO report noted, for 
instance, that “private security providers continue to enter the battle space without 
coordinating with the U.S. military, putting both the military and security providers at 
a greater risk for injury.”281  On the other hand, a number of PSC and military 
personnel have indicated that ad hoc coordination occurs regularly between PSC and 
military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.  How pervasive are PSC-military 
coordination problems in these theatres in reality, and to what extent does change over 
time appear to be possible?   
This study uses original interview data to answer these questions, drawing 
upon interviews that I conducted between September 2006 and December 2007 with 
academic experts, high-level private security company officials, private security 
company operators (lower-level personnel), and U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force 
                                                
279 United States Government Accountability Office, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve 
Use of Private Security Providers,” Publication No. GAO-06-865T (Washington, DC: June 13, 2006). 
280 See for instance David Barstow, “Security Companies: Shadow Soldiers in Iraq,” The New York 
Times (April 19, 2004); Eric Schmitt, “Accord Tightens Control of Security Contractors in Iraq,” The 
New York Times (December 5, 2007). 
281 United States Government Accountability Office, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve 
Use of Private Security Providers – Report Highlights,” Publication No. GAO-06-865T (Washington, 
DC: June 13, 2006), p. 1. 
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soldiers of various ranks, ranging from non-commissioned officers to colonels.  I 
conducted further interviews with one U.K. military officer and four U.K. PSC 
officials, in order to research any potential differences in PSC-military relations 
between the United States and the United Kingdom.282  Because the private security 
industry is so transnational in nature and U.S. and U.K. forces are often integrated 
together with PSC personnel in the field, few major differences were apparent between 
the responses of U.S. and U.K. interviewees.  There were a few significant distinctions 
noted between the two countries’ PSC-military relations, however, as discussed 
further below.   
Altogether, fourteen military and eighteen PSC personnel were interviewed, 
for a total of thirty-two respondents with direct field experience.  In addition, I 
interviewed numerous academic and industry experts to gain a more complete picture 
of the private security industry and of the potential for viable policy options to deal 
with the industry.  The private security company personnel and professional soldiers 
interviewed possessed experience in various theatres, ranging from Iraq to 
Afghanistan, the Balkans, South America, and several regions in both Africa and Asia.  
However, the vast majority of interviewees had served at least one rotation in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and quite a few also served in Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.283  Their dates of service in the two theatres relevant 
to this chapter, Iraq and Afghanistan, ranged from 2002 to 2007, with some 
interviewees deployed more than once to these theatres.  Interviewees were either 
intentionally sought out due to their position – for instance, various high-level PSC 
                                                
282 Seventeen of the eighteen PSC interviewees were former military.  Four had British military 
experience, one had New Zealand military experience, and the remainder had U.S. military experience. 
283 Twenty-three of the thirty-two total interviewees had OIF experience (twelve PSC and eleven 
military personnel), five had OEF experience (two PSC and three military personnel), and four had been 
deployed to both OIF and OEF (three PSC interviewees and one military interviewee). 
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officials were selected in this manner – or were selected via “snowball” sampling, in 
which each interviewee referred one to three other potential interviewees.   
Due to this selection method, there was a range in respondents’ levels of 
experience with the other group; in particular, two of the soldiers interviewed had only 
limited contact with PSC personnel during their deployments.  However, none of the 
interviewees endeavored to answer any interview questions not applicable to their 
experience.  Because the interviews were semi-structured in nature, and given the 
varying experiences of the interviewees, not all questions were asked of all 
respondents.  
Of the original interviews conducted for this project, six out of eleven military 
respondents and fourteen out of fourteen of PSC respondents agreed that successful 
coordination between the military and PSC personnel in the field does occur regularly, 
though many noted that such coordination is often ad hoc and depends upon the 
personalities of those involved.  A few examples include security contractors notifying 
the relevant military commander(s) when traveling into or through a particular area of 
responsibility (AOR), contractors and military personnel exchanging cell phone 
numbers when they know that they will be working in the same AOR, and contractors 
holding up U.S. or coalition flags when passing through military checkpoints.284  
“Success” in this case is conceptualized in terms of a scale of success ranging from the 
basics of communicating and not shooting at each other, all the way up through 
success in achieving the desired tactical, operational, or strategic goal.   
A U.S. Air Force pilot with experience commanding a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan from April 2006 to April 2007 illustrated 
                                                
284 Colonel Tim Vuono (U.S. Army), in interview with the author, October 10, 2006; Mark Lonsdale 
(Vice President and Director of U.S. Operations, Hart Security) in interview with the author, December 
2006; John Nettles (former Army Special Forces; Trainer, Olive Security Training Center), in interview 
with the author, April 2007. 
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an instance of this higher level of success.  He noted that when training the Afghan 
National Police, DynCorp contractors’ assistance “was invaluable in getting the 
mission up and running, and in the removal of two highly corrupt police chiefs.”285  
Meanwhile, one official from the firm Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology 
(EODT) who was deployed to Iraq in 2004 highlighted the types of PSC-military 
coordination practices employed by his firm: 
  
 Always important to coordinate, but stay the hell out of  
 the way.  At Camp Taji we had nightly  
 [U.S.Government]-EODT meetings to stay coordinated.  
 At night my job was to ensure that our last Iraqi guard  
 outpost was tied in with the U.S. Army’s first position  
 on the perimeter.”286  
PSC-military coordination at all levels in the field enables the entire force to be 
more responsive to its own needs and capabilities, and to external conditions.  It also 
increases the entire force’s level of integration.  Successful coordination should 
therefore increase military effectiveness through its impact on integration and 
responsiveness, as defined in Chapter Two of this study.  The fact that much of this 
coordination is ad hoc, however, poses a challenge in terms of how to institutionalize 
the coordination processes so that they occur more regularly.  Through its focus on 
both structural deficiencies and identity issues underlying the various problems of 
PSC-military coordination in the field, this chapter aims to develop both structural and 
identity-based recommendations that will do much to institutionalize and standardize 
coordination processes.  
When coordination problems do occur, they bring with them many interrelated 
problems that can impact military effectiveness, including friendly fire incidents 
between PSC and military personnel (so-called “blue-on-white” incidents), resentment 
                                                
285 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, October 31, 2007. 
286Colonel Tom Johnson (U.S. Army, Ret.; Ethics & Compliance Officer, EODT Technology), in 
interview with the author, July 7, 2007. 
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over PSC-military pay differentials, the military’s lack of knowledge regarding PSCs’ 
presence in their AOR, and PSCs’ often negative impact on local civilians’ 
perceptions of the entire military operation.  These issues, which are discussed in 
detail below, occur both in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
Freedom.287  
 
Blue-on-White Incidents 
Newspaper accounts detailing events in Iraq indicate that something other than 
structural improvements might be necessary to remedy PSC-military coordination 
problems.  At their most extreme, these problems are reflected by “friendly fire” or 
“blue-on-white” incidents in which the U.S. military fires upon PSCs working for 
various U.S. government agencies or other U.S. contractors (such as PSCs working as 
security for construction companies in Iraq), or vice versa.  Reports of the Baghdad 
ROC indicate that the most likely blue-on-white victim is a private security company 
employee.  Blue-on-white victims are most likely to be fired upon by coalition forces 
(as opposed to Iraqi Security Forces), during late-morning (10:00-11:00am).   Victims 
are most likely to be approaching a checkpoint, or overtaking (or being overtaken by) 
a convoy.  The number of reported blue-on-white incidents decreased significantly 
following the establishment of the ROC in 2004, indicating the potential for 
improvement over time with the creation of structural coordination mechanisms.288  
Figures 5.1-5.3 illustrate these data.289 
                                                
287 It is worth noting here that for the purposes of this project, Operation Enduring Freedom does not 
differ significantly from the situation in Iraq, although there is a lower ratio of PSC to military 
personnel in Afghanistan and there are no structural measures like the ROC in place to assure smooth 
communications between PSC and military personnel.  Both a representative of the British Association 
of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) and an MPRI official who served in OEF from 2003-2005 
noted these differences between OIF and OEF.  Hank Allen (International Business Development, 
MPRI), in interview with the author, April 2, 2007; Dr. Sabrina Schulz (Director of Policy, British 
Association of Private Security Companies), in interview with the author, January 25, 2007. 
288 Interestingly, the Reconstruction Operations Center is managed by Aegis Defence Services, Inc., a 
private intelligence company owned by former Sandline owner Tim Spicer, whose activities in Sierra 
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ISF = Iraqi Security Forces                           CF = Coalition Forces 
                              PSC = Private Security Companies 
Figure 5.1: 
Blue-on-White Incidents Involving Coalition Forces and PSC Personnel in OIF 
(November 2004 – August 2006) 
 
While these friendly fire incidents are disturbing, interview data indicates that 
they are not as pervasive as some media reports make them out to be.  Indeed, only six 
of this project’s eighteen PSC interviewees and four of the fourteen military 
                                                                                                                                       
Leone and Papua New Guinea are discussed in detail in Chapter Four.  The Washington Post reports 
that Aegis won the largest single contract for private security in Iraq – a three-year, $293 million U.S. 
Army contract – for its management of the ROC.  Steve Fainaru and Alec Klein, “In Iraq, a Private 
Realm of Intelligence-Gathering,” The Washington Post (July 1, 2007).  Accessed December 18, 2007 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/30/AR2007063001075_pf.html.  
289 The ROC Watch Officer originally produced these charts.  I would like to thank Colonel Timothy 
Cornett of USSOUTHCOM and the Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute of the U.S. Army 
War College for providing me with access to these data, which Colonel Cornett presented at the Combat 
Training Center Commander’s Conference at the Combined Arms Center at TRADOC on September 
26-27, 2006. 
ISF
PSC
CF
ISF
PSC
CF
0
49
01
17
2
0
9
20
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
FIRED AT
F I R E D
BLUE ON BLUE PARTICIPANTS
ISF
PSC
CF
 145 
interviewees were ever involved in or had firsthand knowledge of a blue-on-white 
incident.290  Of course, one should consider the possibility that the figures detailing 
blue-on-white incidents are prone to error.  An in-depth report published in January 
2008 notes that significant incidents are likely to be both underreported and 
misreported by security contractors.  Human Rights First reviewed 610 serious 
incident reports (SIRs) filed with the ROC between July 2004 and April 2005, finding 
that the vast majority of SIRs were in regard to threats perceived by contractors and  
 
 
Figure 5.2:  
Majority of Blue-on-White Incidents Involve  
Approaching Checkpoints & Following/Overtaking Convoys 
(November 2004 – August 2006) 
 
 
did not touch upon contractors’ conduct towards others.  The report notes “Among all 
of these SIRs just one even suggests unwarranted weapons discharge by a security 
                                                
290 It is difficult to grasp the frequency of blue-on-white incidents relative to other friendly fire 
incidents, as no centrally collected figures of friendly fire incidents between regular military forces (so-
called “blue-on-blue” incidents) in Operation Iraqi Freedom exist.  However, one report suggests that 
thirty-two blue-on-blue incidents involving British and coalition vehicles occurred in southern Iraq in 
2004.  See Mark Townsend, “Why Won’t the US Tell Us How Matty Died?,” The Guardian, February 
4, 2007.  Accessed June 10, 2008 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/2007/feb/04/iraq.military/print.  
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contractor.”291  Human Rights First points out that such underreporting is likely due to 
the fact that the self-reporting system is built for coordination and contractor 
protection, and not for the purpose of monitoring or investigating PSC personnel.292  
 
 
Figure 5.3: 
Month-to-Month Breakdown of Blue-on-White Incidents Reported to ROC  
(November 2004 - August 2006) 
 
Furthermore, contractors have little incentive to report incidents, given that:  
 
The individual risks his job, and the private security 
companies themselves may be concerned that a high 
number of compromising incidents may be viewed by the 
military contracting authority as evidence of improper 
training, supervision or conduct, leading to potential 
cancellation of current contracts or a decreased chance to 
secure future contracts.293 
 
                                                
291 Human Rights First, Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of Impunity 
(Washington, DC: Human Rights First, 2008), 13. 
292 Human Rights First report, 2008: 16. 
293 Human Rights First report, 2008: 16. 
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It is impossible to conclusively know the extent of underreporting.  However, an EOD 
Technology official with extensive U.S. Army Special Forces experience and 
experience working as a contractor in OIF in 2004 provides some hope that 
improvement in PSC-military coordination is possible, noting that “Fights [between 
PSC personnel and the military] are less common than you would expect, but there is a 
structural problem – doctrine supported by training and simulations are lacking . . . 
much more needs to be done at the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and 
within the Marine Corps.”294 
The vast majority of both PSC and military interviewees agreed that most of 
these incidents occur because of the lack of interoperable communications devices and 
shortcomings in young soldiers’ training regarding PSC personnel and how to deal 
with them.  Many young reservists in particular were not accustomed to working 
alongside PSCs and were occasionally referred to as “trigger-happy” by their PSC 
counterparts.  A PSC operator involved in several blue-on-white incidents while in 
Iraq from February 2004 to May 2005 noted:  
 
I personally was shot at four times by the military, but I 
never shot at a military person.  So what’s the real 
problem?  Training on the military side.  Don’t just 
shoot at something because you don’t know what it is.  
Simple solution we had: We requested and were issued a 
Marine Corps radio so we could talk to the gate before 
we rolled up.  Problem solved . . .295  
Whatever their cause, such incidents have an unmistakable impact on the force’s 
integration, as they decrease the level of trust between military and PSC personnel 
fighting the same enemy. 
 
                                                
294 Colonel Tom Johnson (U.S. Army, Ret.; Ethics & Compliance Officer, EOD Technology), in 
interview with the author, July 7, 2007. 
295 Interview with private security contractor employed by Triple Canopy in Iraq, April 17, 2007. 
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PSC-Military Pay Differentials 
Both PSC and military interviewees frequently cited the high pay of PSC 
personnel for jobs similar to their military counterparts as a source of resentment 
between the two groups.  In some cases, security contractors can make a soldier’s 
annual salary in just one month.  Two PSC interviewees who served in OEF in 2002 
and 2003 (with one returning for one month in late 2004) noted that they were making 
approximately $1,000 per day while deployed, working as PSC team leaders.296   
One colorful example of pay differentials leading to dangerous levels of 
resentment is seen in the Zapata Engineering incident of May 28, 2005, when sixteen 
employees of the U.S.-based firm Zapata Engineering were arrested for supposedly 
firing upon a U.S. military checkpoint watchtower in Iraq.  Zapata was under contract 
with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at the time, tasked with managing a storage 
depot for captured ammunition in Iraq.  The sixteen contractors were held in military 
custody for three days and, as documented in a report on National Public Radio 
(NPR), were harassed and treated disrespectfully by the Marines during their 
detention.  Referring to Matt Raiche, a former Marine working for Zapata, the NPR 
report notes: 
 
While in Marine custody for three days, Raiche and 
some of the other contractors say they were abused and 
humiliated.  One Marine derided the group as rich 
contractors, Raiche says, and another Marine slammed a 
contractor to a cement floor and crushed his testicles.  
Raiche says a Marine sergeant pushed him to the ground 
with a knee to his back while other Marines mocked 
him.297  
                                                
296 Alan Brosnan (Director, Olive Security Training Center) and Todd Taylor (Instructor, Head of Law 
Enforcement Training Division, Olive Security Training Center), in interview with the author, April 10, 
2007. 
297 Eric Westervelt, “Profile: Confusion in Iraq Over Alleged Incident Between Marines and Private 
Contractors,” National Public Radio: Morning Edition (June 13, 2005).  Accessed March 8, 2007 at 
http://www.npr.org.  
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Another report of this incident notes: 
 
All 16 of the Zapata convoy were imprisoned in small, 
six-foot by eight-foot cells, dressed in orange prison 
garb for three days without legal charges or legal 
counsel . . . Some of the security convoy said the 
Marines also roughed up the contractors before taking 
them to jail and that they were slammed down on the 
concrete one by one, bruising some pretty badly . . . One 
of the contractors, Rick Blanchard of Shelbyville, 
Tennessee, said a Marine put a knee to his neck and 
applied his full body weight as another cut his boots off 
and stripped him of his wedding ring and religious 
ornaments.  Twenty or thirty other Marines laughed, he 
added, as a uniformed woman with a military dog 
snapped photographs.  Taunts were made about the large 
salaries of private security contractors . . . The gathering 
crowd of Marines was saying things like ‘how is that 
contractor money now,’ said Blanchard, a Marine 
veteran.298   
This treatment allegedly occurred despite the fact that some if not all of the employees 
were former military personnel themselves, and despite the contractors’ claims of 
innocence with regard to firing upon the checkpoint.   
The Marines dispute this account of the Zapata employees’ detention, 
however.  Marine spokesman Lieutenant Colonel David Lapan told reporters, “The 
contract personnel were treated professionally and appropriately the entire time they 
were in the custody of military personnel . . . Before they were taken to the detention 
facility, they were placed on the ground, flex-cuffed and searched per standard 
practice.  They were not thrown to the ground.”299  The Zapata contractors were never 
charged for the alleged offense, reflecting the problems regarding contractors’ legal 
accountability which are discussed in Chapter Six of this study. 
                                                
298 David Phinney, “Marines Jail Contractors in Iraq: Tension and Confusion Grow Amid the ‘Fog of 
War,’” CorpWatch (June 7, 2005): 3-4.  Accessed December 13, 2005 at 
http://www.corpwatch.org/article?php.id=12349. 
299 Phinney, 2005: 4. 
 150 
Such encounters – though not usually this severe in nature – underscore how 
sentiments of resentment or competition between the military and PSCs, particularly 
over issues of pay differentials, can become a major problem.  Of the military and PSC 
respondents interviewed specifically for this project, seven of eight military 
respondents and fourteen of seventeen PSC respondents cited resentment between 
PSC and military personnel, often based upon contractors’ higher wages for similar 
work, as a major cause of field coordination problems.  As one U.S. Army Major with 
experience in Afghanistan from August 2003 to May 2004 noted:  
 
There was always resentment between my soldiers and 
the contractors because the contractors were making 
several times more money than my soldiers and doing 
basically the same job . . . Everybody rolls their eyes 
when we start to mention private security contractors.  It 
seems that none of my colleagues have had a positive 
experience when interacting with them.300  
A former Army Airborne Ranger and Special Forces officer with fifteen years of 
military experience, who worked for Triple Canopy in Iraq from February 2004 to 
May 2005, dissected the issue of PSC-military resentment: 
 
In my two years I learned that most of the problems 
between military and security contractors were 
ego/jealousy driven . . . Example: Two guys with the 
same background.  One stays in the military and gets 
deployed to Iraq.  The other gets out of the military and 
deploys to Iraq during the same time period as a 
contractor.  The guy in the military is making $40,000 a 
year working twelve-hour shifts seven days a week 
while the contractor is making $240,000 a year and 
working four- to six-hour shifts four to six days a week.  
The guy in the military sleeps in a room with ten other 
guys while the contractor has his own trailer with air-
conditioning, television, a DVD player, and a fridge.  
The military guy is under the control of the military, so 
no sex or drinking – the contractor isn’t.  The military 
                                                
300 Interview with U.S. Army Major, November 26, 2007. 
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guy wears a uniform while the contractor wears 
whatever he wants.  The military guy stays seven 
months and is forced to stay longer while the contractor 
can leave whenever he wants.  And so on and so on.301  
These results are bolstered by Ryan Kelty’s forthcoming large-n survey findings, 
which show that – in the context of U.S. National Guard soldiers who recently 
returned to the United States after fifteen months in Iraq – negative social comparisons 
with contractors have direct negative impacts on perceived unit cohesion and general 
attitudes toward contractors.  In other words, soldiers who hold an unfavorable 
perception of contractors’ identities in relation to their own (a negative relational 
comparison) feel that co-deploying PSCs with the military has a negative impact on 
the unit’s cohesiveness as a fighting force.302 
At issue here is the fact that PSCs are increasingly infringing upon the 
military’s professional jurisdiction and are paid more for performing the same jobs.  
Matt Raiche of Zapata Engineering reiterated this point, describing members of the 
military as: “Resentful that we made so much money, the fact that we could come 
home, you know, every ninety days.  They didn’t like that.  But mainly they’re mad 
about the money we made, four or five times the amount they make.”303 Such 
resentment impacts the force’s integration and reflects issues of professional 
jurisdictional competition and identity cleavages based upon different social purposes 
and relatively hostile relational comparisons.304  Significantly, though, there are 
structural differences – for instance, in pay levels and vacation time – at the root of 
these hostile relational comparisons.  Therefore, if this resentment is strong enough to 
cause PSC-military coordination problems, both structural- and identity-based 
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remedies to these coordination problems will be necessary.  The connection between 
identity cleavages and resentment are explored further below in the discussion of 
identity issues.  
Interestingly, however, the opinions of military personnel regarding their PSC 
counterparts are not entirely negative.  The interview data in some instances actually 
indicate that increased exposure to security contractors is improving the military’s 
perceptions of PSC personnel and their motives for working as war zone contractors.  
For instance, two British PSC officials noted that the PSC industry received a warmer 
welcome from the U.S. military than from the U.K. military precisely because the U.S. 
military has a longer history of working alongside contractors.305  Furthermore, when 
asked whether they thought the PSC personnel with whom they had come into contact 
were as motivated by patriotism as they were by money, six of eleven military 
interviewees answered in the affirmative, as did twelve of fifteen PSC respondents.  
Though this level of PSC affirmation is not surprising, the military’s level of 
agreement with them on this issue is fairly unexpected, given the military’s 
professional incentives to frame PSC personnel as unpatriotic.  A former Heavy 
Brigade Team Commander with OIF experience from November 2005 to November 
2006 noted “Contractors were generally well-meaning patriots trying to make a 
living.”306  Another U.S. military major with OIF experience in 2003-2004 and again 
from November 2005 to November 2006 said “Money is obviously a strong incentive 
for contractors to work in a combat zone and separate from their families when they 
do not have to.  I think most also have a sense of patriotic duty, since many are prior 
military.”307  These findings are supported by Kelty, Schnack, and Langkamp’s large-n 
survey research, in which the researchers asked 536 U.S. Army infantry and combat 
                                                
305 Interview with high-level British PSC officials, January 24, 2007. 
306 Interview with U.S. Army Colonel, July 12, 2007. 
307 Major Royce Edington (U.S. Army), in interview with the author, July 10, 2007. 
 153 
aviation troops whether civilian contractors are less committed to the work they 
perform than are soldiers.  Of these respondents, 27.2% “disagreed” with this notion, 
while another 28.2% “disagreed somewhat.”  This is compared with only 4.3% who 
“strongly agreed” that contractors are less committed to their work than are soldiers, 
10.1% who “agreed,” and 17.0% who “agreed somewhat.”308  Meanwhile, on the PSC 
side, a retired U.S. military general working as an official at DynCorp noted: 
 
Honestly, I believe that significant numbers of our 
employees are motivated by a sense of duty to our 
Nation.  While money is a strong incentive (and most 
employees earn significantly more deployed than in their 
regular law enforcement jobs), it takes a sense of 
commitment and a desire to help those that can’t help 
themselves.  I see that in most of our employees.”309  
These findings speak directly to Reiter and Stam’s variable of morale, 
discussed in Chapter Two, which they measure in terms of patriotism.310  Based upon 
these findings, it would clearly be difficult to argue that PSCs impact military 
effectiveness negatively based on claims that they are less patriotically motivated in 
the field than are regular soldiers.  A similar finding bolsters this conclusion, with nine 
of the study’s fourteen military respondents and twelve of the eighteen PSC 
respondents saying that they do not believe PSC personnel are likely to abruptly 
abandon their posts.  While it is virtually impossible to find actual data to substantiate 
this finding at this point in time – due to the plethora of firms operating worldwide, 
the lack of any comprehensive study of this issue up to this point, and the incentives 
for firms to cover up instances of employees abandoning their posts – it is nonetheless 
an interesting finding that speaks directly to a common critique of private military and 
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security firms.  For instance, Peter Singer has warned potential purchasers of PSC 
services that: 
 
. . . while firms may have market incentives not to 
abandon their posts or jump ship for better paying 
contracts elsewhere, their employees often do not.  
Operations will thus depend on soldiers, unaccountable 
to the code of military justice, who make their own 
personal risk vs. reward analysis.311 
All in all, the interview findings bode well for PSCs’ impact on the military’s 
skill in terms of soldiers’ motivation, as they indicate that: (a) private contractors 
comprising part of a co-deployed force will likely be relatively easy to motivate for 
particular tasks, since many are in the field for patriotic as well as monetary reasons; 
and (b) military personnel are not likely to feel a decrease in motivation due to having 
to work alongside higher-paid contractors, since many of them recognize that 
contractors are, by and large, patriotically motivated.  Furthermore, twelve out of the 
study’s fourteen military respondents and all eighteen PSC respondents said that they 
believe that PSC employees are necessary force multipliers.  This speaks to Brooks’ 
notion of quality, indicating that PSCs improve military effectiveness in this sense by 
increasing the military’s capacity.  Again, the fact that such a high proportion of 
military respondents answered this question in the affirmative is surprising and 
particularly informative, given the motives for the military to try to defend their 
professional jurisdiction by arguing that PSCs are unnecessary. 
 
The Military’s Lack of Knowledge of PSC Positions  
Both military and PSC personnel have frequently cited the military’s lack of 
knowledge regarding PSC personnel traveling through a particular military unit’s area 
                                                
311 Peter W. Singer, “Should Humanitarians Use Private Military Services?,” Small Wars Journal.  
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of responsibility (AOR) as a result of problematic coordination between PSC and 
military personnel co-deployed in the field.  Both the GAO interviews and those 
interviews conducted specifically for this project included numerous statements 
regarding such a lack of knowledge.312  Of the GAO’s military interviewees, eight of 
the fourteen complained of not being aware of PSCs’ location within their area of 
responsibility, which in some cases led to unnecessary danger for the troops in that 
AOR when having to provide assistance or a quick-reaction force (QRF) to PSCs.  
Again, many interviewees cited the dearth of interoperable PSC and military 
communications devices as an underlying structural cause of this lack of knowledge: 
twenty-two of the GAO’s thirty-three PSC interviewees and eight of the GAO’s 
fourteen military interviewees mentioned communications difficulties as the main 
cause of coordination problems.  This was mainly due to the lack of interoperable 
radio and communications systems between the military and PSCs.  These 
coordination and communications shortcomings can have a significant impact on the 
force’s integration and responsiveness, as they increase the likelihood that PSC 
movements will catch military units off guard, thus hindering the military’s ability to 
unify its troops’ activities and to respond to the enemy.  Many interviewees, however, 
note that these communications shortcomings regarding PSC teams’ field positions 
have abated significantly since the establishment of the Reconstruction Operations 
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Center in Iraq.  This bodes well for structural remedies to PSC-military coordination 
problems.   
Yet, the fact that company participation in the ROC was not mandatory until 
recently, and that some PSCs with a significant presence in Iraq (such as Blackwater) 
did not participate in the ROC for several years, means that further progress in 
remedying these issues is necessary.  A December 2007 agreement between General 
David Petraeus, the top U.S. military commander in Iraq, and Ryan Crocker, the 
American Ambassador to Baghdad, may successfully remedy these PSC-military 
communications and coordination issues.  The agreement, resulting from policy talks 
following the September 2007 Nisour Square incident in which Blackwater guards 
killed seventeen Iraqi civilians, requires that all State Department convoys in Iraq 
coordinate their movements with the military’s main operations center in Baghdad (the 
ROC), sets minimum standards for training the contractors, and establishes guidelines 
for armed guards to use force in self-defense.  Only close examination of the 
agreement’s effectiveness over time will tell us to what extent it successfully remedies 
these coordination issues.  Notably, the agreement’s limitation to State Department 
contractors leaves open a wide loophole for those PSCs employed by other 
governmental actors and/or other companies in Iraq, who may or may not coordinate 
their movements with coalition forces.313  
The devastation that can occur due to such a failure to coordinate contractor 
movements was seen in Fallujah in early 2004, when four U.S. contractors working 
for Blackwater USA were brutally killed by insurgents.  Contractor deaths such as 
these pose a challenge for the military.  In the Fallujah case, moreover, they led to a 
complete overhaul of the original strategic military plan. The Blackwater deaths 
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caused U.S. policymakers to shift the military strategy and launch an offensive in 
Fallujah, as elaborated below. 
 
Fallujah 
 In March 2004, four contractors working for Blackwater USA were ambushed 
while providing security for a convoy attempting to drive through the city of Fallujah.  
Insurgents killed the four men in a violent volley of small arms fire, and lit their 
vehicles and the corpses on fire.  The riotous scene was soon aired on television 
stations across the globe, with jubilant insurgents dragging the burned and mutilated 
corpses of the four men to a nearby bridge and hanging them there.  It is commonly 
acknowledged among Iraq War experts and the media that the gruesome murder and 
mutilation of these four Blackwater contractors served as the rallying cry and 
inspiration for the Marines who fought in the November 2004 battle in Fallujah.314  
Journalists Bill Sizemore and Joanne Kimberlin write that the Fallujah ambush 
“irrevocably altered the course of the war” in Iraq.  “U.S. military commanders, who 
had no advance knowledge of the convoy’s presence in Fallujah, were ordered by 
Washington to change tactics and pound the city into submission, inflaming the Iraqi 
insurgency to new heights.”315  Meanwhile, former Reagan-era Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Bing West, who authored an account of the Fallujah battle, noted in an 
interview that launching the offensive in Fallujah was “a decision by our top 
leadership against the advice of the Marines. They were not going to change their 
entire strategy because of a tactical error. They were overruled.”316  Whether or not 
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this is true, the contractors’ deaths certainly served as the motivation for the Marines 
to roll into Fallujah just five days after the Blackwater deaths – months before 
November’s major battle – in an operation resulting in up to 600 Iraqi deaths, many of 
them reportedly civilian women and children, along with seven Marine deaths, 100 
wounded Marines, and only the temporary pacification of the city.317  This operation, 
Operation Vigilant Resolve, followed Paul Bremer’s statement that “Their deaths will 
not go unpunished,” and the Deputy Director of Coalition Operations’ statement that 
“It will be at a time and place of our choosing.  We will hunt down the criminals.  We 
will kill them or we will capture them, and we will pacify Fallujah.”318   
Whether the Blackwater contractors involved in this incident coordinated with 
the Marines surrounding Fallujah before attempting to travel through the city is 
unclear.  Journalist Robert Young Pelton notes:  
 
According to one theory, the convoy intended to link up 
with an American-trained Iraqi Civil Defense Corps 
(ICDC) team on the eastern entrance to town, which 
would guide them through the city center, providing 
more firepower if anything happened.  However, this 
would have required coordination the evening before, 
and there is no evidence that the marines at Camp 
Fallujah, or the Blackwater contractors themselves, had 
made this contact.319  
A September 2007 Congressional inquiry into Blackwater’s actions in Fallujah 
reinforces the notion that the Blackwater team did not adequately coordinate with 
coalition forces prior to the attack, noting that the Blackwater personnel arrived at the 
wrong military base the day before the attack because they did not have maps and the 
mission had not been sufficiently planned.  The team was forced to spend the night at 
this base (Camp Fallujah) when, upon attempting to depart for the correct base (Camp 
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Ridgeway), they were prevented from traveling farther by a military checkpoint.  At 
Camp Fallujah, a witness employed by contracting firm Kellogg, Brown, and Root 
(KBR) assessed that “the mission that they were on was hurriedly put together and that 
they were not prepared.”320   
It is clear that PSC-military coordination in this instance needed improvement 
to at least some extent, since neither the U.S. military nor coalition forces were 
accompanying the convoy through what was thought at the time to be a dangerous 
area of the country.  Nor was the military involved in helping the convoy to chart out 
the safest course through the city, or blocking off roads for the convoy – things that 
the military often does for convoys when coordination occurs ahead of time.  In 
reality, the Blackwater convoy had entered the city by bypassing a Marine checkpoint 
without the Marines’ knowledge. The Marines first learned of the ambush from 
television reports detailing the contractors’ gruesome murders and the desecration of 
their bodies.321 
Also clear in this case is that PSC actions had an impact on military planning 
and, potentially, on the military’s ability to wage war in accordance with its 
operational and strategic aims.  One must consider the counterfactual scenario 
regarding the battle of Fallujah: what would have happened in that region, militarily 
speaking, if the contractors had not been attacked?  Because the Marines were not 
planning to launch a massive offensive on Fallujah prior to the Blackwater 
contractors’ gory deaths, and because the battle of Fallujah was a major event early on 
in Operation Iraqi Freedom, one may sensibly conclude that the PSC and its 
employees changed the military’s plans significantly in this situation, thus having an 
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impact on the military’s operational and strategic effectiveness.  Of course, as Robert 
Young Pelton notes, “. . . it can be argued that the battle for Fallujah was part of a 
larger plan to destroy insurgent strongholds in the Sunni Triangle.”322  The extent and 
direction of this impact is therefore debatable.  The important point to recognize here, 
however, is that PSCs and their employees can and do impact military planning and 
the military’s ability to achieve its tactical, operational, and strategic goals.  
 
PSCs’ Impact on Local Civilians’ Perceptions of the Entire Military Operation 
Security contractors have been shown, on multiple occasions, to negatively 
influence local civilians’ views of the entire military operation.  Contractors’ impact 
on locals is extremely relevant to military effectiveness because locals do not 
distinguish between security contractors and the military in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Yet, contractors have different tactical aims from those of the military, primarily the 
aim of protecting the “principal,” or the object that they are guarding.  They therefore 
operate differently from the military, particularly with regard to their treatment of 
local civilians.  While the U.S. and coalition forces in OIF and OEF recognize the 
value of cultivating good relationships with locals – focusing largely on the “hearts 
and minds” approach in these two theatres – PSC personnel in many reported cases 
have harmed their own and the military’s relations with locals.   
A highly visible example of this was seen in Baghdad’s Nisour Square on 
September 16, 2007, when Blackwater USA contractors fired upon and killed 
seventeen Iraqi civilians, and wounded twenty-four others, in a confusing and 
ultimately unjustified hail of fire exacerbated by the “fog of war.”  Some accounts of 
the incident cite Iraqi witnesses who say they saw Iraqi Security Forces opening fire 
from a watchtower, thus prolonging the firefight and possibly leading the Blackwater 
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contractors to believe they were under attack.  Iraqi officials have denied this.  
Ultimately, it is virtually impossible to learn exactly what happened in Nisour Square, 
given officials’ failure to secure the scene directly after the massacre and the 
unwillingness of all parties involved to share information with each other.323   
While Nisour Square is an extreme example, military personnel have cited a 
number of other instances in which security contractors have acted disrespectfully at 
best toward locals in their AOR.  For instance, a U.S. Army infantryman with 
experience in Iraq from November 2005 to November 2006 noted that: 
 
Some commanders are thankful because they have well 
qualified security contractors operating in their AO [area 
of operation].  However, it can become the bane of a 
commander’s existence if they are causing more 
problems than they are solving . . . Security contractors 
do not have to worry about the far reaching implications 
of their actions as it pertains to population perception 
and the like.  All they have to do is worry about getting 
their PC (precious cargo) from point A to point B safely.  
However, the end result falls back on the Army soldier 
in that now Iraqis who have been harassed just associate 
it with Americans . . . and they do not differentiate 
between contractors and the military . . . they just know 
that an American harassed them.”324  
This statement speaks both to issues of command and control and to issues of 
contractors’ compliance with legal and normative rules of international humanitarian 
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law, which dictate how civilians in war zones are to be treated.  Such legal issues are 
addressed at length in Chapter Six, but it is worth noting here that such statements 
provide empirical support for H1c, that PSC non-compliance with legal and ethical 
norms of Just War has a detrimental impact on military effectiveness.  Another Major 
in the U.S. military with OEF experience from August 2003 to May 2004 noted: 
 
. . . the contractors could shoot/kill local nationals 
without having to deal with ROE [rules of engagement].  
The contractors often boasted of how many locals they 
had killed.  We always had to do the consequence 
management after these events.  I don’t know if these 
contractor killings were on legitimate Taliban/AQ [Al 
Qaeda] insurgents or not.  We still had to deal with the 
aftermath    . . . it provided unneeded friction.325  
Both of these statements illustrate how contractors can have a negative impact on 
overall military effectiveness by harming local perceptions of the military’s mission 
and the legality with which it is conducted, particularly in a context in which the 
military has opted primarily to follow the “hearts and minds” approach to 
counterinsurgency warfare.  Furthermore, by increasing the difficulty of the military’s 
mission, such incidents reinforce military resentment of PSC personnel. 
The military has little control over such incidents because PSC personnel are 
largely outside of the military chain-of-command.  Of the original interviews 
conducted specifically for this study, only four of nine military respondents and three 
of ten PSC respondents thought that military commanders work well with PSCs.  
Meanwhile, another four of the nine military respondents thought that military 
commanders do not work well with PSCs, and six of the ten PSC respondents said that 
commanders’ abilities to work well with PSCs vary based upon commander 
personalities.  A contractor from New Zealand working for both Control Risks Group 
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(CRG) and BLP in Iraq from January 2004 to August 2005, and then again from 
October 2006 up to the time of his interview in April 2007, stated: 
 
It depends on who the military commander is and their 
attitude to PSCs.  Some military commanders resented 
us mainly because of the money we earned in relation to 
them and also some PSCs were “cowboys” and very 
unprofessional.  I personally got on well with most 
military commanders and providing we conformed to 
their rules and regulations generally there were no 
problems.  Problems usually occurred when the military 
rotated their units and the new unit had different rules 
and regulations and their attitude to us varied.326  
When asked specifically about the chain of command, six of this study’s eight military 
respondents and four of the eleven PSC respondents thought that the chain of 
command does not operate smoothly with regard to security contractors in the field.  
The low percentage of PSC interviewees sharing this sentiment probably reflects the 
industry’s incentives to appear as though it is under clear control in the field.  The 
military’s views on this issue may therefore more closely approximate reality.  A U.S. 
Army Colonel and former Heavy Brigade Combat Team Commander who served in 
Iraq from November 2005 to November 2006 noted that security contractors “did 
NOT fall under my command.  Normally they were attached to another command 
moving through the area or worked for [the U.S. State Department] . . . The main issue 
is that they did not have to answer to me, so I had very little leverage over them.”327  
Difficulty integrating contractors into the chain of command can have a negative 
impact on both the military’s responsiveness and its integration.  They also lower the 
military’s skill as it is conceived in this study, by making effective leadership more 
difficult.  
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Overall Impact on Military Effectiveness & The Democratic Advantage 
 As illustrated in the examples above, PSC-military co-deployment can have a 
significant and lasting impact on the military’s ability to successfully achieve its aims.  
While PSCs do serve as force multipliers in Iraq and Afghanistan and thus have a 
beneficial impact on quality, they have a negative impact on integration through the 
structural and identity-based hindrances to their effective coordination with the 
military.  These coordination problems pose further challenges for the military in 
terms of their effects on responsiveness.  For instance, when a military unit is pulled 
away from its activities to send a quick-reaction force (QRF) to the aid of a PSC team 
in its AOR of which it had no previous knowledge, the ability of the soldiers in 
question to respond to external threats and changes in enemy capabilities is 
compromised.  The soldiers in question are placed in a dangerous situation for which 
they had not planned nor prepared, to save the lives of “friendly” contractors who had 
not coordinated with them.   
 PSC-military co-deployment’s impact on the military’s relationship with the 
local population also detrimentally affects military integration, as well as military 
quality.  Because contractors in Iraq have, in many instances, fired upon civilians and 
driven recklessly through civilian areas while firing shots, the locals harbor resentment 
toward them.  Furthermore, because they associate the contractors with the U.S.-
military led coalition occupying their country, many Iraqis reportedly hold the 
coalition forces accountable for contractors’ actions.  This is particularly problematic 
because the U.S. and coalition forces have opted to follow the “hearts and minds” 
approach to COIN in these theatres.  Therefore, such contractor actions further spur 
resentment of security contractors within the military ranks, making the integration of 
PSC and military personnel into a cohesive occupying force less likely.  Furthermore, 
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a strong line of argument exists which says that because the military’s capacity to fight 
an insurgency depends so strongly on local support, locals can be seen as a type of 
“weapon” contributing to or taking away from the coalition’s counterinsurgency 
activities.  If one accepts this logic, then it becomes clear that the military’s quality is 
compromised by contractors’ alienation of the local citizenry as well. 
Meanwhile, PSCs have a moderately negative impact on the military’s skill in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Although their patriotism mitigates the impact of their presence 
on soldiers’ levels of motivation, the fact that resentment over wage differentials still 
exists between PSC and military personnel means that PSCs’ higher pay has at least 
somewhat of a disheartening effect on military personnel, decreasing their motivation 
levels and thus their skill.  This is illustrated by the fact that many soldiers are leaving 
the military in order to join the private sector.328  Furthermore, many of the PSC and 
military personnel interviewed for this study thought that military commanders do not 
exercise effective control over PSC personnel.  This level of doubt indicates that the 
presence of PSC personnel co-deployed alongside the military in the field likely 
lowers the military’s skill by making overall effective military leadership more 
difficult. 
Thus, the Iraq and Afghanistan cases demonstrate that PSCs can have a 
significantly detrimental impact on military effectiveness, providing support for H2 in 
situations of PSC-military co-deployment.  By extension, the democratic advantage 
should be less likely with democracies’ use of PSCs co-deployed alongside the regular 
military.  This is because PSCs tend to diminish the very military effectiveness that, in 
part, defines the democratic advantage.  PSCs logically do not have as much of an 
impact on the selection effects side of the democratic advantage in these cases of co-
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deployment as they do in Chapter Four’s cases of PSC substitution for regular military 
forces.  This is because the deployment of regular forces alongside PSCs in co-
deployment situations draws the electorate’s attention to the conflict, diminishing the 
chances that PSCs will allow policymakers to make conflict decisions outside of the 
public eye.  Yet, contractor deaths are not included in official casualty counts for 
either OIF or OEF.  This indicates that the use of PSCs may be enabling U.S. 
policymakers to continue involvement in these conflicts beyond what U.S. voters 
would stand for if contractor casualties were widely publicized, to the detriment of the 
democratic advantage. 
 
Underlying Determinants of PSC-Military Coordination 
In the above analysis, both structural and identity issues are at the core of PSC-
military coordination.  As Chapter Two notes, “structure” in this study is conceived in 
terms of the ordering principles characterizing PSC-military co-deployments, the 
functions of the PSC and military units in question, and distribution of capabilities 
across those units.  Meanwhile, identity is studied here in terms of the collective 
identities of both PSCs and the military, based upon Abdelal et al.’s operationalization 
and disaggregation of the content of collective identity into constitutive norms, social 
purposes, relational comparisons with other social categories, and cognitive models, or 
worldviews.329  Table 5.1 reiterates the different interview responses, categorizing 
them in terms of identity and structure. 
 
 
 
                                                
329 Abdelal et. al., 2006: 5-6.  For a further explanation of these measurement rubrics, refer to Chapter 
Two. 
 167 
Structural Issues 
Of the original interviews discussed above, eight out of eight military 
respondents and sixteen of seventeen PSC respondents cited structural causes for 
coordination problems.  These problems spanned the entire range of structural 
variables, including shortcomings and incompatibilities in PSC and military 
capabilities (such as lack of training and lack of interoperable communications 
devices), and shortcomings and incompatibilities in PSC and military ordering 
principles (for instance, the failure to effectively integrate contractors’ into the 
military’s chain of command).   
One Army infantryman with OIF experience from November 2005 to 
November 2006 said, “I think most of the issues between the military and contractors 
are tied to incompatibility of equipment (communications, etc.).”330  A Lieutenant 
Colonel in the British Army, speaking of emerging thoughts on PSC issues, 
acknowledged that the ROCs in Iraq are “a major step forward, but correlated pre-
deployment training is still not happening because [PSCs and the military] are still not 
planning for joint operations together.”331 He noted that one example of the multitude 
of problems associated with this lack of correlated pre-deployment training and 
planning is that the military has no standard operating procedures in place for what the 
military should do if PSC personnel get attacked by insurgents in a military unit’s 
AOR.332  In other words, planning for PSC-military field interactions is not included in 
each group’s stated functions, at least not to the degree necessary for effective 
coordination. 
                                                
330 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, October 11, 2007. 
331 Lieutenant Colonel Chris Butler (British Army, stationed at the Development, Concepts and 
Doctrine Centre at MOD Shrivenham), in interview with the author, January 22, 2007. 
332 Lieutenant Colonel Chris Butler (British Army, stationed at the Development, Concepts and 
Doctrine Centre at MOD Shrivenham), in interview with the author, January 22, 2007. 
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These results closely replicate those from the interviews conducted for the 
2005 and 2006 GAO reports on coordination problems between the military and PSCs 
in Iraq, as structural issues were the most commonly cited causes of military field 
coordination problems in the seventeen relevant GAO interview transcripts.  Beyond 
the capability issues cited above, the second most common response from PSC 
interviewees regarding the causes of PSC-military coordination problems referred to 
incompatibilities in ordering principles: the lack of standard military rules, 
instructions, or doctrine regarding how PSCs and the military should deal with each 
other in the field.  These responses included statements regarding PSCs’ ambiguous 
position in the military chain of command, the ambiguity in the military’s 
responsibility to provide assistance to PSC personnel, and ambiguity in the rules of 
engagement applying to PSC personnel.  One-third (eleven of thirty-three) of PSC 
interviewees also noted the lack of pre-deployment training for the military regarding 
security contractors and their roles in the field.  Notably, none of the PSC employees 
interviewed by the GAO mentioned that PSC employees should receive pre-
deployment training on how to interact with the military.  One-quarter (eight of thirty-
three) of PSC personnel interviewed noted the lack of standard procedures for 
approaching military checkpoints and passing convoys as a major problem hindering 
PSC-military coordination, while six of the thirty-three PSC interviewees stated or 
implied that problems identifying PSCs as friendly forces contributed to poor PSC-
military coordination. 
The structural problems noted by the military differed slightly from those that 
PSC interviewees cited, although eight of the GAO’s fourteen military interviewees 
similarly noted the lack of pre-deployment training as a structural weakness hindering 
effective military-PSC coordination.  Yet, military interviewees thought that both 
groups should receive such training.  Furthermore, eight of the fourteen interviewed  
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Table 5.1: 
Structural & Identity Issues Mentioned in the Interview Data 
 
                     Structural Issues                                   Identity Issues  
 
 
 
 
PSC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Military 
 
 
 
 
 
 
from the military complained of a lack of knowledge regarding PSCs’ location within 
their AOR, which in some cases led to unnecessary danger for the troops in that AOR 
when having to provide assistance or a quick-reaction-force to PSCs.  Another eight of 
• Communication 
difficulties 
• Lack of standard doctrine 
for PSC-military 
interactions 
• Lack of pre-deployment 
training for military on 
PSCs 
• Lack of standard 
procedures for 
approaching 
checkpoints/convoys 
• Problems identifying 
PSCs 
• Perceive military as 
“conventional,” “slow,” 
“inefficient,” 
“dismissive” of PSCs, 
envious of PSCs’ higher 
wages 
• Military commander’s 
personality determines 
PSC-military 
relationship  
 
 
• Communication 
difficulties 
• Lack of standard doctrine 
for PSC-military 
interactions 
• Lack of pre-deployment 
training for both military 
and PSCs  
• Lack of knowledge of 
PSCs location / PSC 
failure to notify 
commander when in AOR 
• Lack of formal command 
& control relationship 
between military and 
PSCs 
• Resentment of PSC 
personnel due to pay 
differentials 
• Perceive PSCs as 
disrespectful, ranging 
from “professional” to 
“pseudo-mercenaries” 
and “cowboys” 
• Varying PSC identities 
• Different operating 
cultures/styles 
• Different missions (i.e., 
social purposes) 
• Perceive most PSC 
personnel as at least 
somewhat patriotically 
motivated 
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the GAO’s fourteen military interviewees noted the lack of a formal command and 
control relationship between the military and PSCs as a cause of coordination 
problems.  In a related finding, six of the fourteen interviewed from the military said 
that they had no knowledge of any formal military rules or doctrine regarding how to 
interact with PSCs.  
Clearly, structural shortcomings are paramount in hindering effective PSC-
military field coordination.  Development of rigorous, standardized training regimens 
for both PSCs and the military regarding how the two groups should interact in the 
field, development of doctrine institutionalizing the guidelines for these interactions, 
and placement and clarification of PSCs’ position in the military chain of command 
are necessary structural remedies that would help prevent many of the coordination 
issues cited above. 
In considering these data, it should be noted that there is a potential for change 
over time as structural improvements are instituted to better facilitate PSC-military 
coordination.  As exposure of military personnel to PSC personnel (and vice versa) 
increases, and as the number of media reports about their interaction increases, 
policymakers are slowly instituting changes to remedy coordination problems.  The 
2004 development of the ROC in Iraq is an example of such a structural change, as is 
the new policy agreed upon by the U.S. Departments of Defense and State regarding 
the processes for notifying the military of State Department contractor movements 
throughout Iraq.333  
Identity Issues 
Convergence & Divergence Along the Four Components of Identity 
The discussion earlier in this chapter of resentment based on pay differentials 
touches upon structural incompatibilities causing collective identity cleavages, which 
                                                
333 Schmitt and von Zielbauer, 2007. 
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then lead to misunderstandings and envy.  The majority of PSC-military resentment is 
based upon these actual or perceived identity distinctions.  However, identity issues 
pertaining to PSC-military relations expand beyond issues of resentment caused by 
divergent pay scales.   
As indicated in the data cited above, PSC personnel and the military have quite 
different constitutive norms and social purposes in a war zone.  For instance, two of 
the GAO’s military interviewees noted that differences in operational cultures and 
missions made it difficult for the two groups to coordinate.  Not only do PSCs vary 
among themselves in terms of operational styles, they also differ from the military in 
this sense.  One military interviewee noted a structural indicator of these differing 
operational styles, saying that the military tends to drive slowly when approaching 
checkpoints, whereas PSCs drive fast through them in order to avoid roadside 
attacks.334  The two groups also differ rather drastically in their missions in the field: 
whereas the military mission is to secure the entire AOR, the PSC mission is to protect 
certain assets (individuals or static sites, depending upon the contract in question).   
It is these different social purposes (of which the different missions are an 
example) and constitutive norms (of which operational culture is an example) that can 
lead to resentment, despite the fact that PSC and military personnel share similar 
cognitive models and other constitutive norms to some extent.  The existence of 
worldviews and constitutive norms shared by the two groups stems from the fact that 
the majority of security contractors have previous military experience, and thus they 
share a common professional background and training with the military.  Furthermore, 
the aforementioned finding that PSC personnel are motivated by patriotism in the 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan speaks to some similarity of motivation between the 
                                                
334 GAO interview with U.S. military personnel, May 9, 2005.  Transcript acquired from the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, October 2006. 
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two groups, assuming that the majority of military personnel are patriotically 
motivated as well.  The two groups do, therefore, have common ground to stand upon.  
If this common ground were better emphasized through structural policy initiatives, 
the prospects for eliminating PSC-military resentment would grow substantially.   
Divergent relational comparisons between the two groups, however, contribute 
substantially to PSC-military resentment and make it difficult to overcome 
coordination problems.  PSCs see the military as inefficient, bureaucratic, and envious 
of the PSC lifestyle, while the military views security contractors as varying from 
“professional” to “cowboys” or “pseudo-mercenaries.”335  For instance, two different 
PSC respondents interviewed by the GAO mentioned their perceptions of the military 
mindset as being “conventional” and “dismissive of PSCs,” unwilling to risk their 
lives for “these private security guys who are making nearly five times their salary.”336  
The GAO’s military interviewees, on the other hand, noted that they perceive PSCs as 
having little respect for applicable military rules, and that some PSCs act like 
“cowboys.”337  PSCs’ apparent disrespect for a particular division’s rules while in their 
AOR had a particularly strong effect on military personnel: “PSCs acted as though 
they had the right to do whatever they wanted and thought they were exempt from 
1AD [First Armored Divison] rules.  Sometimes there were confrontations between 
1AD soldiers and PSCs that came to fist fights and drawing weapons.”338 Although 
this statement refers to events in 2004, the interviews with military personnel who 
served in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 indicate that improvement in PSC-military 
                                                
335 GAO interview with U.S. military personnel, March 27, 2006.  Transcript acquired from the U.S 
Government Accountability Office, October 2006. 
336 GAO interview with PSC personnel, August 31, 2004.  Transcript acquired from the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, October 2006. 
337 GAO interview with U.S. military personnel, March 27, 2006.  Transcript acquired from the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, October 2006. 
338 GAO interview with military official from the 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army, December 9, 2004.  
Transcript acquired from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, October 2006. 
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coordination over time has not been as complete or happened as quickly as some 
might have hoped. 
 
Spectrum of PSC Identities 
Related to these incompatible perceptions of each other is the possibility that 
PSC identities vary along a spectrum, depending upon the background, training, and 
experience of the men and women that each company hires, as well as upon the 
operating style of the company itself.  For example, does the company provide 
uniforms and armored sports-utility vehicles for its personnel, or operate relatively 
undercover with indigenous cars and clothing?  In the GAO interviews of military 
personnel, one interviewee noted that PSC identities range from “professional” to 
“pseudo-mercenaries,” and another commented of PSCs “Some were good, but others 
were cowboys.”339  Although GAO’s PSC interviewees did not explicitly refer to this 
variance among PSC identities, some interviewees did speak implicitly of key 
differences among companies – for instance, different company standards regarding 
uniforms or the use of armored versus civilian vehicles.   
Interviews conducted specifically for this project with high-level British PSC 
officials from ArmorGroup International, Olive Group, and Control Risks Group 
supplement this implicit recognition of variance among PSC identities.  In each of 
these interviews, the company official(s) in question made remarks to distinguish their 
company from other private military and security companies.  The variance in how 
each official defined his company among just these three interviews is, in itself, 
suggestive.  For instance, an official with ArmorGroup International strongly 
disapproves of the “private military company” or “PMC” terminology, instead 
                                                
339 GAO interview with U.S. military personnel, March 27, 2006.  Transcript acquired from the U.S 
Government Accountability Office, October 2006. 
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preferring to refer to ArmorGroup personnel as “project managers” who comprise an 
integral part of “national capacity.” Relaying a joke shared by industry insiders 
regarding the debate over the “PMC” label, the same interviewee said they might as 
well be called “JAC” or “Just Another Contractor.”340  Meanwhile, Eric Westropp of 
Control Risks Group (CRG) rejects the “PMC” terminology in favor of “crisis 
management consultancy,” explicitly distinguishing CRG from U.S. companies like 
Blackwater and Triple Canopy who, he says, are “more proactive” in their willingness 
to fire their weapons than is CRG (among other differences).341  This variance in how 
PSCs identify themselves represents at least a moderate level of contestation regarding 
the definition of PSCs.  Organizing various PSCs into a typology based upon the 
identity characteristics mentioned here is one way to clarify the identity differences 
between various companies, as elaborated below. 
 
The Potential for Shifts in Identity 
Clearly, there are a multitude of ways that identity cleavages may hinder 
effective PSC-military coordination in situations of co-deployment.  Yet, because 
identities are dynamic and mutually constitutive, we would expect to see change over 
time in these collective identity characteristics – either positively or negatively – as 
PSC and military personnel become more accustomed to operating alongside one 
another in the field.342  Indeed, we do see change over time in these characteristics, but 
it is inextricably linked to structure.  Identity-related issues improve when extended 
                                                
340 Christopher Beese (Chief Administrative Officer, ArmorGroup International) in interview with the 
author, January 23, 2007. 
341 Eric Westropp (Director, Control Risks Group) in interview with the author, January 23, 2007. 
342 For more on the dynamic and mutually-constitutive qualities of identities, see Peter J. Katzenstein, 
“Introduction,” in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J. Kazenstein (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 5, 6, 26;     Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics,” in Theory and Structure in Political Economy: An International 
Organization Reader, ed. Charles Lipson and Benjamin J. Cohen (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999), 
83, 95; Jeffrey Checkel, “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change,” International 
Organization 55, 3 (September 2001): 553-588. 
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exposure to each other helps in the development of ad hoc coordination mechanisms to 
overcome structural shortcomings in PSC-military co-deployments.  On the other 
hand, identity-related issues worsen when extended exposure reinforces negative 
relational comparisons, especially if there are no structural mechanisms to bolster 
coordination.  For instance, as noted earlier, a high-level British PSC official 
mentioned that his company’s experiences with resentment were more acute with the 
British military than with the U.S. military, because the U.S. military is more 
accustomed to working with private security than is its British counterpart.  This 
suggests that states that are new to the security privatization trend are likely to see 
more friction between PSCs and the regular military than are states with more 
experience co-deploying the two groups.  Also indicative of the potential for identity 
shift over time are statements regarding variation in PSC identities, with the 
interviewees noting that the “old hands” were less likely to be “trigger-happy” than 
were new recruits.343 
 
A Framework of PSC-Military Interaction: 
The Interplay of Structure & Identity 
Clearly, both structural and identity-based factors are at play in determining 
the nature and extent of PSC-military coordination in the Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflicts, at least during the period from mid-2004 through early 2006.  Structural 
factors figured much more prominently in respondents’ answers regarding the causes 
of PSC-military coordination problems.  Beyond the frequent mention of structural 
issues, however, we can see a pattern of how the interplay of structure and identity 
affect PSC-military coordination.  Specifically, where structural weaknesses exist, 
coordination becomes dependent upon individual and collective identities.  In such a 
                                                
343 GAO interview with U.S. military personnel, March 27, 2006.  Transcript acquired from the U.S 
Government Accountability Office, October 2006. 
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situation, outcomes vary with the variance of these individual and collective identities.  
For instance, because communications between PSCs and the military are ad hoc (a 
structural weakness), coordination in any particular situation becomes dependent on 
the personalities of all involved.  This is particularly true with regard to the relevant 
military commanders – hence individual identities are significant.  Coordination also 
becomes dependent upon the relational comparisons and constitutive norms that each 
group employs in assessing the other, and thus collective identity is relevant as well. 
Both the structure-identity interplay and its relationship to the various 
components of military effectiveness are illustrated in the framework depicted in 
Table 5.2.  In this figure, the lower right-hand quadrant reflects the goal that 
policymakers from the United States and other PSC purchasing states should strive 
for: very few instances of structural or identity-based shortcomings in order to insure 
efficient and effective PSC-military coordination, so that PSCs will have a beneficial 
impact on military effectiveness.  Unfortunately, in Iraq – and to a lesser extent in 
Afghanistan – the situation most closely matches that depicted in the upper left-hand 
quadrant of Table 5.2.   
Interestingly, even if the situation reflected that depicted in the upper right-
hand quadrant of the table (high levels of structural problems and low levels of 
identity problems), the coordination difficulties and confusion spurred by the lack of 
adequate coordination structures would likely breed resentment between the two 
groups, thus causing identity-based problems and shifting the situation into that 
depicted in the upper left-hand quadrant.  The arrow in the upper half of the table 
illustrates this potentiality, which is particularly significant when considering the 
aforementioned finding that structural weaknesses lead PSC and military personnel to 
rely more strongly on identity-related factors.   
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In other words, structural weaknesses lead to both a greater reliance on 
identity-based factors, and to a greater chance for identity-related problems to emerge. 
Therefore, while identity issues will never disappear, military and PSC strategists 
should: (a) focus on remedying structural shortcomings such as deficiencies in training 
and doctrine; and (b) learn which types of individual and collective identities promote 
strong PSC-military coordination, and provide incentives for the military and PSCs 
(both as individual companies and collectively) to align their identities with those that 
promote PSC-military coordination.  The practice of aligning these identities will 
undoubtedly require minor structural changes in order to support the norms 
constituting these more beneficial identities, but the overall change will be a shift in 
identity.   
For example, let us assume that the PSCs viewed as “professional” in the 
military’s eyes are those providing armored cars and standard uniforms to their 
employees, and that this practice makes it easier for these PSCs to coordinate with the 
military because it easily identifies the PSCs as friendly forces.  Implementing the 
above suggestions would lead less professional PSCs to make a structural change (in 
the form of a rule or company standard) to abide by this norm of providing armored 
cars and uniforms, which, ceteris paribus, will eventually shift these companies’ 
identities to be in line with the more “professional” PSCs. 
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Table 5.2: 
              Framework of Analysis 
 
                   IDENTITY PROBLEMS 
 
          HIGH     LOW 
 
 
 
          
 
 
HIGH 
 
 
 
 
STRUCTURAL 
PROBLEMS 
 
 
             LOW 
 
 
 
Typology of PSC “Operational Professionalism” 
 As seen in the above analysis, certain practices enable PSC and military 
personnel to engage with each other productively in the field.  Taken together, these 
practices constitute part of the structure of PSC-military co-deployments and, for the 
purposes of this study, are considered indicative of the private security firm’s level of 
operational professionalism.  As Chapter Two notes, professions theorist Andrew 
Abbott defines “professions” as “exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat 
abstract knowledge to particular cases,” and argues that interrelations between 
Coordination difficulties; 
Low integration;  
Low responsiveness; 
Low skill;  
Moderate to high quality 
(IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN) 
Confusion; 
Coordination difficulties;  
Low integration;  
Low responsiveness;  
 
Moderate skill;  
Moderate to high quality 
Coordination better; 
Integration varies; 
Responsiveness varies; 
Low skill;  
High quality 
Good coordination; 
Good integration; 
Good responsiveness; 
High skill; 
High quality (GOAL) 
 179 
professions are determined by how each group controls its knowledge and skill.344  
Part of this control of knowledge and skill, I argue, includes the practices relating to 
how PSCs and their personnel operate in the field.  These practices play a large part in 
dictating how the military and PSC personnel interact with and view each other.  They 
include, for instance, PSCs’ use of armored vehicles and the requirement that PSC 
personnel wear identifiable uniforms.  Other examples of these practices include PSC 
operational styles that correlate well with the operational style of the military units 
alongside which they operate – for instance, driving styles – and treating local 
civilians respectfully.  An overarching indicator of dedication to operational 
professionalism is membership in a major trade association, such as the International 
Peace Operations Association (IPOA).   
Significantly, the scope of this typology is limited to focus only upon 
professional activities at the operational level, dictating proper actions while in the 
field.  Limiting the typology’s scope in this way is necessary in order to clearly 
delineate which firms are best at implementing those structural variables that matter 
most for PSCs’ impact on overall military effectiveness.  Some firms may be 
considered “professional” according to other measurement rubrics – for instance, the 
dollar amount of contracts they are awarded – but such measurements are irrelevant to 
the goal of determining a set of practices that will best enable PSCs to have a 
beneficial impact on military effectiveness. 
 Some firms adopt the practices most important for operational professionalism 
relatively easily, while others argue that different operating styles better enable them 
to act effectively in the field.  However, the evidence gathered from the interviews 
conducted for this study indicates that, in almost all cases, the use of identifiable 
                                                
344 Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1988), 8. 
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armored vehicles and uniforms better enables effective PSC-military field 
coordination than does the use of so-called “indigenous” vehicles and plain-clothes.  
Furthermore, the fact that many military and PSC interviewees noted the divergent 
operational styles of the two groups, and that soldiers repeatedly complained of having 
to manage the consequences of contractors’ disrespect of local civilians and of their 
traditions and customs, indicate that operational styles (as dictated, for instance, by 
driving procedures) and treatment of local civilians are two additional areas in which a 
structure of common practices could improve PSCs’ impact on military effectiveness.   
We can therefore conceive of private security companies along a “spectrum of 
professionalism,” with the firms that employ most of these practices at the “more 
professional” end of the spectrum, and the firms that employ fewer of these practices 
at the “less professional” end of the spectrum.  Figure 7.1 depicts this typology, with 
several firms listed for illustrative purposes.  Notably, no firm is entirely perfect in this 
regard, and – because the policies of each firm are likely to undergo some fluctuation 
as contracts and deployments change – firms are likely to move up and down the 
spectrum over time.  Some firms, however, will implement these practices better than 
others at certain times, and purchasers should recognize this and award contracts 
accordingly.  By doing so, purchasers will create market incentives for firms to 
employ these “professional” practices, pushing the entire industry closer to the “more 
professional” end of the spectrum, and increasing the prospects that PSCs will have a 
beneficial impact on military effectiveness.  This is particularly true with regard to 
situations of PSC-military co-deployment, but these professional practices can also 
have a beneficial impact in situations where PSCs are substituting for an intervening 
state’s military force.  In many such cases, the PSC in question will still be responsible 
for interacting with the military of the state to which the company is deployed, and 
these practices will assist in that regard.  Furthermore, the requirement that PSC 
 181 
personnel act respectfully toward local civilians and local traditions and customs in 
order to be considered “professional” will benefit PSC and military actions in all 
theatres, regardless of the deployment situation. 
 Of course, the risk that certain individual employees will fail to abide by these 
practices is ever-present, and it is thus necessary that each firm establish rigorous 
training and vetting standards to minimize this risk among its employees.  
Furthermore, each firm must establish internal regulations and guidelines for dealing 
with employees who fail to abide by the company’s standards for ethical and 
professional practices.  
 
MORE                  LESS 
PROFESSIONAL                        PROFESSIONAL 
Identifiable uniforms                                                                         No standard uniforms 
Armored vehicles                                                     “Indigenous” vehicles 
High standards for treatment of civilians                          Varying levels of respect for civilians 
Membership in trade association                                          No membership in trade association 
 
EODT , CRG, Olive Group, MPRI      Triple Canopy, Hart    Blackwater, Zapata 
Figure 5.4: 
Typology of PSC Operational Professionalism345 
 
Implications for Policy 
This chapter shows the interplay between military effectiveness and structure, 
identity, civil-military relations, and the professions.  As my analysis makes clear, 
structural factors and identity-based factors are equally relevant in determining the 
                                                
345 Several private security companies are listed on this typology to illustrate the range in levels of 
operational professionalism across the industry.  Please note that this is a rough classification of these 
firms, and that their positions on this spectrum may shift relative to each other in any given situation. 
As noted above, firms will likely change position on the spectrum of operational professionalism as 
their policies shift over time, and that this spectrum does not endeavor to judge firms’ levels of 
“professionalism” beyond the factors relevant to operational professionalism that are mentioned above.   
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quality of PSC-military interactions and coordination in the context of the Iraq War, 
though they do operate differently.  When structural weaknesses abound, both PSC 
and military actions rely on identity factors.  Identity factors are simultaneously likely 
to be negatively affected by the coordination problems that are caused by the structural 
weaknesses, which breed PSC-military resentment and unfavorable relational 
comparisons.  Thus, both structure and identity are important in the context of PSC-
military relations, and both must be considered.   
Related to this is the preliminary finding that military professionals may not 
need to worry (at least not as much as some have argued they should) about the 
takeover of their professional jurisdiction by contractors.  In other words, there may be 
a limit to what you can pay someone to do; necessary actions beyond this limit would 
thus fall within the purview of the military. Preliminary evidence indicates that this 
may be the case, at least with regard to some PSCs.  For instance, a high-level PSC 
official who asked to remain anonymous noted that there may be a limit to what PSCs 
could do in any particular event, with PSC employees not being as fully committed to 
take and accept risk as are men and women in the military.  As a former military 
officer himself, he noted that he was personally “prepared to stand into harm’s way as 
a serviceman, on active service, when serving [his] nation,” whereas his motivation as 
an employee of a PSC would be “very much more conditional.”346  However, this may 
not be the case with PSCs who have a particular political or ideological leaning.  
Interviewees from one PSC, for instance, told the GAO that they were not working for 
a PSC for the money, that they were “doing something that they believed in and as 
part of their love of the United States and the democratic society for which it 
stands.”347  Companies sharing this ideological stance may instill a stronger sense of 
                                                
346 Interview with high-level PSC official, January 25, 2007. 
347 GAO interview with PSC personnel, August 30, 2004.  Transcript acquired from the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, October 2006. 
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national loyalty into their personnel, essentially providing them with the sense of civic 
duty found within the professional military.  This point has potential as an interesting 
issue for future research.  Chapter Seven elaborates several policy recommendations 
relevant to improving PSCs’ impact on military effectiveness in co-deployment 
situations. 
 
Conclusion 
As this chapter endeavors to make clear, the problems illuminated in the 
Zapata Engineering, Fallujah, and Nisour Square cases are not anomalous; they are 
pervasive issues that threaten situations of PSC-miltary co-deployment.  While 
coordination successes also occur regularly, an examination of the data makes clear 
that coordination successes and failures are not mutually exclusive.  In order to best 
harness the beneficial qualities of PSCs and minimize the potential problems 
associated with utilizing these firms, states must take an active role in dictating how 
private forces should be structured.  One way for the state to increase its involvement 
in such a manner is through its domestic legal system, by helping to define the legal 
status and accountability of PSC personnel.  The next chapter explores this topic in 
depth. 
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CHAPTER 6 
REGULATING THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY 
 As seen in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, the private security industry can – 
in different deployment situations – impact military effectiveness and the democratic 
advantage in a variety of ways.  The industry’s effects on the military and the 
democratic advantage are directly related to states’ abilities to hold PSCs and their 
employees accountable for their actions in the field.  While a plethora of existing laws 
and guidelines arguably apply to private security company personnel, enforcement of 
these rules is lacking, as are legal precedents.  This can impact military effectiveness 
in several ways.  For instance, PSCs’ lack of legal accountability hinders their 
relationship and, by extension, local forces’ relationships, with local civilians.  This 
has a particularly negative effect on the military’s ability to effectively wage 
counterinsurgencies, a type of conflict in which local support is crucial to military 
success, and therefore further reduces the state’s control of violence beyond the 
reduction engendered by the act of security privatization itself.  PSCs’ lack of legal 
accountability also challenges integration, as PSC personnel acting outside of legal 
boundaries spur resentment from the military by further complicating combat 
environments that are complex to begin with.348  
Clearly, there are a multitude of reasons to more effectively regulate the 
private security industry, especially as it grows and becomes a more frequent actor in 
global conflicts.  Recognizing this, members of the U.S. Congress have proposed a 
variety of new laws to hold PSCs accountable for their actions in the field, and 
international actors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have 
embarked on a series of workshops designed to develop better international policies to 
                                                
348 For more on PSC-military resentment, refer to the findings in Chapter Five of this study.  See also 
P.W. Singer, “Can’t Win With ‘Em, Can’t Go To War Without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and 
Counterinsurgency,” Policy Paper No. 4 (Brookings Institution, September 2007). 
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regulate the industry.  Industry representatives have themselves made comments 
indicating that they welcome increased regulation and oversight, as it bodes well for 
their public image and hence for future business opportunities.  For instance, 
Blackwater Worldwide founder Erik Prince has stated: “We absolutely want more 
oversight.  We welcome the accountability.  We want a good name for this industry 
because we think it plays an important role for what the U.S. policies are going 
forward.”349  Yet, it should be noted that increased industry regulation would bring 
with it an increase in costs which may, over time, make the use of PSCs 
uneconomical.  I nonetheless recommend increased industry regulation as outlined in 
this chapter, in order to ensure that – as long as they remain major actors in modern 
warfare – PSCs benefit military operations and do not detract from military 
effectiveness. 
This chapter outlines the status of private security contractors under existing 
U.S. and international laws, and suggests potential remedies for weaknesses in these 
laws.  Given the prevalence of U.S. companies in (and U.S. government contracts for) 
the private security industry at present, I focus here on the U.S. case, examining how 
the United States can develop regulatory measures that will address PSC abuses in the 
field and have a beneficial impact on military effectiveness.  In doing so, I employ the 
lessons of the literature on comparative regulation, which suggests both that more 
stringent and legalistic regulatory measures will have better success in the U.S.-
context in the long-term, and relatedly, that they will likely be more easily accepted by 
the domestic public of the United States than will lax standards.  Indeed, despite early 
observations in the literature that stringent regulatory approaches in cases of 
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environmental regulation were no more effective than were lax approaches based 
largely on industry self-regulation, more recent research indicates that laxer self-
regulation approaches have led to a series of regulatory failures in Europe, while 
stringent approaches in America have resulted in an absence of such regulatory 
failures.350  Furthermore, the literature indicates that globalization is causing stringent 
regulatory policies to spread worldwide, and that – despite increasing business 
resistance to such tough regulations – political support for more stringent measures is 
increasing in Europe and elsewhere around the globe.351  This literature thus highlights 
several factors affecting regulatory effectiveness, including the levels of public and 
business dissent with regard to particular regulatory policies, the influence of business 
over regulatory outcomes, and the ability of the state to develop effective monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms for existing regulations.  Despite the effects of 
globalization, however, a one-size-fits-all regulatory regime is not appropriate here 
due to variations in the political structures of different countries.  Hence, this chapter 
focuses on developing adequate regulatory measures for the U.S. case, drawing upon 
several examples of regulatory measures pursued in Britain and South Africa in order 
to illustrate the cross-national distinctions in regulatory policies pertaining to PSCs. 
The chapter’s analysis makes it clear that domestic law at this point provides a 
suitable preliminary model for effective regulation of the industry in the United States, 
whereas international humanitarian law and U.K. and South African domestic law 
pertaining to the private security industry require substantial restructuring before they 
will provide effective regulatory and enforcement mechanisms.  I argue below that in 
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order to best harness PSCs’ strengths and ensure that they have a beneficial impact on 
military and humanitarian operations worldwide, civil and criminal mechanisms for 
both regulation and enforcement must be pursued immediately and in tandem, and 
should take into account the prospects for industry-wide standards as a supplement to 
– but not a replacement for - domestic and international measures.  
 
Status of Modern Private Security Contractors  
Under International Humanitarian Law 
Several international conventions define mercenaries and their rights and 
limitations under international humanitarian law (IHL).  The two key questions in 
determining the legal status of PSC personnel under IHL are: (1) whether they qualify 
as “mercenaries” based upon the various IHL definitions of the term; and (2) whether 
they are (lawful or unlawful) “combatants,” or “noncombatants,” based upon the 
definitions of the Geneva Conventions.  If found to qualify as mercenaries, lawful 
combatants, or unlawful combatants under IHL, PSC employees’ protected status 
under IHL would be altered, and in some cases they could be subject to criminal 
prosecution.   
Yet, it is unlikely that the majority of PSC personnel would qualify as 
mercenaries under IHL.  This is because definitions of mercenaries in international 
law are filled with ambiguities and contradictions, making it difficult for anyone to 
qualify as a mercenary.  Moreover, in most cases where certain categories of PSC 
personnel might qualify as mercenaries according to one of the legal definitions, the 
laws in question do not restrict mercenary activities to an extent sufficient to 
effectively regulate the behavior of PSC personnel.  In the few cases where mercenary 
definitions are broad enough to encompass PSC activity and the laws in question 
impose strict penalties upon mercenaries, states have chosen not to enforce the 
restriction on mercenary activity. 
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For instance, the first mainstream IHL instrument to deal with mercenaries was 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, which entered into force in 1977.  
Article 47.1 of this convention dictates that mercenaries do not benefit from prisoner-
of-war (POW) status if captured.  Article 47.2 develops a comprehensive and 
frequently referenced definition of a mercenary as any person who: 
 
(a) is specially recruited locally and abroad in order to 
fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially 
by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is 
promised by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict 
material compensation substantially in excess of that 
promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and 
functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a 
resident of territory controlled by a Party to the 
conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to 
the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed 
forces.352  
Notably, each of these six provisions must be fulfilled in order for the person in 
question to qualify as a mercenary.  Many analysts argue that this definition is 
inapplicable to modern private security contractors and is generally “unworkable” due 
to these six cumulative conditions.353  Yet, there is potential for certain categories of 
PSC personnel to qualify as mercenaries under this definition.  As discussed in 
Chapter One, modern private security personnel may be covered by this definition if 
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they are third-country nationals (TCNs) paid substantially in excess of the regular 
military and shown to have taken “a direct part in hostilities.”  The question of what 
constitutes “direct participation in hostilities” is relevant to both the designation of a 
mercenary and to issues of combatant status, and is discussed in further detail in a 
separate section below.   
Even if proven to qualify as “mercenaries” under the Article 47.2 definition, 
however, the fact that Additional Protocol I does not criminalize mercenary behavior 
means that these actors are only subject to the Article 47.1 restriction on POW status, 
and this only applies if the detaining power makes the determination that the person is 
a mercenary based upon this definition.  Under the Geneva Conventions, mercenaries 
nonetheless still benefit from Article 75’s broad fundamental guarantees, including the 
right to be treated humanely in all circumstances and the right to be protected against 
murder, torture, corporal punishment, and outrages upon personal dignity, as well as 
the right to a fair trial and due process.354  Furthermore, Protocol I only regulates 
international armed conflicts; hence, its provisions in most cases do not apply to 
mercenaries or private security company personnel involved in civil wars or other 
forms of internal strife.355  Thus, while some PSC personnel may qualify as 
“mercenaries” under the definition laid out in Additional Protocol I, the consequences 
of this designation are fairly mild and will not be overly effective in regulating the 
entire private security industry across the spectrum of its operations. 
The so-called “mercenary-specific conventions,” in contrast to Additional 
Protocol I, develop various definitions of the term “mercenary” and focus on 
criminalizing mercenary activity.  While these conventions are therefore more 
stringent, carrying with them greater threats of punishment, the manner in which they 
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define a “mercenary” varies widely.  For instance, Article 1 of the the 1976 Draft 
Luanda Convention states that the crime of mercenarism may be committed by 
individuals, groups or associations, representatives of states, and states themselves.  
This provision might therefore apply to companies rather than only to individual 
contractors.  The relevant legal actor is guilty of mercenarism if he or she “with the 
aim of opposing by armed violence a process of self-determination,” does any of the 
following: 
 
(a) organizes, finances, supplies, equips, trains, 
promotes, supports or employs in any way 
military forces consisting of or including persons 
who are not nationals of the country where they 
are going to act, for personal gain, through the 
payment of a salary or any other kind of material 
recompense; or 
(b) enlists, enrolls, or tries to enroll in said force; or 
(c) allows the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to 
be carried out in any territory under its 
jurisdiction or in any place under its control or 
affords facilities for transit, transport or other 
operations of the abovementioned forces.356  
Based upon this much broader definition of what constitutes mercenary activity, many 
more modern PSCs and their personnel could be found guilty of mercenary activity 
under this convention than under Article 47.2 of Additional Protocol I.  For instance, 
any non-Iraqi company or individual providing security forces in Iraq that could be 
proven to constitute “military forces” developed “with the aim of opposing by armed 
violence a process of self-determination” would be found guilty of the crime of 
mercenarism.  Of course, most international tribunals would not likely accept the view 
that PSCs operating in Iraq are doing so to oppose a process of self-determination, but 
this is not to say that certain PSCs might not be found to be working against 
democratic ideals of self-determination in other regions of the world in the future. 
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 Another of the mercenary-specific conventions, the Organization for African 
Unity’s 1972 Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, defines 
mercenary activity in a manner similar to Additional Protocol I.  Indeed, the OAU 
Convention’s definition differs only from the Article 47.2 definition in terms of 
motivation, replacing the requirement that the person in question be motivated 
primarily by a desire for private gain with a requirement that he or she be promised 
material compensation by a Party to the conflict.357  If found guilty of the crime of 
mercenarism under this convention, the person in question is also held responsible for 
any criminal acts committed in the course of his or her duty as a mercenary.  The 
notion of “criminal acts” in this context presumably includes shooting at soldiers, as 
Article 3 of this convention dictates that mercenaries do not enjoy combatant or POW 
status.  Article 7 requires each state Party to the convention to punish those guilty of 
the crime of mercenarism “by severest penalties under its laws, including capital 
punishment.”358  The OAU Convention is therefore slightly more open-ended in its 
definition of who constitutes a mercenary, as well as more severe with regard to the 
penalties imposed upon mercenaries, than is Additional Protocol I.  Yet, the relevant 
state parties have not taken steps to enforce its provisions. 
 Meanwhile, the most recent of the mercenary-specific conventions, the 
International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of 
Mercenaries (U.N. Convention) – which opened for signature in 1989 but did not enter 
into force until 2001 – defines mercenaries in a manner that makes it nearly 
impossible for anybody to actually qualify as a mercenary.  The first part of the U.N. 
Convention’s two-part definition of mercenary activity mimics Additional Protocol I’s 
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definition, though it excludes the requirement that a mercenary “does, in fact, take part 
in the hostilities.”359  The second part of the definition is more specific, requiring that a 
mercenary, in any situation other than armed conflict: 
 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad for the 
purpose of participating in a concerted act of 
violence aimed at: 
a. overthrowing a Government or otherwise 
undermining the constitutional order of a state; 
or 
b. undermining the territorial integrity of a state; 
(b) is motivated to take part therein essentially by the 
desire for significant private gain and is prompted by 
the promise or payment of material compensation; 
(c) is neither a national nor a resident of the State 
against which such an act is directed; 
(d) has not been sent by a State on official duty; and 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of the State on 
whose territory the act is undertaken360  
Ryan Scoville outlines the difficulty of finding anyone who fits this definition, arguing 
that the specific intent, profit-motive, and residency requirements are useless factors 
irrelevant to modern mercenary activity that only complicate attempts to hold 
mercenaries accountable to states.361  The problems with this U.N. definition are 
underscored by the fact that the U.N. Convention criminalizes all mercenary activity, 
and yet no modern private security companies or their personnel have been held 
criminally liable for alleged offenses against this convention.  This paradox illustrates 
the difficulty of enforcing existing regulations that apply to private security 
companies, as well as the normative question of whether modern PSC activity should 
be so broadly criminalized.   
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Existing definitions of mercenaries under IHL are therefore insufficient to 
regulate PSC behavior in most instances, and a norm against their enforcement has 
been developed in those instances when they are potentially applicable to modern PSC 
personnel.  Legal scholars have suggested other legal definitions of mercenaries that 
might, if adopted, apply to a larger number of PSC personnel than do existing 
international laws outlawing mercenarism.  The relevant question, however, continues 
to be whether the states would do their part in enforcing this law, an issue that is 
addressed in further detail below.  Two other definitional issues are also relevant to the 
discussion of PSC status under international humanitarian law: the combatant status of 
PSC personnel, and whether their actions constitute “direct participation in hostilities.”   
 
Combatant Status  
 As Lindsey Cameron notes:  
 
. . . there are three distinct reasons why it is essential to 
know whether PMC employees are combatants: first, so 
that opposing forces know whether they are legitimate 
military objectives and can be lawfully attacked; second, in 
order to know whether PMC employees may lawfully 
participate directly in hostilities; and the third reason, 
related to the second, is in order to know whether PMC 
employees who do participate in hostilities may be 
prosecuted [under IHL] for doing so.362   
There are but two categories of individuals in an armed conflict under international 
law, combatants and civilians.363  Under the Geneva Conventions, combatants, as 
opposed to civilians, can be the direct object of attack under IHL and are entitled to 
POW status.  If civilians do participate directly in hostilities, they are classified as 
“unlawful combatants” or “unprivileged belligerents” and can become the direct 
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object of attack, losing their protected status (at least while engaged in hostilities).  
This can impact their legal status if captured, as well as their criminal liability.364  
They do not benefit from POW protections, and may be punished for their actions 
because they lack the “combatant privilege” to use force against belligerents.365  
However, if the conflict in question qualifies as a non-international armed conflict 
within the meaning of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, customary 
international law does not make a distinction between lawful and unlawful 
combatants.  In such a case, contractors who had participated in hostilities and were 
captured by enemy forces would be entitled to a minimum set of protections set forth 
in Common Article 3.  Their right to participate in hostilities in the first place would 
be determined by the prevailing local law.366  
The relevant legal doctrine that defines combatants and noncombatants is 
found in Article 43.2 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.  Article 
43.2 states that “Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict . . . are 
combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.”367  It 
is therefore necessary to ascertain whether the private contractors in question have 
been incorporated into the armed forces of a Party to the conflict under Article 4A(1), 
which requires incorporation under the laws of the state, or whether they qualify as a 
militia under Article 4A(2).368  While PSC employees may in some cases fulfill the 
first requirement by being officially incorporated into the armed forces (such as in the 
case of the French Foreign Legion or the “sponsored reserves,” discussed below), the 
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plethora of different companies providing different services in combat zones likely 
makes it exceedingly difficult for the enemy to distinguish between combatant PSCs 
and noncombatant PSCs.  In such a scenario, it is virtually impossible for the enemy to 
know who can be rightfully targeted.  
The second means for a group to qualify for combatant status under IHL is to 
meet the requirements set out in Article 4A(2) of the Third Convention.  This Article 
states that the following are entitled to POW status: 
  
Members of other militias and members of other  
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance 
movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and 
operating in or outside their own territory . . . provided 
that such militias or volunteers corps, including such 
organized resistance movements, fulfill the following 
conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for 
his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of war.369  
Notably, this Article requires that the militia must belong to a party to the conflict, and 
all four of the requirements must be met by the group as a whole.  Furthermore, the 
fact that only some PSCs mandate that their personnel wear standardized uniforms 
with “fixed distinctive signs recognizable at a distance” means that each company 
would have to be assessed separately to determine its employees’ combatant status 
under this provision.  The idea that PSC personnel would be considered as “militia” is 
dubious also, and they certainly are not volunteers.  All in all, the majority of legal 
scholars with expertise on combatant status and private security issues agree that 
modern private security personnel are unlikely to be considered lawful combatants 
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under existing laws.370  They are most likely to be considered civilians, or “unlawful 
combatants” if found to be “directly participating in hostilities.” 
 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” 
The question of what constitutes “direct participation in hostilities” is a 
significant one, and is vigorously debated by analysts and legal scholars working on 
these issues.  The ICRC Commentary appears to support a high threshold for direct 
participation, stating, “Direct participation in hostilities implies a direct causal 
relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the 
time and place where the activity takes place.”371  The Commentary further describes 
direct participation as “acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause 
actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces” (emphasis 
added).372  The same document warns “there should be a clear distinction between 
direct participation in hostilities and participation in the war effort.”373  Yet, Michael 
Schmitt points out that “there is a participation continuum that runs from general 
support for the war effort to the conduct of combat operations,” and notes that “direct 
participation determinations are necessarily contextual, typically requiring a case-by-
case analysis.”374  Lindsey Cameron similarly argues that “Support and logistics 
activities conducted by civilians, such as catering and construction and maintenance of 
bases, are not seen as direct participation in hostilities,” noting that “the theory that 
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individuals working in industries helpful to the overall war effort (such as those in 
munitions factories) are quasi-combatants has been widely discredited.”375  
IHL does not, however, allow for these civilians to engage in combat, even 
defensively.  In fact, IHL does not distinguish between fighting to attack and fighting 
to defend.  This fact makes it much easier to argue that PSC personnel – who are 
deployed for defensive purposes – do, on many occasions, directly participate in 
combat.376  As Avril McDonald points out: 
 
It is generally and increasingly considered that there are 
many activities which involve a more indirect role for 
civilians – where the latter is one or more steps 
(geographically or temporally) away from the actual 
application of violence (which may be virtual rather than 
physical) and may not even consider him or herself to be 
a direct participant in hostilities, and which do not 
actually involve attacks in the literal or kinetic sense, or 
where the causality relationship is more indirect, yet – 
which are also considered as direct participation in 
hostilities.377  
In other words, many examples of seemingly indirect participation in hostilities 
actually – in legal terms – constitute direct participation.  Significantly for private 
security personnel, the U.S. Navy Manual states that “Direct participation may also 
include civilians serving as guards, intelligence agents, or lookouts on behalf of 
military forces.”378  Thus, certain PSC functions do fall within the purview of “direct 
participation in hostilities,” impacting the combatant and mercenary status of the 
contractors performing those functions.   
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Prospects for International Legal Regulation of the Private Security Industry 
 Though the above section outlines different circumstances in which current 
IHL applies to private security contractors, these distinctions are difficult to discern 
and enforce in practice.  Employing the laws of international armed conflict to 
regulate the private security industry is an unlikely prospect, at least as these laws 
currently stand.  For instance, POW status is not a significant issue in practice; it 
applies only in international armed conflicts, which are rare in modern warfare.  
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the Geneva Conventions do not draw distinctions 
between defensive and offensive operations, a fact that creates friction when 
attempting to apply these laws to actors defined in terms of their sole reliance on 
defensive capabilities.379  The distinction between combatants and noncombatants is 
filled with ambiguities when applied to the category of “contractors,” requiring that 
each be assessed on an individual basis.  Finally, no international tribunal has 
jurisdiction to try contractors under IHL; enforcement therefore falls upon the state 
parties, as outlined above.   
Eric Mongelard creatively explores another international regulatory option: the 
prospects for holding companies civilly liable for IHL violations.  Mongelard 
highlights the benefits of civil liability, pointing out that a number of countries do not 
recognize criminal liability of “legal persons” (individuals or non-state entities) under 
IHL, that civil actions enable victims to obtain material compensation for their 
sufferings (while some legal systems do not allow for this in criminal proceedings), 
and that civil actions enable victims or their representatives to set a judicial inquiry in 
motion.  He also notes that the standard for a decision in a civil trial is lower than that 
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in a criminal trial.  Indeed, whereas the existence of reasonable doubt is necessary to 
prevent a guilty verdict in a criminal trial, the preponderance of evidence is the 
standard for a decision in a civil trial.380  While legal precedents for such a practice are 
lacking, this is an option that should be further explored by the international 
community, particularly by those states exporting and/or purchasing PSC services. 
 Despite the myriad difficulties in holding contractors accountable under the 
international law of armed conflict, it is important to devise a means – either criminal 
or civil – through which contractor activities are regulated to ensure compliance with 
IHL, both to benefit PSCs’ impact on military effectiveness and to ensure widespread 
respect for human rights and norms of just war.  The changing nature of warfare, 
including the increased prevalence of intrastate conflicts involving non-state actors, 
suggests that the best way to apply IHL to contractors is through a recasting of IHL 
itself, in order to make it coalesce with changes in the international system.  
Convening a meeting of representatives from each of the states party to the Geneva 
Conventions, with the explicit purpose of devising an additional protocol or revised 
mercenary definition to address these issues, may be the most effective and efficient 
solution to the problem of holding contractors accountable to international 
humanitarian law.  Such a protocol should, at the very least, define private military 
and security contractors as a separate category of war-zone actors distinct from 
mercenaries (or specify that existing IHL definitions of mercenaries are meant to 
apply to contractors and/or the firms employing them), and should clarify the 
combatant status of PSC personnel. 
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Prospects for Domestic Legal Regulation of the Private Security Industry 
As noted above with regard to the Draft Luanda Convention and other 
mercenary-specific conventions, states are expected to play a key role in enforcing 
international law.  As Michael Cottier, Deputy Head of the Section for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law at the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs’ Directorate of 
International Law, notes:  
 
International law establishes direct as well as due  
diligence obligations of states.  States hiring private 
security and military companies (“contracting states”) 
for operations abroad must respect their international 
legal obligations and cannot elude them by outsourcing 
activities.  For example, they have an obligation to 
ensure respect of international humanitarian law.  In 
addition, states are responsible for violations of 
international law and particularly human rights and 
international humanitarian law committed by private 
contractors they hire that can be attributed to them.  
States on whose territory such companies operate 
(“territorial states”) as well as states from whose 
territory their services are “exported” (“exporting 
states”) must, for instance, punish grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions.  Moreover, there may be 
circumstances in which states must take appropriate 
measures or exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, 
investigate, or redress the harm caused by the acts of 
private companies or their staff that impair human 
rights.381  
This statement makes clear that any international regulation of PSCs must go hand in 
hand with domestic regulations and enforcement mechanisms in order to operate 
effectively.  In doing so, it emphasizes the continuing relevance of the state in an era 
of private security company proliferation.  The practice of instituting effective 
regulatory and enforcement mechanisms for the industry appears more likely to 
happen in the near future in some states rather than others.  Due to the preeminence of 
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U.S. private security firms in the international market, this chapter focuses on the 
potential for the United States to develop effective domestic regulations and 
enforcement mechanisms.  British and South African efforts to regulate the private 
security industry are also outlined below, in order to illustrate the breadth in regulatory 
policies cross-nationally. 
 
The United States 
 Despite recent outcries in U.S. and foreign media against the dearth of 
legislation covering private security contractors, several significant U.S. criminal laws 
do apply to PSC personnel in a variety of situations.  These include the War Crimes 
Act (18 U.S.C. Section 2441), which applies if the victim or perpetrator is a U.S. 
citizen, and covers the crimes of torture, cruel or inhumane treatment (including 
degrading treatment), murder, mutilation, or maiming, intentionally causing serious 
bodily harm, rape, sexual assault or abuse, and hostage-taking, as well as conspiring to 
do any of these things; the Anti-Torture Statute (18 U.S.C. Section 2340A), which 
provides for federal criminal trial if the perpetrator is a U.S. citizen or is ever found in 
the United States; the Genocide Statute (18 U.S.C. Section 1091), which provides for 
criminal punishment up through the death penalty for a U.S. citizen who engages in or 
incites genocide anywhere in the world; the Walker Act (18 U.S.C. Section 960), 
which prohibits U.S.-based financing, initiation, or conduct of military action against 
any state with which the United States is at peace; and the Special Maritime and 
Territorial Jurisdiction (SMTJ), which extends federal criminal jurisdiction to U.S. 
nationals on the premises of U.S. diplomatic, consular, or other U.S. missions or 
entities, or in residences or appurtenant land used for the purposes of these missions or 
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entities.382  Amazingly, as of June 2008, only one private contractor has been 
prosecuted under any of these laws: David Passaro, who abused a detainee in 
Afghanistan, was successfully prosecuted under the SMTJ.383  In addition to these, the 
International Transfer of Arms Regulations (ITAR) exists as a regulatory mechanism 
that implements the Arms Export Control Act.  The purpose of ITAR is thus to control 
the export and import of US defense articles and defense services, through its power to 
provide licenses for such articles and services.384  Finally, two significant pieces of 
legislation were recently amended to make them applicable to private security 
personnel: the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA).  Because the UCMJ and MEJA are at the 
forefront of legislative debates in the United States surrounding PSC-related 
regulatory issues, the discussion here focuses primarily on the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with applying either of these laws to security contractors.   
 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
 The UCMJ was created in 1950 as the U.S. military’s criminal code, providing 
for prosecution of military personnel to be entirely administered by the military, 
through the court-martial process.385  Until recently, Article 2 of the UCMJ explained 
that any military jurisdiction over civilians was limited to “in time of war, persons 
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serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.”386  U.S. Senator Lindsay 
Graham inserted an amendment to the UCMJ into the 2007 Defense Authorization 
Act, placing civilian contractors accompanying the armed forces in the field under 
court-martial jurisdiction during times of contingency operations, in addition to times 
of declared war.387  This amendment defines a contingency operation as “a military 
operation that is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which 
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, 
operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing 
military force,” among other conditions where the military may be called into 
action.388  The amendment is particularly significant given that the U.S. Congress has 
not issued a formal declaration of war in several decades.   
 Thus, in order to convene a court-martial for a contractor, the contractor must 
be serving with or accompanying the armed forces in the field, and the trial must take 
place in time of war or contingency operations.  There are several benefits associated 
with broadening the scope of the UCMJ to apply to contractors in this manner.  
Because courts-martial are convened on an ad hoc basis and can be established in 
conflict environments, they provide an efficient method to try civilian contractors.  On 
a related note, the threat of being swiftly court-martialed and potentially imprisoned 
under military auspices could deter contractors from engaging in illegal activity, if this 
provision were regularly enforced.389  Furthermore, subjecting civilian contractors to 
the UCMJ could help to bring contractors under the authority and control of the 
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military commander in their area of operation, thus helping to integrate security 
contractors into the military operation and bridging the culture gap between PSC and 
military personnel.390 
 Despite these important benefits, applying the UCMJ to PSC personnel in the 
present contracting system has several key disadvantages that cannot be overlooked.  
For one, the UCMJ would clash with the existing contracting regime, which gives 
contracting authorities the power over contractors.  Under this regime, contractors – 
unlike military personnel – can simply be fired for minor infractions, rendering the 
UCMJ system unnecessary in some cases.  The relevant question would be how to 
determine those cases in which the contractor should be fired as opposed to tried by 
court-martial.  Furthermore, the U.S. government is unlikely to approve of a local 
commander having the authority to order a PSC or PSC employee to do anything 
outside of the scope of an existing contract.  Increasing commander’s authority 
through the application of the UCMJ to contractors could therefore upset the existing 
regulatory framework, including present governmental methods of selecting 
companies to perform certain services, or methods for permitting changes in existing 
contracts.391  Another point requiring further clarification pertains to whether the 
language of the amended UCMJ applies to third-country nationals (TCNs) working for 
PSCs; if not, firms could evade the regulatory oversight provided by the UCMJ by 
simply relying more heavily on TCNs than on local nationals or U.S. citizens to 
comprise their workforce.392  The UCMJ’s applicability to non-Department of Defense 
contractors is also debatable, and is quite significant considering that the U.S. State 
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Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development also employ private 
security contractors in conflict zones to a large extent.  
Perhaps most fundamentally, while the UCMJ was amended in late 2006, the 
2007 Manual for Courts Martial (MCM) offers no clarification regarding how this 
amendment should be implemented.  The U.S. Army publication Army Lawyer 
outlines the significance of this omission:  
  
Subjecting contractor personnel to the UCMJ during all  
contingency operations appears to constitute a 
significant change rather than a clarification.  No 
legislative history explains this change.  Further, as there 
is no published guidance, it is unclear how this change 
will be implemented and precisely what the 
ramifications will be.393  
The actual practice of prosecuting contractors under the UCMJ is therefore, at this 
point, more difficult to institute than was amending the legislation in the first place.  
Clearly, the UCMJ should be further amended in order to clarify any discrepancies in 
its applicability to all categories of contractors as noted above.  However, the real 
challenge in applying it to civilian contractors is likely to be the establishment of 
norms of enforcement.  Similar challenges exist with regard to the application of the 
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private contractors, as discussed below. 
  
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) 
 Unlike the UCMJ, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) 
authorizes private contractors to be tried in U.S. federal courts.  The MEJA was 
originally passed in 2000 to target offenses committed overseas by private contractors 
employed by the U.S. Department of Defense.  The law was revised in 2004 to extend 
federal criminal jurisdiction to all contractors “supporting the mission of the 
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Department of Defense.”394  Pending legislation would further extend MEJA’s 
jurisdiction to all contractors working in a contingency operation.395  This legislation, 
the “MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007” (H.R. 2740), passed the House 
of Representatives in early October 2007 by an overwhelming vote of 389 to 30, with 
only Republicans voting against the bill.396  To qualify for MEJA jurisdiction, an 
offense must: (1) be committed by overseas contractors who are employed by the 
United States or accompanying U.S. armed forces overseas; and (2) be equal to an 
offense which would result in over one year of imprisonment if committed in the 
United States.  Federal judges and the Department of Defense are primarily 
responsible for enforcing the MEJA.  Federal judges are authorized to order the 
removal of accused individuals from the country in question to face prosecution in the 
United States, and Pentagon law enforcement officials are responsible for arresting 
and transferring the accused.397  
 As with the UCMJ, there are benefits associated with reliance on the MEJA to 
prosecute contractor abuses.  The most significant of these is the fact that the MEJA 
circumvents legal precedents from the Vietnam War era that eroded courts-martial 
jurisdiction over civilians.  While the U.S. Supreme Court throughout the twentieth 
century restricted civilian courts-martial based on Bill of Rights concerns, the UCMJ 
continued to cover contractors accompanying the force.  During Vietnam, however, a 
lower appeals court expanded the Supreme Court’s position, arguing that deployed 
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contractors were only subject to court martial during a declared war.398  MEJA 
bypasses the potential enforcement difficulties related to these precedents.  Because 
MEJA’s system for prosecuting contractors operates in the civilian sphere, MEJA also 
avoids the aforementioned problems associated with interjecting military authority 
into a civilian-run contracting system. 
 Yet, MEJA is not without its own problems.  Because it is a relatively new 
piece of legislation, few precedents exist on which to base future cases.  Federal 
judges have little incentive to take initiative to investigate and try cases of alleged 
contractor abuses under a law that provides such uncertainty regarding the outcome.  
Furthermore, political will plays a large role in dictating when and how MEJA is 
applied: the Secretary of Defense must authorize law enforcement personnel to detain 
the contractor accused of wrongdoing in order for any arrest to proceed, and a federal 
judge must order the arrest of the contractor and his or her transfer to the United States 
in order for any federal trial to begin.399  Meanwhile, both the White House and 
Pentagon oppose the idea of placing private contractors under the jurisdiction of 
civilian courts.  They argue that to do so would insert civilian investigators into areas 
better covered under military law.400  In contrast to this position, the private security 
industry – as represented by the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), 
the Washington, D.C.-based trade association to which thirty-eight private military 
and security companies belong – has endorsed the “MEJA Expansion and 
Enforcement Act of 2007” (also known as the Price Amendment).  IPOA released a 
statement in October 2007 that reads:  
 
IPOA has long supported effective oversight and 
accountability for the Peace and Stability Operations 
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Industry.  We believe that H.R. 2740 provides important 
improvements to the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act which will enhance accountability for 
contractors working in support of U.S. efforts abroad.401  
Whether the UCMJ or the MEJA is a more appropriate vehicle for prosecuting 
contractor abuses is clearly a hotly debated topic between policymakers, legislators, 
and industry insiders at this time.  Again, however, determining which piece of 
legislation is more likely to be enforced in the majority of cases should be the most 
relevant consideration of this debate.   Because neither piece of legislation has been 
applied to private security contractors in practice up to this point, it remains to be seen 
whether the benefits of either would outweigh its disadvantages.  Yet, taking the 
perspective that additional oversight and investigation of contractor or other abuses in 
conflict zones is always desirable, MEJA is likely to be the easier of these laws to 
implement, the most effective in prosecuting contractor crimes, and – once it is used 
regularly – the most likely to prevent future contractor abuses.  I recommend the 
development of a separate office within the U.S. Department of Justice tasked 
specifically with investigating and trying contractor abuses under the MEJA.  
Although costly, this would bypass the difficulties associated with motivating federal 
prosecutors to take on such cases, and help to ensure that the law is enforced.  Due to 
the growing prevalence of outsourcing traditional governmental functions, such an 
office would certainly be useful, particularly if it focused on a wide spectrum of 
contractors operating abroad.  Furthermore, the development of such an office would 
address the concerns emerging from the comparative regulation literature: that 
adequate enforcement mechanisms be developed to effectively implement the 
regulatory system, and that legalistic, prosecutorial regulatory policies have proven 
more effective in the U.S.-context over the long-term than have laxer policies focused 
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solely on industry self-regulation.  Of course, political resistance from the business 
community should be expected, and in the United States such resistance will likely 
have greater clout than in European countries, for instance.402  Yet, because regulatory 
leaders such as the United States are in a position to greatly influence regulatory 
laggards and less-developed countries, it is crucial for U.S. lawmakers and the 
judiciary system to resist these business pressures.403 
The alternative option, bringing contractors under further military authority 
through the UCMJ, is desirable in terms of its impact on PSC-military integration and, 
relatedly, military effectiveness.  However, the difficulties associated with applying 
military authority to contractors employed by agencies and private actors other than 
the Pentagon makes it unlikely that this law would ever be used in a widespread 
manner to prosecute contractor abuses.  Furthermore, bringing contractors under 
military jurisdiction in some ways contradicts the efficiency benefits of outsourcing 
those functions in the first place.   
 
Britain 
 Unlike the United States, Britain has been fairly slow to institute any 
regulations to hold its war-zone contractors accountable for abuses of their position 
perpetrated in the field.  This is in spite of the fact that Britain was one of the first 
states to field private military and security firms, following on the outsourcing trends 
of the Thatcher Revolution in the 1980s.404  The delay in instituting regulations in 
Britain is not surprising, given that Britain has historically been lax in terms of 
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regulatory policy, preferring instead to utilize industry self-regulation to a great 
extent.405   
Yet, there has been a push since 1990 within Britain toward more stringent 
regulatory standards, and in 2002 the House of Commons ordered a Green Paper to 
evaluate the options for regulating private military companies.  This paper outlined six 
options for regulating these firms: (1) the imposition of a ban on such firms’ military 
activity abroad; (2) the imposition of a ban on the firms’ recruitment for military 
activity abroad; (3) the development of a licensing regime for military services; (4) the 
institution of a practice of registration and notification; (5) the development of a 
general license for the companies themselves; and (6) industry self-regulation.406  To 
date, however – aside from slight progress on the issue of industry self-regulation – 
none of these regulatory schemes have materialized.  In line with the country’s 
regulatory history, the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) is 
actively pushing for industry self-regulation.  The BAPSC is calling upon the British 
government to establish an independent ombudsman to adjudicate on any alleged 
wrongdoing by employees of British PSCs.  Yet, the BAPSC is relatively nascent at 
this point, and results of its efforts have yet to be seen. 407  Notably, there are very few 
successful examples of self-regulation operating on its own, without any other 
regulatory structures in place.  Furthermore, the few examples that do exist tend to 
occur in corporatist systems with very few actors, making it quite unlikely that self-
regulation will be successful as a standalone policy in Britain.  With regard to the 
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other options recommended in the Green Paper, ministers have been unable to agree 
on how to regulate the industry.408  
Meanwhile, the “Sponsored Reserve” (SR) concept has materialized in practice 
in Britain to a limited degree, and – as a moderately stringent regulatory mechanism –  
it has the potential to affect the legal status and regulatory options for deployed British 
PSC personnel.  The SR concept was legislated into the 1996 Reserve Forces Act (Part 
V), and is intended to allow the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to contract with civilians 
to provide services in “nonbenign areas” as trained reservists.  By converting 
contractors to reservists on deployed operations, the military can ensure that they are 
fully integrated into the military chain of command.  Problems with the SR concept 
persist, as the MoD has failed to define what constitutes a “nonbenign area,” and 
appears to be utilizing SRs to replace rather than augment military capabilities.409  
Further clarification of the concept is also necessary, particularly with regard to 
whether foreign contractors (local nationals and/or third-country nationals) could 
become Sponsored Reservists.  If not, the concept would seem to have limited utility, 
given the large numbers of local nationals and third-country nationals employed by the 
majority of private security firms in recent years.  Notably, as of late 2005, only 335 
Sponsored Reservists were available to the UK armed services.410  Yet across the 
Atlantic, both the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army are interested in developing this 
concept for their own services.411  How the SR concept would be applied in the U.S. 
case remains to be seen.  While it has the potential to grow and be adopted across 
national boundaries, the Sponsored Reserve concept is still relatively underdeveloped 
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and open to criticisms regarding its underlying premise, the primary critique being that 
integrating contractors into the military defeats the efficiency benefits of outsourcing. 
 
South Africa 
 The only government thus far to pass a law prohibiting their citizens from 
engaging in mercenary activities is that of South Africa.  In September 1998, the 
South African government passed the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, 
prohibiting any mercenary activity – defined as direct participation by a combatant in 
armed conflict for personal gain – and prohibiting the rendering of military assistance, 
or any offer to render such assistance unless authorized by the Minister of Defense.412  
There are several key problems with this legislation.  First, by incorporating the main 
tenets of IHL definitions of mercenary activity – particularly the terms “direct 
participation” and “combatant” – into its own definition, the law adopts the 
definitional problems inherent in the IHL treatment of “mercenaries.”  Second, by 
including a prohibition on the rendering of foreign military assistance, the law 
unintentionally prohibits the activities of aid agencies and other humanitarian groups 
working in conflict zones.413  This, again, is primarily a definitional problem, for the 
Act defines “foreign military assistance” very broadly to include the following: 
 
• Advice and training;  
• Personnel, financial, logistical, intelligence, or 
operational  support;  
• Personnel recruitment;  
• Medical or paramedical services;  
• Procurement of equipment;  
• Security services for the protection of 
individuals involved in armed conflict or their 
property;  
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• Any action aimed at overthrowing a government 
or undermining the constitutional order, 
sovereignty, or territorial integrity of a state;  
• Any other action that had the result of furthering 
the military interest of a party to the armed 
conflict, but not humanitarian or civilian 
activities at relieving the plight of civilian 
activities in an area of armed conflict.414 
 The fact that the South African law carries with it inherent definitional 
problems can be overlooked if it is proven to effectively regulate the activity that it 
seeks to regulate.  Yet, the law’s impact has thus far been minor.  It has not prevented 
South African citizens from working for PSCs in Iraq or in other parts of Africa.  
Indeed, the company that spurred the country to devise the legislation in the first 
place, Executive Outcomes, was able to move its operations overseas in order to 
escape the law before ceasing their operations completely.  As Christopher Kinsey 
notes, Executive Outcomes’ ability to escape this law is indicative of the fact that 
domestic regulation of this transnational industry requires state governments to 
coordinate their efforts with other nations.415  
 
Prospects for Synthesizing a Comprehensive Domestic Regulatory Policy 
 The United States, Britain, and South Africa have all approached the issue of 
domestic regulation of the private security industry from different angles, and all can 
learn from one another in this regard.  The United States’ attempts to regulate PSCs 
through the UCMJ and MEJA reflect ongoing policy discussions around the globe 
regarding the importance of improving military control and oversight over contractors, 
and balancing it with civilian legal options.  Because these are stringent legalistic 
regulatory mechanisms not suffering from the definitional issues inherent in South 
Africa’s prohibition of mercenary activity, they hold great potential for regulating the 
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private security industry within the United States.  Their applicability to other 
countries, however, depends upon the political structures and unique situations of the 
countries in question.  
Meanwhile, Britain’s “Sponsored Reserve” concept incorporates the notion of 
bringing PSC personnel under military control to a greater degree than is seen in the 
UCMJ debate, and onlookers can learn from Britain’s successes and failures with this 
program.  South Africa’s outright ban on mercenary activity falls at the very stringent 
extreme of the regulatory spectrum, and while it has not been very effective at curbing 
overall PSC activity, it provides an example for other states thinking of instituting 
anti-mercenary legislation on their own territories.  Above all, the South African case 
highlights the need for national governments to coordinate with each other when 
attempting to devise even domestic regulations for the transnational private security 
industry.   
While all of these laws have strengths, their largest common weakness is the 
failure to establish mechanisms and norms of enforcement.  Each of the 
aforementioned domestic regulatory initiatives approaches the problem of regulation 
from a criminal legal standpoint, as does current international law pertaining to PSCs.  
Other options do exist, however.  For instance, there is a developing literature that 
examines the prospects for utilizing contract provisions to regulate contractor 
behavior.  Michael Cottier has explored this issue in detail, outlining the possible ways 
in which such a process might work.  Cottier notes four aspects of the contracting 
process that could usefully and effectively regulate contractors’ actions: (1) selection 
criteria; (2) contract-specified obligations; (3) monitoring mechanisms; and (4) 
sanctions.  Criteria for selecting a company for a particular contract could include a 
requirement that the firm possess all required authorizations, adequate procedures and 
standards regarding hiring, training, and vetting of employees, rulebooks and standard 
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operating procedures, internal oversight, compliance and sanctions mechanisms, 
and/or membership in a reputable trade association and adherence to its Code of 
Conduct.416  Once the contract has been awarded, the contract should specifically 
require that the company and its employees comply with all applicable domestic and 
international law.417  To enforce these requirements, the contract could mandate that 
the firm monitor and sanction misbehavior itself, through an internal compliance 
mechanism or otherwise, and should also clearly define the company’s reporting 
obligations.418  The contract can also provide penalties for breaches of contract, 
including fines, termination of the contract, and exclusion of the company from future 
bidding processes.419 
The idea to use contracts as regulatory mechanisms coalesces with the 
fluctuating needs of the industry and those who purchase its services.  It has the 
potential to provide ample oversight of the private security industry, and would be 
flexible enough to accommodate variations in deployment scenarios.  When seeking to 
devise a comprehensive domestic regulatory system to effectively hold PSCs and their 
employees accountable, policymakers need to keep in mind the key issues raised 
through the processes that other states have gone through to develop their own 
regulations for this industry.  These include the need to balance the military’s 
oversight over contractors with the outsourcing goal of eliminating government 
oversight and bureaucratic inefficiencies, the potential for legislative loopholes to be 
exploited through companies’ use of TCNs, and above all, the prospects for effective 
enforcement of any potential legislation.  Utilizing contract mechanisms in the manner 
suggested by Michael Cottier is a good solution that may help many states find the 
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“middle ground” between different regulatory schemes, and the prospect of using 
contracts in this way should – at the very least – be considered as a supplement to 
more standardized legal solutions.  Industry-wide standards provide yet another 
regulatory option that could successfully supplement – though not replace – domestic 
and international regulations, as discussed below. 
 
Prospects for Regulation Through Industry-Wide Standards 
 A historically-recognized alternative to strict legal regulation of industry 
behavior is the development of a laxer regulatory system that relies primarily upon 
industry self-regulation.420  Up through the 1980s in Britain, such a system was 
thought to be just as effective at regulating industry behavior as was a more legalistic 
approach.  This was mainly due to greater support of such a system within the 
business community, and therefore less resistance to regulatory measures.421  As noted 
above, the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) is pushing for 
the establishment of an independent ombudsman to adjudicate any alleged PSC 
abuses, under the rubric of industry self-regulation.  BAPSC leadership have argued 
that: 
 
. . . for the industry, regulation is a vital issue for several 
reasons.  Most importantly, it can enhance its 
respectability and legitimacy by putting its operations on 
a firm legal basis.  In order to create new markets and in 
order to increase their individual market shares the 
companies depend heavily on their public image.  This 
is particularly true for British PSCs who, unlike their 
U.S. counterparts, cannot rely on public contracts to 
remain in business.  The big and respectable players in 
the British private security industry – comprising 
perhaps 15 companies – are therefore keen to introduce 
regulation which may, in the long term, outlaw most of 
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the disreputable competitors that mar the image of the 
entire industry . . . Against this background, self-
regulation has become a viable and feasible option for 
the British industry, at least for the time being.  It can be 
argued that the industry understands itself better than the 
government and can therefore apply sanctions that are 
better targeted.422  
Such arguments are not unique to Britain, as the International Peace 
Operations Association (IPOA) in Washington, DC makes similar arguments for self-
regulation of the industry.  Serving as a trade association for U.S.-based – and more 
recently, international – private military and security firms, the IPOA was formed in 
2001 and now has thirty-eight member companies and its own ethical Code of 
Conduct to which its members must adhere, or else risk expulsion from the 
association.  While the Code is open to critiques that it is vague and idealistic, it cites 
specific concepts from IHL for the ethical conduct of warfare, and has survived eleven 
revisions in order to make it as comprehensive as possible.  Membership in the 
association is limited, as IPOA staff independently and extensively review the 
operating practices and contract history of each potential member to ensure that the 
firm in question will not tarnish IPOA’s reputation as an ethics-based trade 
association.  The IPOA Standards Committee, composed of officials from member 
companies and IPOA staff, is responsible for independently investigating infractions 
of the Code of Conduct alleged to have been committed by member companies or 
their personnel.  The Standards Committee is also responsible for determining an 
appropriate course of action if the company and/or employee in question is found 
guilty of the alleged abuse, ranging from requiring that the company fire the employee 
to expelling the company from the IPOA altogether.   
                                                
422 Andrew Bearpark and Dr. Sabrina Schulz, “The Regulation of the Private Security Industry and the 
Future of the Market,” in From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military 
Companies, ed. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lenhardt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), 
13-14. 
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This system is effective in terms of the market incentives that it creates for 
compliance with the IPOA Code of Conduct, as member companies benefit from the 
reputational effects associated with IPOA membership.  Membership in IPOA signals 
to potential purchasers of the companies’ services that these firms are committed to 
ethical operating practices, and that their activities and company practices have been 
independently and thoroughly assessed for compliance with ethical norms.  This is, 
quite simply, good for business – both for the supplier and the purchaser of security 
services.  IPOA member companies thus have an incentive to comply with the Code of 
Conduct and remain a member of the IPOA.  This is particularly true of those firms 
who intend to stay in business for the long-term, for whom reputation is crucial. 
Furthermore, at least a few IPOA member companies appear to have 
internalized the norms of ethical conduct outlined in the IPOA Code of Conduct over 
and above what is required by IPOA membership.  Such firms reflect these norms in 
their own company practices, making an effort to transform the industry into a model 
for ethical wartime practices.  For instance, EOD Technology, Inc. (EODT) went 
above and beyond what is expected of IPOA membership when they held their own 
internal symposium on ethical security practices in the Fall of 2007.  The event was 
titled the “Ethics Stand Down,” and was said to be part of EODT’s “continuous 
improvement process.”423  JJ Messner of IPOA, who attended the event, reflected that 
the very sponsorship of such an event, as well as the content of the panels themselves, 
made the EODT symposium an ideal towards which IPOA hoped all of its member 
companies would strive.424  The fact that member companies demonstrate 
compatibility with IPOA norms of ethical conduct – whether for public-relations 
                                                
423 Colonel Tom Johnson (U.S. Army, Ret.; Ethics & Compliance Officer, EODT Technology), in 
correspondence with the author, November 6, 2007. 
424 JJ Messner (Director of Programs and Operations, International Peace Operations Association), in 
discussion with the author, October 28, 2007. 
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purposes or because they actually internalize these norms – is significant, for it means 
that the IPOA operates through both market-oriented mechanisms and learning 
processes. 
Yet, as noted above, recent research on comparative regulation points out that 
regulatory failures do occur more often under lax regulatory systems relying solely on 
industry self-regulation than under stringent regulatory systems.425  Successful 
examples of self-regulation – outside of a more formalized regulatory system – are 
rare, and usually only occur in corporatist systems with few actors.  Indeed, when 
abuses do occur, the IPOA’s system reveals its flaws.  For instance, when Blackwater 
USA was under IPOA investigation following the September 2007 Nisour Square 
incident, Blackwater simply announced that it was putting its IPOA membership on 
hold: “We have decided to take a hiatus from the [association] . . . We, like many 
other organizations engaged in this type of work, are pursuing other aspects and 
methods of industry outreach and governance.”426  Though Blackwater has received a 
massive amount of media attention following this incident, very little of it has 
mentioned the company’s decision to withdraw from IPOA.  Thus, the reputational 
effects of IPOA withdrawal, at least with regard to a firm as large and influential as 
Blackwater, have proven in this case to be negligible.  Furthermore, the Code of 
Conduct and Standards Committee have no “teeth” in such situations, as there is 
nothing that IPOA can do to enforce the Code aside from expelling a company who 
refuses to abide by it – and clearly, in this case, expulsion was irrelevant. 
This is not to say that industry self-regulation is impossible or undesirable, but 
rather that it should be pursued in combination with a legalistic regulatory approach, at 
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426 August Cole, “Blackwater Quits Security Association,” The Wall St. Journal (October 11, 2007).  
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least as far as the U.S. case is concerned.  Both the BAPSC and IPOA are significant 
players in this process, and the system envisaged and developed by IPOA in particular 
might be effective with slight revision and the establishment of state structures to 
support it.  For instance, the IPOA Standards Committee has very few resources with 
which to investigate alleged abuses, particularly those occurring outside of U.S. 
territory.  If U.S. and foreign governments were to provide financial support to the 
IPOA and/or similar trade associations, as well as mandate that any government-held 
contracts for security services were only to be given to companies who were members 
of these trade associations, the self-regulatory schemes outlined here could be much 
more effective. 
 
Conclusion 
 There are clearly a multitude of options for those seeking to regulate the 
private security industry.  As this chapter notes, international and domestic criminal 
and civil legal mechanisms, contract mechanisms, and industry-wide standards 
enforced by trade associations are among the regulatory options being seriously 
considered at this point.  While each of these possibilities has promise, effective 
regulation is most likely to be brought about through a combination of these 
mechanisms used in tandem.  A comprehensive system of effective regulation would 
do much to remedy the detrimental impacts of the private security industry on military 
operations that are discussed in previous chapters of this study, particularly through its 
impact on PSC compliance with the legal and ethical norms and rules of Just War.427  
Furthermore, by holding PSC personnel accountable for their actions in civilian areas 
of combat-ridden regions, an effective regulatory system would improve local 
                                                
427 Again, it should be noted that such a system of regulation may prove to be so costly as to ultimately 
render PSCs uneconomical.   
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civilians’ perceptions of entire military operations, thus helping to win the “hearts and 
minds” that are so necessary to modern warfare.  Yet, despite the obvious importance 
of such a system, regulations alone are not sufficient to improve PSCs’ impact on 
military effectiveness.  In drawing conclusions for this study, the next chapter 
elaborates additional policy recommendations.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
Summary & Synthesis of Findings 
The preceding chapters have assessed the impact of private security companies 
on democracies’ military effectiveness and on their propensity to be victorious in 
conflicts across various deployment situations.  Chapter One places the issues at hand 
into the global historical and political context of mercenarism and the outsourcing of 
violence and other governmental functions.  From this contextual setting, it becomes 
clear that violence has been outsourced throughout history and across the globe in 
order to both supplement the capacity of state militaries and to allow states to distance 
themselves from normatively undesirable conduct.  The modern private security 
industry is similarly employed according to this logic of capacity and normative logic.  
Chapter One also outlines the study’s overall goals: (1) To compare different 
situations of privatized force employment in order to illustrate PSCs’ potential effects 
on military effectiveness, and, by extension, on the theory of the democratic 
advantage; and (2) To understand the different effects of structure and identity on the 
effectiveness of military forces composed of national armies combined with PSCs, 
with an eye to providing prescriptions for current U.S. policy.   
Chapter Two places these goals in a theoretical context, drawing upon relevant 
tenets of state theory, democratic advantage theory, and various theories of military 
effectiveness.  Chapter Two also elaborates upon the structure-identity debate in the 
social sciences, and this debate’s significance for the underlying determinants of PSC-
military coordination problems.  Using each of these bodies of theoretical literature, 
the chapter develops several hypotheses that are explored throughout the remainder of 
the study. 
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 Chapter Three’s analysis of historical cases of private and national force 
integration illustrates the potential for successful coordination between private and 
national forces when the appropriate structural boundaries are delineated.  It also, 
however, demonstrates the significance of both identity and structural variables in 
determining a hired force’s impact on military effectiveness.  Because both of these 
instances include infractions of the laws of war – or, in the Hessian case, the norms 
underlying what would later be indoctrinated in the laws of war – these cases provide 
insight into the question underlying the study’s four sub-hypotheses: whether ethical 
behavior in warfare is more likely to benefit military effectiveness than is unethical 
behavior.  The French Foreign Legion case, furthermore, raises the question of 
whether mercenary forces are more likely to violate IHL than are regular military 
forces, as it appears that the regular military was equally culpable in this case.  With 
regard to the democratic advantage, the fact that the cases in Chapter Three do not 
involve democratic actors allows them to provide interesting insights into the validity 
of democratic advantage theory itself.  The Hessian case in particular provides 
evidence to contradict the basic assumption of democratic advantage theory, for it 
indicates that both democracies and non-democracies can experience the processes 
that democratic advantage theory insists are unique to democracies.  
Chapter Four’s exploration of cases in which private security companies are 
deployed in place of a national military force depicts the ease with which democratic 
statesmen can involve their country in a foreign conflict, bypassing the electoral 
restraints on such involvement and thus decreasing the prospects that the state in 
question will enjoy the democratic advantage.  On the other hand, the chapter 
demonstrates that when involved in a conflict in place of a national military, private 
security companies can often have quite a positive impact on military effectiveness by 
benefiting the skill, responsiveness, and quality of the foreign forces they are sent to 
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assist.  This effectiveness can come at the cost of conducting the conflict in 
accordance with the international laws of war, however.  While it is difficult to 
conclusively prove that national militaries would be more likely to comply with IHL 
in every situation, one can – at the very least – reasonably conclude that the use of 
private firms to carry out traditionally military tasks carries with it the risk that these 
tasks will not be achieved in accordance with international laws of war, due to the 
relative dearth of public oversight of such deployments. 
In looking at the more recent situations of PSC-military co-deployment seen in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Chapter Five deconstructs PSC-military coordination problems.  
To do so, it assesses original and existing interview data to determine the relative 
salience of two competing explanations for such problems: the argument that they are 
caused primarily by structural variables, versus the argument that they are caused 
primarily by identity-based variables.  Chapter Five thus has two important theoretical 
contributions.  It contributes first to the military effectiveness literature by analyzing 
the causes and consequences of PSC-military coordination problems when PSC and 
military personnel are co-deployed.  The findings derived from this analysis indicate 
that PSC-military coordination problems, caused by a combination of structural and 
identity-related variables, lead PSCs to have a negative impact on the military’s 
integration, responsiveness, and skill when the two groups are co-deployed in the 
field.  Yet, by acting as (often well-equipped) force multipliers in such co-deployment 
situations, PSCs do have a beneficial impact on quality.   
Chapter Five’s second theoretical contribution speaks to the ongoing debate in 
the social sciences regarding structure versus identity, speculating that structural 
variables are causally prior to identity-based variables in situations of PSC-military 
coordination.  In other words, deployed private security company and military 
personnel turn first to the structure guiding their interactions when determining how to 
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coordinate, relying upon both perceived and actual identities when structural variables 
to guide their interactions are lacking or are indeterminate with regard to how those 
interactions should proceed. 
Finally, Chapter Six assesses the current state of regulation of private security 
companies and their personnel, as well as prospects for improvement in this regulatory 
system, with a particular focus on the U.S. case and regulations designed to address 
PSC abuses in the field.  This chapter examines multiple types of regulation designed 
to address such abuses, including domestic versus international regulatory options, 
civil versus criminal regulatory options, the need for adequate enforcement 
mechanisms to be included in any forthcoming regulatory measures, and the prospects 
for industry-wide standards to operate as a supplement to domestic and international 
regulations.  The chapter’s analysis concludes that all of these different regulatory 
options must be pursued immediately and in tandem with regard to the private security 
industry.  It also finds that domestic law provides a suitable preliminary model for 
effective regulation of the industry in the United States, whereas international 
humanitarian law and other countries’ domestic laws will require substantial 
restructuring in order to provide effective regulation and enforcement. 
Each of the preceding chapters contains findings that are intended to speak to 
audiences both supportive and critical of the value of PSCs.  Those taking for granted 
that PSCs are here to stay are most likely interested in the findings regarding how to 
use PSCs most effectively, many of which are elaborated in this chapter’s policy 
recommendations.  Meanwhile, those skeptical of the value of PSCs are likely most 
interested in two notable implications of the findings herein: (1) the strong critique of 
the democratic peace hypothesis posed by the evidence indicating that PSCs can and 
are being used by democratic leaders to avoid accountability to the citizenry for 
decisions to go to war; and (2) the fact that greater regulatory oversight of PSCs, as 
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recommended here, is potentially so costly of a “solution” to the problems facing the 
private security industry at present as to render PSCs uneconomical.  Both audiences 
hold important views regarding the private security industry, and this study therefore 
does not deign to choose one position over the other, seeking only to represent the 
facts accurately so that the reader may determine his or her own feelings regarding the 
inherent value of the industry.  To this end, the next section highlights the study’s 
main findings. 
 
Overall Lessons 
Five main lessons can be gleaned from the analyses of the preceding chapters, 
along with several related speculative findings deserving further research.  First, the 
case studies examined in Chapters Three and Four demonstrate support for H1, 
indicating that private forces can have the best impact on military effectiveness in 
situations where they are either structurally integrated into the military force alongside 
which they operate, or where they are deployed in place of a national military force.  
This is primarily because PSCs in such deployment situations have a positive impact 
on quality while avoiding a negative impact on military integration.  Tense PSC-
military relations are avoided, either through structural mechanisms that minimize 
resentment between the two groups, or through the deployment of only one group to a 
particular combat zone. 
Second, Chapter Five’s analysis of the PSC-military co-deployments in Iraq 
and Afghanistan shows significant support for H2, indicating that co-deployment 
situations have a negative impact on military effectiveness.  The robustness of this 
finding could be bolstered by further research involving cases other than OIF and 
OEF.  This is related to the first lesson discussed above, as co-deployment situations 
primarily have a negative effect on integration.  Such integration problems stem from 
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both structural and identity-based causes: among other structural gaps, a lack of 
adequate training pertaining specifically to PSC-military field interactions, and a 
doctrinal weakness in specifying and clarifying PSC personnel’s position in the chain 
of command, play a large role in exacerbating the military’s largely unfavorable 
perceptions of PSCs and vice versa.  The tense PSC-military relations stemming from 
such problems impact the entire co-deployed force’s integration, and relatedly, its 
responsiveness.  Co-deployment scenarios also impact skill negatively, both by 
hindering commanders’ leadership capabilities and by risking a decrease in soldiers’ 
motivation levels when deploying them alongside much higher-paid private 
contractors.  The fact that many soldiers see PSC personnel as patriotically motivated 
does speak to the possibility that PSC and military personnel are similarly motivated.  
However, PSCs’ higher wages and dwindling military retention rates in an era when 
co-deployment is common are enough to make one wary and to stimulate further 
research on PSCs’ overall impact on soldiers’ motivation levels. 
Third, the analyses in the preceding chapters demonstrate that PSCs have a 
largely negative impact on the democratic advantage across deployment scenarios.  In 
cases of PSC-military integration, PSCs provide a rationale for policymakers to 
continue their conflicts beyond the timeframe that would be allowed by solely relying 
on regular military forces.  In cases of PSC deployment in place of a regular military 
force, PSCs allow democratic policymakers to involve their countries in conflicts not 
approved by the electorate, thus making it less likely that the electorate will have any 
influence in “selecting” to engage only in those conflicts that the democracy is most 
likely to win.  This has a negative impact on the selection effects side of the 
democratic advantage.  Furthermore, such uses of PSCs – to avoid democratic 
accountability to the electorate – pose a serious challenge to democratic peace theory.  
Finally, in cases of co-deployment, PSCs act as force multipliers whose deaths do not 
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have to be reported in official casualty statistics, thus allowing policymakers to 
deceive the electorate in such a manner as to disrupt the electorate’s conflict 
selectivity prowess.  This, again, has a negative impact on the selection effects side of 
the democratic advantage.  Although PSCs do improve democracies’ military 
effectiveness in some cases, their negative impacts on democracies’ conflict selectivity 
tend to counteract any positive impact that they may have on the military effectiveness 
side of the democratic advantage. 
Fourth, as outlined above, Chapter Five’s examination of the underlying 
reasons for PSC-military coordination problems illustrates the fact that a combination 
of structural and identity-based variables are at the root of poor PSC-military 
coordination.  Drawing upon the OIF and OEF case study evidence, I speculate that 
structural variables are prior to identity-based variables in this regard.  This finding – 
although speculative – is significant for policy, for it directs policymakers to first 
develop adequate structural mechanisms to guide PSC-military interactions, and then 
to devise mechanisms to encourage the development of those identity characteristics 
beneficial to PSC-military relations. 
The case studies in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, by providing empirical 
support for H1a and H1c, illustrate another lesson deserving further examination: that 
PSC compliance with the laws of war benefits military effectiveness across the 
spectrum of deployment situations.  This preliminary finding provides support for the 
“hearts and minds” approach to civilian treatment in counterinsurgency warfare.  It 
should be noted, however, that the cases of the French Foreign Legion in Algeria and 
MPRI in Croatia provide limited support for the “draining the sea” approach to 
civilian treatment, as both provide evidence to support H1d.  Yet, the case of the 
Foreign Legion in Algeria only appears to support the notion that IHL non-compliance 
increases military effectiveness in the short-term, and it is difficult to establish a clear 
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causal link between IHL non-compliance and military effectiveness in the Croatian 
case. 
Finally, the fifth lesson evident in Chapters One through Six is that the state 
remains a prominent actor in force provision, despite the growth of the private security 
industry and its increasing involvement in traditional military activities.  The state 
maintains its prominence by maintaining state militaries, providing contracts to PSCs, 
arranging contracts between PSCs and other states (as the United States did between 
MPRI and Croatia, for instance), and devising and enforcing regulations pertaining to 
PSCs in the field.  Interview data examined in Chapter Five provide a preliminary 
indication that the professional jurisdiction of national militaries may not be 
exceedingly challenged by PSCs, as there appears to be a limit to the actions modern 
private security companies and their personnel will carry out for money, at least in 
some cases.428  Thus, these data allow us to speculate that PSCs will not infringe upon 
at least some professional military functions, therefore leaving open a continuing state 
role in the control of national forces.  Yet, as outlined in Chapter One, PSCs do appear 
to have a differential impact on weak versus strong states, particularly in terms of 
state-building activities.  By hindering the development of a viable bureaucratic 
apparatus in weak states – whether employed directly by the leaders of those states or 
by stronger intervening powers – PSCs can narrow weak states’ options for improving 
their systemic position in the long run.  Simultaneously, PSCs can provide strong 
states that wish to intervene in regional conflicts and/or less-developed areas of the 
world with an expanded range of options for doing so.  I speculate that PSCs therefore 
have significant potential to alter the systemic organization of states within the 
international system.  
 
                                                
428 Interview with high-level PSC official, January 24, 2007. 
 230 
Potential Future Research Agendas 
 Much potential for research on issues related to security privatization remains, 
beyond the issues and lessons highlighted above.  As Chapter Two notes, one 
interesting issue for future research relates to how a takeover of the military’s 
professional jurisdiction by the private security industry would impact civil-military 
relations, particularly in the United States.  When considering Huntington’s work, it 
would appear that this competition – if the end result were a decrease in military 
professionalism and a strengthening of the private sector’s professional hold over 
formerly military functions - could decrease objective civilian control over the U.S. 
military, thus harming civil-military relations in the United States.  A second line of 
inquiry related to this study’s theoretical underpinning would examine the significance 
of democracy-type for decisions to hire PSCs, questioning whether other “types” of 
democracies besides the United States and Britain are likely to hire PSCs or supply 
them to their allies, and whether democracy-type affects PSCs’ impact on the 
democratic advantage.  This line of inquiry would be difficult to research at present, 
given the dearth of available cases.  Yet, current trends seem to indicate industry 
expansion in the future, which is likely to increase the number of cases available for 
study and thus increase the value of such a research agenda. 
 Another relevant line of inquiry would examine PSCs’ overall impact on 
soldiers’ motivation levels, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.  Although 
the interview data presented in Chapter Five touches upon this issue, an entire project 
devoted to the topic would provide interesting additional insight into PSCs’ impact on 
the military’s skill. 
 Tactical-level research directions would also pose fruitful avenues for future 
research.  One such research agenda would examine the specific issue of how PSCs 
hiring third-country and/or local nationals impact efforts to integrate PSC and military 
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personnel in the field, and how they impact overall military effectiveness.  A 
particularly interesting and relevant case of study related to this line of inquiry is the 
U.S. military’s use of local nationals as private contractors (the so-called Sahwa) in 
the Iraq War surge at present.429  
Finally, one might endeavor to compare the effects of contracts completely 
undertaken by that state’s government, versus those contracts entered into in 
conjunction with an intervening power, on the civil-military relations of the state in 
which the action is taking place.  As the Papua New Guinea case in Chapter Four 
demonstrates, contracts to supplant the military that are completely undertaken by the 
government of the state in question may be more likely to generate professional 
competition between the PSC and the military than are instances in which such 
contracts are made in conjunction with an intervening state.  Additional studies and 
further research on this phenomenon are necessary in order to draw any solid 
conclusions with regard to this trend, however.  The next section of this chapter aims 
to translate the study’s theoretical lessons into clear policy prescriptions to help insure 
that future PSC hiring and deployment decisions are optimally situated to have a 
beneficial impact on military effectiveness. 
 
Recommended Policy Initiatives & Improvements 
As Chapter Five notes, the 2005 GAO Report on Actions Needed to Improve 
the Use of Private Security Providers in Iraq recommended that the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense enhance military procedures to reduce incidences of the military firing on 
security providers, and provide training to U.S. military forces on the role of security 
providers.  Yet, the 2006 follow-up report found that no action had been taken on the 
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development of a pre-deployment training program, and that PSCs continue to enter 
the battlespace without coordinating with the U.S. military.430  Since then, limited 
attempts have been made by both PSC and military representatives to enhance military 
training regimens, to little avail.  Both the International Peace Operations Association 
(IPOA) and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) of the Army 
War College have worked on this, but the best result of their efforts has been the 
inclusion of a role for “contractors” into military readiness exercises (MREs).431  
Notably, such measures only partially address the problem, only educating military 
personnel regarding contractors’ roles in the field and failing to educate PSC 
personnel or to provide pre-deployment opportunities for the two groups to interact 
outside of the “fog of war.”   
 The 2005 and 2006 GAO reports also focus heavily on the difficulties in 
conducting criminal background screenings when hiring PSC personnel, and the lack 
of U.S. or international standards for establishing private security provider and 
employee qualifications.432  While the GAO reports’ recommendations are substantial 
and represent a step in the right direction, they fail to highlight some of the 
information from the interviews conducted in preparing these reports.  A more 
comprehensive approach to reforming the nature of PSC-military interactions in Iraq 
(and elsewhere, potentially) would build upon the GAO recommendations while 
recognizing and correcting their shortcomings.  
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The establishment of a standardized pre-deployment training program for both 
PSC and military personnel is of primary importance, in order to teach each group 
their respective roles and responsibilities with regard to other actors in the battlespace.  
In the United States, the Continental U.S. (CONUS) Replacement Centers (CRCs) 
provide potential venues for such a training program – at least for U.S. citizens – as 
contractors, soldiers, and military civilians already come together at the CRCs for 
administrative processing and related tasks prior to deployment.433  Policymakers 
would need to establish similar programs at other venues in or near conflict zones, in 
order to ensure adequate training of local nationals and third-country nationals as well.  
Preferably, such training programs would bring together groups of PSC and military 
personnel for at least a few hours to conduct a training scenario in tandem, and would 
include both classroom and practical training.  Any PSC winning a government 
contract should be required to send all operators on its staff through such a program, 
although there should be variation in program levels to suit different “types” of 
contractors, given that PSCs use varying degrees of expatriates, third-country 
nationals, and local nationals in different security roles and positions.  For instance, a 
static site security guard should only be required to undergo a level of training relevant 
to his job, while personal security detail (PSD) contractors (i.e., bodyguards) should 
be required to undergo a higher level of training due to the relatively higher likelihood 
of attack and, relatedly, the higher capability required for his job.   
Furthermore, given that the GAO reports failed to take into account the 
question of what party would be responsible for funding such a training program, this 
study recommends that funding for training PSC operators be deducted directly from 
PSCs’ government contracts, with the contracting government covering the costs of 
                                                
433 Dr. Henry A. Zimon (Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired; Strategic Plans and Programs, MPRI) in 
interview with the author, April 2, 2007. 
 234 
soldiers attending such trainings.  Companies should also be mandated by the laws of 
the country in which they are based to require each of their operators to participate in a 
PSC-military joint training program, with the costs to be covered by the firm 
employing the operators.  This will ensure that the appropriate training reaches those 
PSC personnel operating under non-governmental contracts (such as, for instance, 
PSC personnel guarding pipelines for an oil company in Azerbaijan).  Because the 
passage of legislation on these issues may progress more slowly than desired, the 
Pentagon and other defense agencies worldwide may wish to pass rules mandating 
such training as an intermediate step prior to the passage of formal legislation. 
Related to this notion of Pentagon-mandated rules, it is necessary to establish 
clear, unambiguous military doctrine to guide PSC-military interactions, including the 
military’s responsibilities to PSCs in the field and vice versa.  For instance, the 
doctrine should highlight the need for PSCs to report their location to the military 
commander when in or traveling through his/her AOR, and should clearly define the 
chain of command with respect to contractors on the battlefield.  The doctrine should 
apply to all contractors on the battlefield, regardless of the companies employing them 
and the actors holding the contracts with those companies.  This doctrine must then be 
integrated into the pre-deployment training programs of both the military and PSCs, so 
that everyone is made aware of the rules.  While progress is slowly being made to 
institute these doctrinal changes, the pace of change needs to hasten in order to best 
insure that the growing numbers of PSCs accompanying military forces in modern 
warfare are improving – not detracting from – military effectiveness.  
Third, it is crucial to the success of military operations involving PSCs to 
standardize communications between the two forces.  Ideally, this would result in 
interoperable radios being distributed to all verifiable PSC teams operating in a 
military unit’s AOR.  Such a proposition is risky, however, given the nature of modern 
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warfare and the chance that insurgents or terrorists could penetrate PSC teams and 
thus intercept military communications.  At the very least, it is necessary to establish 
an enforceable rule making it mandatory for all PSCs operating in Iraq to participate 
in the Reconstruction Operations Center (ROC).  While such a rule was recently 
announced with regard to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the degree to which it is 
enforceable remains to be seen.  This trend must spread beyond the boundaries of Iraq 
as well, with the establishment of ROCs in all other theatres where PSC-military co-
deployment occurs, and a requirement that all companies and military units operating 
in those theatres utilize the ROC.  
Fourth, national legislation should be developed to require that any contractor 
employed by a U.S. government agency (or subcontracted thereto) require its staff to 
wear standardized uniforms with identifying insignia.  Many firms do require this of 
their employees, but others do not.  While some may see this as a trivial matter, the 
fact that uniforms allow military personnel to distinguish contractors from insurgents 
is extremely relevant to the issue of “blue-on-white” incidents and to overall PSC-
military communication, coordination, and trust.  Having to wear standard, identifiable 
uniforms will also bring PSC personnel one step closer to fitting the current IHL 
definition of “combatant,” thus helping to clarify the status of PSC personnel under 
the international laws of war.  As Chapter Five mentions, this is a structural change 
that will assist all PSCs in aligning their identities with those most likely to 
demonstrate operational professionalism.  On a related note, national legislation 
should be developed to mandate the use of armored vehicles, at least in all co-
deployment scenarios.  This will reduce the frequency of blue-on-white incidents by 
making contractors both more identifiable to friendly forces and less vulnerable to 
both enemy and friendly fire, and will better insure overall contractor safety. 
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 Several recommendations pertaining to the regulation of the private security 
industry are relevant here as well, as covered in Chapter Six.  The first of these deals 
specifically with international regulation of the industry, recommending that the states 
party to the Geneva Conventions convene a meeting to devise an additional protocol to 
the Geneva Conventions that would provide detailed guidance on how states and the 
international community are to regulate the private security industry.  At the very 
least, representatives at this meeting should revise existing IHL definitions of 
“mercenary” to account for modern private security actors.  Due to the confusion 
regarding PSCs’ classification under international law, the broad reach of the Geneva 
Conventions, and the transnational nature of the private security industry, this is a 
necessary and useful way to begin the project of international regulation of the 
industry. 
 Second, with regard to domestic regulation of the industry in the United States, 
U.S. policymakers should mandate the creation of a separate office within the U.S. 
Department of Justice, with the specific purpose of investigating and trying war zone 
contractors under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA).  The 
establishment of such an office would do much to remedy the problem of MEJA’s 
minimal case history, creating norms of MEJA enforcement that would build upon 
each other to establish a solid base from which to regulate PSC abuses in the field.   
 A third viable possibility for regulating PSC behavior and preventing PSC 
abuses in the field exists in the form of contract provisions, which could be used in a 
standard manner to regulate PSC behavior across various situations.  As Michael 
Cottier notes, contracting parties should use the selection criteria, obligations 
specifications, monitoring mechanisms, and sanctioning aspects of contracts and the 
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contracting process to regulate PSC behavior.434  As Chapter Six mentions, using the 
contracting process in this way would enable purchasers of PSC services to create 
market-driven incentives for private security firms to: (a) possess all required 
authorizations; (b) follow adequate procedures and standards regarding the hiring, 
training, and vetting of employees; (c) possess rulebooks and follow standard 
operating procedures; (d) have internal oversight mechanisms; and (e) be a member of 
a reputable trade association, such as IPOA.  Government oversight of companies and 
government agencies purchasing PSC services would enable the standardization of 
certain contract requirements across the industry and its range of services, thus 
standardizing regulation of the industry through market mechanisms.  Policymakers 
should take immediate steps to institute such a program, although limited government 
regulation of contract provisions at first may be the most efficient and effective means 
of instituting such a system.  A program that is established incrementally will allow 
policymakers to test out particular contract provisions on a small scale, and to make 
corrections to them if necessary prior to large-scale implementation. 
 Finally, on a related note, policymakers around the globe should allot 
government funding to support PSC trade associations in their respective countries.  
This will allow these trade associations to encourage the development of enforceable 
industry standards without the undue financial influence of those firms that the 
standards are designed to regulate.  If government regulations simultaneously push 
PSC purchasers toward hiring only those firms who belong to such trade associations, 
the result will be the efficient and effective use of government regulations to create 
market mechanisms – industry-wide standards verified and enforced by trade 
associations – for the regulation of the industry and of contractor behavior. 
                                                
434 Michael Cottier, “Elements for Contracting and Regulating Private Security and Military 
Companies,” ICRC Review 88, 863 (September 2006): 642. 
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